United Nations Development Programme

Empowered lives.
Resilient nations.

Revised Project Document – Amendment and Extension to August 2024

Regional Stabilisation Facility for Lake Chad

August 2021

Project Title:	Regional Stabilisation Facility for Lake Chad Basin (Amended and extended Phase)
Project Number:	00119216
Implementing Partner:	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Start Date:	1 September 2021
End Date:	31 August 2024
PAC Meeting Date:	30 July 2019

Brief Description

Countries of the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) have grappled with various forms of insecurity for decades. The LCB has witnessed acts of banditry, abduction, highway robbery and cattle rustling among other challenges that have historically and collectively plagued the region. Against the backdrop of these concerns, one of the most significant security challenges to confront the LCB remains the Boko Haram crisis. Failures of the State, socioeconomic and political gaps have created an environment for Boko Haram and its evolving factions to thrive and evolve. Boko Haram related insecurity has left tens of thousands of people dead, approximately 3 million displaced[1], and more than 10 million people in the region affected and in need.

While robust national and multi-national military operations have re-taken territory previously controlled by Boko Haram and factions, a new approach is required to consolidate these gains and establish the conditions necessary to transition from military to civilian responsibility for security. The RSF is a rapid-response mechanism that relevant authorities can sequence with military operations. The first phase of the Regional Stabilisation Facility concentrated on two results areas:

1. Immediate stabilization of specific areas, cleared of Boko Haram and other armed group control, but where communities remain vulnerable to continued infiltration and attack; and
2. Initiation of extended stabilization activities across the Boko Haram-affected States and Regions, through support, to implement the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) Regional Stabilisation Strategy.

The amended and extended Regional Stabilisation Facility builds on the results and lessons learned of the nearly first two years of RSF implementation, resulting in a clear 'proof of concept'. The extended phase will thus focus on increasing the scale of stabilisation by connecting, enlarging, or increasing the number of intervention sites. Stabilisation achievements will be consolidated, and the ground prepared for a handover to peacebuilding and development actors.

The Facility's overall objective is to improve the social contract in insurgency-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin. As in the previous phase, the Facility is divided in to immediate and extended stabilisation. Under the immediate stabilisation outcome 'Community stability and State presence increased in JAP locations,' which is at the centre of the first 18 months in each site, 3 outputs contribute to the expected results:

- Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP [Joint Action Plan] locations
- Essential social services infrastructure constructed and/or rehabilitated, functional, and accessible
- Targeted households provided with livelihood opportunities

The extended stabilization outcome– the 'post-immediate stabilization' phase – has 4 outputs with the aim to 'support local, national, and regional stabilization structures to oversee, coordinate, and implement stabilization and recovery efforts':

[1] Source: LCB Humanitarian Snapshot – 19 July 2021

- Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilization achievements and promote social cohesion
- Improved cross-border coordination and cooperation
- LCBC capacity developed to steer and support RSS[2] implementation and governance structures
- Improved LCBC coordination and oversight of TAP [Territorial Action Plan] implementation

The amended and extended phase of the RSF has furthermore a stronger focus on conflict sensitivity and gender.

Total additional resources required for the extended project period:	USD 300,000,000.00

Agreed by (signatures):

Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC)		**UNDP**
Ambassador Mahaman Nuhu Executive Secretary to the LCBC		Ms Ahunna Eziakonwa Regional Director, UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa
Date:		**Date**:

[2] LCBC Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin

Table of Contents

I. DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE 6

1.1 Security Context 6
1.1.1 Boko Haram's evolution and leadership ` 6
1.1.2 JAS and ISWAP approaches 7
1.1.3 Post-Shekau trends and implications for stabilisation - Scenario projection 8
1.2 Conflict Impact and Challenges 9
1.2.1 – Impact of the conflict in Nigeria 11
1.3 Regional Responses 11
1.4 The International Response 12

II. STRATEGY 13

2.1 Nature of the intervention 13
2.1.1 Achieving scale and an integrated approach 13
2.1.2 Speed of response 15
2.1.3 Coverage - the selection of target areas 15
2.2 Theory of change 16
2.3 An area-based approach 19
2.3.1 Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) 19
2.4 Liaison and cooperation with Security Forces 19
2.5 Winning the peace 20
2.5.1 Community engagement 21
2.5.2 Conflict Sensitivity and Doing No Harm 21
2.5.3 The imperative of a rights-based approach 25
2.5.4 Visibility and strategic communications 26
2.6 Promoting ownership and working in partnership 26
2.6.1 Communities and civil society 26
2.6.2 National and local government 26
2.6.3 Regional and continental institutions 26
2.6.4 The international community 28

III. RESULTS & PARTNERSHIPS 28

3.1 Result area 1 - Immediate stabilisation 29
3.1.1 Output 1.1 – Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP locations 29
3.1.2 Output 1.2 - Essential social services infrastructure constructed and/or rehabilitated, functional, and accessible 32
3.1.3 Output 1.3 - Targeted households provided with short-term livelihood opportunities 34
3.2 Result area 2 – Extended stabilisation 34
3.2.1 Output 2.1 – Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilisation achievements and promote social cohesion 36
3.2.2 Output 2.2 - Improved cross-border coordination and cooperation 37
3.2.3 Output 2.3 – LCBC capacity developed to steer and support RSS implementation and governance structures 38
3.2.4 Output 2.4 – Improved LCBC coordination and oversight of TAP implementation 42
3.2.5 Summarised RSF results framework 46
3.2.6 RSF alignment with and contribution to RSS implementation 54
3.3 Partnerships 61

3.4 RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS 61
3.5 STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 61
3.5.1 A focus on youth 61
3.5.2 Addressing the situation of women & girls 62
3.6 SOUTH-SOUTH AND TRIANGULAR COOPERATION 62
3.7 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 63
IV. PROJECT MANAGEMENT 63
4.1 COST EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS 63
4.2 THE PROJECT SET-UP 63
4.2.1 Offices 63
4.2.2 Four national teams 63
4.2.3 Regional coordination and support to LCBC 64
4.2.4 Project assurance and audit arrangements 68
V. RESULTS FRAMEWORK 70
VI. MONITORING, EVALUATION, LEARNING AND REPORTING 78
6.1 MONITORING 78
6.2 EVALUATION 78
6.3 REPORTING AND COMMUNICATION WITH DONORS 79
6.4 LEARNING 80
VII. MULTI-YEAR WORK PLAN ' 81
VIII. GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS 86
8.1 FUNDING MODALITIES 86
8.2 GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS 86
8.2.1 RSF Technical Coordination Committee 86
8.2.2 Partner Platforms 86
IX. LEGAL CONTEXT AND RISK MANAGEMENT 86
9.1 LEGAL CONTEXT STANDARD CLAUSES 86
X. RISK MANAGEMENT STANDARD CLAUSES 87
XI. ANNEXES 89
ANNEX 1 - PROJECT QUALITY ASSURANCE REPORT 89
ANNEX 2 - SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCREENING TEMPLATE 89
ANNEX 3 – RISK ANALYSIS 89
ANNEX 4 – TERMS OF REFERENCE REGIONAL TECHNICAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE 89
ANNEX 6 – TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE CSO PLATFORMS 92
ANNEX 7 – RSF COMMUNICATION STRATEGY 96
ANNEX 8 - COMMUNITY STABILISATION COMMITTEES – GUIDANCE NOTES 96
ANNEX 9 - SUPPORT TO LCBC KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 96

I. Development Challenge

1.1 Security Context[3]

Countries of the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) have grappled with various forms of insecurity for decades. The LCB has witnessed acts of banditry, abduction, highway robbery and cattle rustling among other challenges that have historically and collectively plagued the region. Against the backdrop of these concerns, one of the most significant security challenges to confront the LCB remains the Boko Haram crisis. Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria have all endured the impact of this violent extremist problem that questions the very existence of the State and its capacity and willingness to provide human security. The focus on conflict dynamics in the LCB is therefore to be understood as a critical examination of the wide spectrum of actors, structures and processes that spawn insecurity in the region while still placing centre stage the Boko Haram phenomenon and how it connects with other conflict or security dynamics.

The antecedents of the Boko Haram crisis can largely be traced to the failures of the State and the last decade underscores a context where Boko Haram factions have thrived and evolved through the exploitation of socioeconomic and political gaps. However, long before Boko Haram's emergence, the LCB countries set up the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) in the 1960s, initially to deal with environmental issues and later to coordinate efforts to address cross-border criminality. Over time, the same countries created the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the 1990s when the entity was then known as the Multinational Joint Security Force. The decision to create such a force to combat organised crime and banditry in the region had first been taken in 1994 and by 1998 it was effectively established. By 2015, deployment of the MNJTF was authorised by the African Union's (AU) Peace and Security Council. By this period, the regional character of Boko Haram was already evident and respective countries identified the need to bolster the efforts of the MNJTF with support from diverse community-based civil defence groups.

1.1.1 Boko Haram's evolution and leadership `

Although the group's violence intensified progressively since 2009, Boko Haram's origins date back to the 2002 period when its followers were referred to as the 'Nigerian Taliban'. Beyond this period, followers have more prominently been known as the JAS (Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad). Yet, like other violent extremist groups, Boko Haram has experienced shifts in its leadership and structure over the years. The first major change was in the 2009-2010 period when the late Abubakar Shekau assumed leadership following the death of the group's first leader Mohammed Yusuf. Shekau's grip on power is regarded as one of the longest so far in the violent extremism space and it has been the subject of several studies. Some of these enquiries have also drawn attention to the schisms within the group.

A typical case is that of Ansaru (Jama'atu Ansaril Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan), a faction of the group that broke away in 2012 due to the hard-line approach of Shekau. Although Ansaru's profile has remained inferior in comparison to Shekau's JAS, such rifts in Boko Haram have persisted. In March 2015, Boko Haram declared allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and by August 2016, the group splintered, and its breakaway faction was recognised as the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). At the time, JAS and ISWAP disagreed on ideological issues and the treatment of civilians.

[3] Content taken, with only minor changes, from a forthcoming ISS conflict analysis of the Boko Haram-affected area, commissioned by the RSS Secretariat, with funding from the RSF.

Evidence of internal tensions within Boko Haram were again observed in late 2018 when rival members within ISWAP killed one of the group's pioneer figures, Mamman Nur. Prior to this, however, was the recognition by ISIS of the leadership of Abu Musab al-Barnawi as ISWAP's leader from August 2016 to around March 2019 when someone known as Abdullah Ibn Umar Idriss al-Barnawi or Ba Idrissa became leader. In the first quarter of 2020, another ISWAP leadership under Lawan Abubakar or Ba Lawan sought to swiftly consolidate power by purging key members of the group's Shura council and with this move, Ba Idrissa was reportedly eliminated. Despite the leadership spasms of the group, perpetuation of attacks, interaction with (and disruption of) communities, as well as responses from security forces, JAS and ISWAP retained the ability to adapt and remain resilient.

Intra- and inter-factional conflicts are part of the dynamics that have moulded Boko Haram with inevitable repercussions for communities and stabilisation in the wider region. The death of Abubakar Shekau is a notable case in point and one which also demonstrates the role of external influences such as ISIS. Shekau's death in May was ordered by ISIS and the promotion of a global agenda that aligns with ISIS' slogan of 'remaining and expanding' by capitalising on the group's most vibrant franchise in Africa – ISWAP, has become more evident. With JAS currently undermined and members either affiliating themselves with ISWAP's new leadership under Abu Musab al-Barnawai or deserting and handing themselves to security forces, ISWAP is being restructured into four caliphates. These include Sambisa Forest, Alagarno Forest (or Timbuktu), Tumbuma and the Lake Chad islands, each with its own semi-autonomous leadership. All these are in Borno state, north-east Nigeria but tactically they provide operational bases for the extension of activities to other parts of Nigeria's north-east, as well as Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.

As part of ISWAP's consolidation, former Boko Haram fighters who left for Libya over the years for different reasons are now returning to the LCB to re-join ISWAP. Some of the returned fighters – Nigeriens, Nigerians, Chadians, and Malians – were part of the ISWAP team that attacked Sambisa in May, resulting in Shekau's death.

1.1.2 JAS and ISWAP approaches

From 2016 to date, and despite a five-year period of complex factional trends, the approaches of JAS and ISWAP are best analysed through three broad categories: geographic areas of operation, targets of assault, and relationship with local communities.

At different periods, a mix of locations in the four LCB countries have been under the influence of JAS and ISWAP. Influence in this sense entails territorial occupation or temporary hideouts, and in other instances, locations that the different factions find conducive for attacks. Following the splintering of Boko Haram in 2016, JAS was known to have retained a stronghold in areas close to the Sambisa Forest, extending to the southern and central parts of Borno in Nigeria. The location, however, did not restrict the faction's ability to launch attacks beyond this zone into neighbouring countries.

ISWAP, on the other hand, was observed more in the northern part of Borno near Nigeria's border with the Republic of Niger and the islands of Lake Chad. However, in some cases, the line demarcating each faction's area of influence became blurry, with each faction carrying out attacks in areas considered the stronghold of the other. For instance, ISWAP's foothold in Alargarno Forest in Damboa local government area, southern Borno, which is considered a JAS stronghold, saw the group carrying out attacks in that axis. Similarly, Bakura Doro, one of Shekau's top and most influential commanders, is based around the Lake Chad islands near Niger and has been credited with some deadly attacks on civilians, especially around the Diffa region.

In terms of assault targets, JAS was for a long time responsible for the use of suicide attacks by women and children. For the year 2019, the Global Terrorism Index identified the group as responsible for around 80 percent of global fatalities linked to female suicide attacks between 2013 and 2018. JAS also maintained an indiscriminate approach to the selection of targets. Civilians (including Muslims, women, elders, and children) and military entities were not spared. The Chibok abduction in April 2014 was a typical assault trademark of the JAS character of Boko Haram when Shekau was still in control.

ISWAP's perspective on attacks has been more measured. Although the faction was responsible for the mass abduction of over 100 schoolgirls in Dapchi in February 2018 (all of whom were released on the orders of ISIS, except the one Christian girl), the prime target of attacks has been State symbols, security forces, government officials, non-Muslim civilians, and humanitarian workers. ISWAP attacks have at certain periods portrayed audacity resulting in huge casualties as was the case when scores of troops of the Nigerian Army 157 Task Force Battalion were killed in Metele, Borno state in November 2018.

Rapport with communities also reflects some nuance in the positioning of JAS and ISWAP. Since 2016, ISWAP has differentiated itself from JAS through the development of strategy and tactics that mark it as potentially a more sophisticated and formidable opponent. Unlike JAS, ISWAP seeks to avoid unnecessary violence and exploitation against civilian populations, and has introduced a level of governance, including administration of justice, control of commodities and provision of social welfare. An April 2019 report by the Global Initiative for Civil Stabilisation (GICS) identifies the main success of ISWAP as its ability to effectively appeal to and co-opt local networks, while blending a globalist caliphate messaging with local grievances, competently using it to establish legitimacy in the eyes of local communities[4].

Changes in ISWAP tactics, growing concerns of coordination between the ISWAP and JAS factions, and external support from Islamic State and Al Qaeda, and the increased number of violent incidences since the last quarter of 2018, is raising fears that the security situation is once again deteriorating, and that urgent action is required to prevent a significant resurgence of the crisis.

1.1.3 Post-Shekau trends and implications for stabilisation - Scenario projection

Two scenarios, a minimum-to-moderate situation on the one hand, and an extreme situation on the other, can help to make sense of unfolding trends in the months ahead. In terms of the first, the death of Shekau has led to a reduced frequency of attacks on civilians, may create a context where the MNJTF has an opportunity to consolidate its capacity to launch counter-offensives that can weaken the ability of JAS' remnants and ISWAP to launch a major comeback. However, with the absence of Idriss Déby from the Chadian front, joint military efforts may not benefit from the strong push that the region witnessed in past onslaughts against Boko Haram's factions. Weakening Boko Haram will also depend on the political will of respective countries to act in a coherent and structured manner.

Attacks may continue but can be countered or prevented if the current window of opportunity is capitalised on in terms of governments taking urgent steps to plug governance gaps in affected communities that Boko Haram appeals to. A rebranded and stronger ISWAP relies on a recruitment campaign and part of this effort involves community buy-in through the group's 'welfare policies.' Therefore, stemming the tide of recruitment is possible if governments address deprivation factors that push communities towards violent extremism.

The second possible scenario which could take an extreme turn concerns the significant rise in the profile and strength of ISWAP in the region. With ongoing recruitment in communities, the integration of the rank

[4] Survival and Expansion: The Islamic State's West Africa Province, Global Initiative for Civil Stabilisation, April 2019.

and file of Shekau's JAS and the backing of ISIS, ISWAP stands to project influence through providing alternative governance structures, increased attacks on the military and some civilians. The prospects of establishing caliphates in Nigeria's Borno state are present and this will enable the group to administer activities beyond the northeast of Nigeria towards the broader LCB region. However, the threat does not stop here because the support of ISIS suggests an expansion of contacts and routes cutting across West and North Africa including Algeria, Libya, and Mali, to facilitate the movement of fighters.

This means that the outlines of the regional problem may enlarge, and this will have implications for a continent that is already reeling from the multiple effects of violent extremism linked to other ISIS affiliates in the Sahel, as well as groups such as al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa. The extreme scenario also means that increased attacks may trigger an even worse humanitarian emergency[5] in the LCB. In such a scenario, more livelihoods will be affected, and civilians may struggle to cope if measures are not taken to address the principal threat from Boko Haram. Overall stabilisation efforts will be delayed, and multi-stakeholder programming will be required to ramp up scarce (financial) resources for the region.

1.2 Conflict Impact and Challenges

For most in the region, military forces have been the primary interface between local communities and the State over the past decade. While in some areas the military remains highly regarded, in other areas operations have been characterized by a heavy-handed approach and serious violations of human rights. A culture of impunity and lack of accountability mechanisms continues to undermine national counter-insurgency efforts and inhibits international responses in support.

Economic and mobility restrictions imposed by the military, designed to block revenue flow to armed opposition groups, have in practice led to severe restrictions in freedom of movement, affecting a great deal of economic activity, including, inter alia, the use of motor taxis, the trade in certain types of food and fuel, access to land for farmers and pastoralists, and the operation of markets in more remote villages and towns. Commerce-related infrastructure has been deliberately targeted by armed opposition groups, and the closure of borders for security purposes has further constrained local economies and livelihoods while driving up the cost of basic commodities. Humanitarian aid has developed as a new domain of economic activity, creating new challenges of dependence, unpredictability and local 'war economies' that are becoming entrenched as the 'new normal'.

Displacement and demographic change exacerbate the challenge. Limited public services are concentrated in urban areas, and – in line with global experience –many of those displaced from rural communities are unlikely to want to return. The urban economy provides more diverse opportunities for the increasingly young workforce: over 0.5 million young people enter the labour market each year; 60% of them in North-eastern Nigeria. A lack of voice and agency of youth contributes to their perceived and real social marginalization. It seems likely that globalization processes, the spread of mobile phones and mobile internet connectivity, have played a role in transforming a mix of grievances about governance shortfall, corruption, political and social marginalization, and exclusion of certain groups, into a recruitment platform for violent extremism and armed opposition.

[5] As things stand, the humanitarian situation continues to be a source of concern; 2.8 million people from the Boko Haram-affected area are internally displaced; there are 260.000 refugees, and 10.5 million people are in need of assistance. 5.1 million people are struggling with food insecurity – the worst increase in four years – and 400,000 children are severely malnourished. Nigeria continues to be the epicenter of the crisis with 2 million internally displaced persons and 8.7 million people in need (Source: LCB Humanitarian Snapshot – 19 July).

The Lake Chad Basin has historically had a poor record of women's empowerment including low school enrolment, preponderance of early marriages for girls and poor participation of women in public life. The region's deep-rooted patriarchal norms, often codified in law and reinforced by socio-cultural institutions, have defined women's status through marriage and childbearing and confined them to gender roles that do not go beyond the domestic sphere.

The conflict has further exacerbated these discriminatory practices and increased insecurity for women and girls who have been victims of violence and abuse from formal and informal security providers as well as armed opposition groups. Sexual and gender-based violence is endemic across the conflict-affected regions. Harassment of women and girls has been reported in both IDP Camps and host communities, often in the course of conducting daily domestic chores such as fetching water or firewood or whilst using latrines and showers. With rampant hunger and malnutrition, displaced women are often forced to resort to negative coping mechanisms including survival/transactional sex to provide income for their families.

Rebuilding the social contract and regaining the trust of the population is a challenge that requires visible government effort, sustained community engagement, and improved accountability and transparency of security providers. While root causes of the conflict are many and varied, priority must be given to re-establishing the presence as well as the authority of the State: a 'peace dividend' of essential infrastructure and basic services, facilitation of access to livelihoods and the establishment of conditions for private sector development and job creation. The key focus must be on improving conditions for youth in general, and for women and girls, and to ensure that all activity conforms to a gender strategy with protection and empowerment at its heart.

A specific layer of complexity for the Lake Chad region is that it straddles four countries, two regional economic communities, two countries that are landlocked and two countries that invest more in the development of their coastal regions than their Sahelian interior. The region has huge potential as a hub for farming, livestock, and fisheries, not just in primary production, but also in the cross-border trade and services economy that links production areas to markets. Prior to the insurgency, Northeast Nigeria did more trade across national borders than it did with the rest of Nigeria. Nascent efforts to enhance cross-border cooperation to resuscitate and develop cross-border trade, within a broader common framework for addressing the root causes of the crisis, should be fully supported with appropriate advocacy, capacity development and resources.

The populations living in the Lake Chad Basin depend heavily on the Lake Chad for their livelihoods (i.e., access to water for farming, livestock rearing and drinking, fishing, hunting), but pressure on these resources is increasing significantly, because of intensified extraction and, more importantly, climate change. This has caused the shrunk of water surface over the past four decades (from 25,000 km² to only 2,500 km²), heavily impacting the economic activities and food security in the Lake Basin. It is expected that the reduced availability of water will further trigger conflicts between communities, who seek water for survival, and might therefore be more inclined to associate with Boko Haram to find alternative solutions for subsistence.

1.2.1 – Impact of the conflict in Nigeria

UNDP[6], based on the International Futures model[7], estimates that through the end of 2020, the conflict (in Nigeria alone) has resulted in nearly 350,000[8] deaths, with 314,000 of those from indirect causes, because of the conflict's physical and economic effects. Insecurity has led to decline in agricultural production and trade, reducing access to food and threatening the many households who depend on agriculture for income. Hundreds of thousands of Nigerians have been displaced from their homes, often meaning the loss of livelihoods, assets, and critical support systems. Moreover, displaced populations must often live in overcrowded and degraded living conditions without access to clean water and sanitation.

Young children, who are especially vulnerable to malnutrition and disease from a lack of clean water, are hit hardest. UNDP Nigeria estimates that more than 90 percent of conflict-attributable deaths through 2020, about 324,000, are of children younger than five. With another decade of conflict, that could grow to more than 1.1 million.

Conflict has been especially damaging to education, as schools have been targeted directly by insurgents. In 2020, UNDP estimates that 1.8 million students are out of school who would have been enrolled if not for conflict.

1.3 Regional Responses

Over the past two years, efforts to respond to conflict, humanitarian, and security challenges because of the Boko Haram insurgency has taken a more regional dimension- from a military to a more comprehensive effort involving political, development, humanitarian and peace actors operating in the Lake Chad Basin region. The MNJTF, which comprises military contingents from the four affected countries, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, plus Benin, have led the military offensive against Boko Haram.

Over the past year, the MNJTF has become more nuanced in approach. It has embraced a community centred approach and engaged in activities that promote and strengthen civil-military relationships. The establishment of the LCBC/MNJTF Civil-Military Cooperation Cell has also led to new initiatives such as the community civil-military dialogue and outreach. The MNJTF has also commended medication outreach to affected communities in the LCB region in collaboration with the United Kingdom.

In November 2020, the LCBC and MNJTF convened a workshop to develop strategic communication for counter-narratives against Boko Haram. The workshop led to series of community consultations and engagements that led to the development of a Communication Strategy for MNJTF. To strengthen its engagement with communities, the MNJTF has also put in place plans to identify and implement quick impact projects as a means of building strong bonds and winning hearts and minds.

The roll-out of the LCBC Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin in 2019 by the LCBC has led to the mobilisation of regional actions to fulfil the second phase of the MNJTF mandate. By establishing a common regional framework,

---

[6] Assessing the impact of conflict on development in North-East Nigeria, Taylor Hanna, David K. Bohl, Mickey Rafa, Jonathan D. Moyer, UNDP Nigeria, 2020.

[7] A systems dynamic integrated assessment tool, to compare two scenarios: a Conflict scenario that simulates conflict and its effects based on the best data and literature available, and a No Conflict scenario that simulates development in a counterfactual without conflict. By comparing these two scenarios, we can evaluate the conflict's direct and indirect effects.

[8] National data in Nigeria estimate total direct deaths in the BAY States at around 35,000.

the Strategy has galvanised humanitarian, development, and peace actors. As a result, around 32 UN and Non-UN humanitarian and development actors support the Lake Chad Basin Commission to implement the RSS through the Regional Task Force of Implementing Partners and the Cluster working Groups. In addition, through collaboration with various HDP actors, the LCBC has developed some regional policies that will be presented to Member states for adoption and initiated regional studies that would inform policy programmes and policy development at both regional and member state levels.

The LCBC has activated a series of regional dialogue and coordination structures that support cross border interaction between affected government, civil society groups, and communities. Platforms such as the Governors' Forum and the LCBC Civil Society Forum has served as spaces for cross border discussion and proposition of joint stabilisation initiatives. Since 2019, the LCBC has also elevated its level of political engagement at the regional level and strengthened political cooperation with the African Union, UNOWAS, UNOCA and United Nations Resident Coordinations in the four affected countries, all of which are members of the RSS Steering Committee. So far, two Steering Committee meetings of the RSS were held in 2019 and 2021 with high-level participation from the key national government, regional and international actors demonstrating commitment to the RSS as the regional strategy for the LCB region.

1.4 The International Response

As the crisis in the Lake Chad basin evolves, international actors continue to advocate for a "New Way of Working" that promotes humanitarian, development, and peace nexus and ensures the collaboration of different layers and levels of society in the LCB region through an "Whole of Society" approach. Responses have led to improvements in some of the affected communities but require improved coordination, cooperation, and collaboration between different actors in the region (state and non-state). The international response in the region since 2019 has been in the form of political cooperation, programmatic interventions, and security cooperation.

In May 2020, the United Nations Executive Committee held on the Lake Chad Basin crisis called for coordinated international response to the crisis and urged the United Nations entities, particularly, UNOWAS, UNOCA and ECOWAS, ECCAS, and the AU to mobilise collectively towards the implementation of the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience.

The political engagement at the international level has also led to policy and technical collaboration with the United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF) on Boko Haram. On July 24, 2020, the IATF extended an invitation to the Lake Chad Basin Commission to participate in the regular meetings of the United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF) on Boko Haram. The participation of the Lake Chad Basin in the IATF has also shaped the nature of international attention and support through the RSS framework by allowing the discussion on the crisis to go beyond the provision of humanitarian assistance. Development and peace actors have mobilised different levels of support in the past two years to tackle the crisis through various entry points. In early 2021, the European Union renewed its commitment to the MNJTF and committed to providing additional financial support to the MNJTF through the African Union.

The international community continues to provide support to the region through the International Support Group (ISG). At the 2019 Steering Committee of the RSS, it was agreed that the Oslo consultative group would transform into the International Support Group to provide political, financial and advocacy support to the Lake Chad basin countries. Few members of the International Support Group, Germany, the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the EU are currently RSF donors.

II. Strategy

2.1 Nature of the intervention

The strategy of the amended and extended Regional Stabilisation Facility builds on the results and lessons learned from the first two years of implementation. The UNDP stabilisation 'pilots' in the four countries have delivered a UNDP stabilisation "proof of concept". The three main areas of intervention during the immediate stabilisation phase (see Section 3.1 *Result area 1 - Immediate stabilisation*) therefore remain, with a few indicative activities added to ensure more comprehensive interventions.

At the explicit request of the RSF Regional Technical Coordination Committee, the strategy has a stronger focus on the extended stabilisation ('post-immediate stabilisation') phase (Output #2.1, see Section 3.2.1) to a) consolidate the support provided to the JAP locations and b) prepare the ground for the implementation of the peacebuilding and development objectives outlined in the Territorial Action Plans. Of essence for consolidating the stabilisation interventions is to simultaneously advocate, firstly, for Government and, secondly, for peacebuilding and development actors support to build on the foundations provided by the stabilisation intervention.

On the first point, UNDP will obtain national and local government commitment to a) maintain the rehabilitated infrastructures; b) ensure the provision of security; and c) provide the staff and equipment required to provide services during and after the JAP implementation phase.

On the second point, the UNDP Resident Representative will close liaise with the Resident Coordinator who plays a central role to ensure UNDP stabilisation support is sequenced with UN peacebuilding and development programming aimed at the implementation of the TAPs.

Besides the focus on extended stabilisation, the strategy proposes a significant increase in the scale of stabilisation programming (see next section) hand in hand with a more modest outlook on what immediate stabilisation can achieve in the short to medium term (alas a stronger focus on extended stabilisation and ensuring government ownership).

2.1.1 Achieving scale and an integrated approach

As described in the previous section, UNDP, based on lessons learned from nearly two years of RSF implementation (resulting in a clear 'proof of concept'), considers the time is ripe to increase the scale of stabilisation by a regionally, nationally, and locally suitable combination of three types of scaling-up:

- By connecting JAP locations[9] (through road and bridge rehabilitation or construction);
- By enlarging the JAP locations; and
- By increasing the number of JAP locations.

While the size and number of JAP locations is important, connectivity is equally important to achieve stabilisation objectives. Decisions on resource allocation (by the National Window Platforms) should therefore strike a balance between the size and number of JAPs on the one hand, and re-establishing trade routes by connecting JAPs[10] (to the extent possible in cross-border areas) on the other. This is also in line with the actions proposed in the TAPs, which call for increased cross-border interactions and cooperation.

[9] The selection of JAP location is outlined in section 2.1.3 (*Coverage – the selection of target areas*).
[10] Which, among others, also depends on the capacity of the four Governments to provide security along the trade routes.

A gradually expanding network of connected localities will contribute to increasing the resilience of target areas and communities to renewed take-over attempts from Boko Haram and thereby ensure delivery against the overall stabilisation target.

Delivering a stabilisation programme *at-scale* (i.e., with a higher budget and presuming the security situation allows) facilitates simultaneous stabilisation programming focusing on all desired results (i.e., larger and more areas of stability, connecting trade routes and cross-border stabilisation programming).

At-scale programming also reduces the potential pressure on host communities[11] (in JAP locations) as internally displaced people and refugees move into the relatively secure but (much) larger and more numerous JAP locations[12].

While it has always been central to stabilisation programming, at-scale programming will depend even more on national Authority leadership and requires an increase in Government capacity to deliver, among others, in terms of the provision of security, ensuring the provision of services in rehabilitated social and productive infrastructure, and road and cross-border infrastructure rehabilitation. It will also require an ever-closer involvement of Community Stabilisation Committees who will gradually take over responsibility for social and economic exchanges between communities.

If resource mobilisation were to significantly increase (among others through national government cost-sharing, IFI funding, private sector financing and diversified bilateral funding), UNDP would a) need to further boost its operational and procurement capacity and establish service centres, à la Maiduguri, in Cameroon, Chad and Niger[13]; and b) increase the presence of programmatic or third party staff across an increasingly larger territory for more effective representation, real time analysis, mentoring and monitoring.

Stabilisation of fragile zones can only be achieved when interventions are indeed implemented rapidly enough and with sufficient resources to prevent further deterioration of the security situation. The capacities, management arrangements, operational processes and activities of stabilisation initiatives need to be designed accordingly and coordinated closely with national stakeholders as local, provincial, and national levels. Moreover, the implementation at scale and speed in highly insecure environments comes at a cost. It requires capacities fully dedicated to the task, and necessarily leads to comparably higher management ratios.

As mentioned in the previous section, coordination with national and international actors[14] working in the conflict-affected areas is important as several of the activities envisaged under immediate stabilisation support are already under implementation by other actors although often uncoordinated or small-scale. The RSF will aim to increase the impact of these efforts by delivering the activities in an integrated way and *at*-scale, in close coordination with the actors present and, where recommendable, funding these actors to implement the interventions[15].

---

[11] As stated in the MTR report: "This could have implications on the internal stability of these locations if the services, infrastructure, and livelihood opportunities are not adequate to support the growing populations within the JAP locations".
[12] The paragraph refers to secondary displacement. If IDPs and refugees return to their place of origin, stabilisation objectives are met.
[13] Alternatively, for particularly complicated procurement, the National Windows can request support from the Dakar-based Regional Service Centre.
[14] If present… In some JAP areas, such as the Far North in Cameroon or Diffa, no or very few stabilisation, peacebuilding or development actors are operating, turning the RSF and its implementing partners into the sole support provider.
[15] This could be a CSO/NGO, public or private sector partner contracted to support the implementation of livelihoods or social cohesion activities.

2.1.2 Speed of response

In areas where security is re-established, the RSF must move at speed to consolidate military gains and re-establish civilian control. Failure to move quickly risks alienating, or even endangering, local populations and losing the ideological struggle against extremism.

The RSF will act as a rapid-response mechanism that relevant authorities can sequence with military operations, to ensure immediate follow-up in specific locations and curtail the ability of armed opposition groups to re-infiltrate and exploit any security vacuum or community perceptions of non-responsive Government. The need to move at speed, however, must still be balanced by a commitment to minimum levels of participatory planning and preparatory assessment if the overall goal is to be achieved.

UNDP's previous experience in stabilisation validates the agency's ability and agility to facilitate quick and reliable delivery. UNDP has acquired institutional capacity and in-house know-how to put in place special measures with dedicated operations support for the RSF, which will support expedited processes while ensuring transparency, value for money, accountability, effectiveness of partnerships and quality assurance.

2.1.3 Coverage - the selection of target areas

Representatives of the formal security forces, state Government representatives at the different administrative levels, and UNDP Regional Stabilisation Facility staff will work together to prepare a Joint Action Plan (JAP) for each target area no more than six weeks after date of selection. UNDP will ensure inclusive community participation (through the CSCs) in the formulation process of the JAPs. Successful implementation of the Joint Action Plans should increase the space and improve conditions for the work on 'extended' stabilisation, as defined in the Territorial Action Plans[16].

JAPs will specify implementation arrangements, timelines for delivery, and budget allocations per activity for each target area. Each Joint Action Plan will be accompanied by Letters of Agreement between UNDP and relevant actors specifying roles and responsibilities and providing the contractual basis for disbursement of funds. The delivery of each Joint Action Plan will be subject to on-going internal monitoring by Facility staff in each State team.

The Head of the RSF and UNDP seniors should ensure that the various JAP locations selected make sense from a larger *regional* and *national* stabilisation[17] lens, agreed between UNDP, the respective Governments, national and international security forces, and the RSF donors.

While the ambition is to prioritise JAP locations along important trade routes and on the borders of the four countries, the security situation may oblige JAP selection in locations close to each other (creating increasingly larger ´islands of stability') to facilitate the provision of security.

Sine-qua-non criteria for JAP location selection are:

- The JAP location is selected and endorsed by the national and local government (in line with the national and MNJTF military strategy); and

[16] While JAPs can indeed contribute to and provide the foundation for TAP implementation, it is important to realize that a) TAPs cover a much larger territory (province or state) and b) TAPs, besides stabilisation, also plan for peacebuilding and longer-term development interventions.
[17] As opposed to, among others, a "needs-based" lens.

- Government (national, state, and local) short- and medium-term commitment for security provision to protect communities and implementing partners during and post the immediate stabilisation phase.

Important *additional* selection criteria for JAP locations are:

- Commitment by national and local authorities to maintain investments over time and guarantee staffing of rehabilitated infrastructure;
- Relevance from a stabilisation point of view, i.e., from a political perspective, considering the need for cross-border stabilisation;
- Strong formal and informal authorities in the target area (or clear indication of authorities' willingness to return);
- Community willingness to participate in stabilisation activities;
- Place of high return, local integration, or resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees and willingness of refugees and IDPs[18] to return to target location;
- Access and feasibility of implementation within existing budgets;
- Conflict sensitivity, i.e., an assessment that stabilisation activities can be delivered in a conflict-sensitive manner that does not (inadvertently) exacerbate local, national, and cross-border tensions and conflicts; and
- An 'in-principle' willingness of UN and other peacebuilding and development actors to provide post-immediate stabilisation support, should the security situation improve, bringing the risks down to manageable levels for these non-stabilisation actors.

2.2 Theory of change

Before outlining the RSF Theory of Change and what the RSF aims to achieve (i.e., the level of outputs, where results should be significantly or, at the very least, partially attributable to RSF supported interventions) or aims to contribute to (i.e., the level of outcomes, where results can only be partially attributed to RSF supported interventions), it is important to emphasise the stabilisation *sine-qua-non*: security in target communities.

While the requirement of securitization[19] of sites as a precondition for stabilisation must be central to UNDP's engagement in any location, all RSF partners know that 'risk-free' stabilisation interventions do not exist in the Lake Chad area due to, among others, the unpredictable nature of the insurgency.

An essential element of the stabilisation approach, therefore, is one of partnership with and leadership of one key actor: the State and the security forces it commands, including the police´s increasing role in security provision as the situation normalises.

Given the importance of this partnership, the ambition of the stabilisation programme therefore depends on a) the capacity of this partner to provide security across an (presumably) increasingly large territory and

[18] It is important to clarify that UNDP will support IDPs in their place of *voluntary* return, local integration or resettlement but will *not* facilitate the return or resettlement process from current location to final destination, nor will UNDP support forced returns.

[19] An important point for ongoing discussion is what a 'secure environment to initiate stabilisation interventions' means. There is no easy answer to this question and decisions will need to be made on a 'JAP-by-JAP' basis, in close coordination with the national and local authorities; the national and regional security forces; and the communities involved

b) the degree to which the stabilisation programme itself can help improve community security (for example, through improved early warning systems) and reduce the pressure on formal security forces.

The genesis of UNDP stabilisation programming took place in a gradually expanding *post*-conflict territory as insurgents were pushed back and eventually no longer held territory. Stabilisation in most areas of Lake Chad is different as it often takes place *during* conflict.

Besides, one opponent, ISWAP[20], is increasingly more sophisticated in the way it operates:

1. ISWAP is reducing attacks on civilians, providing security and some basic services to communities with the objective to create goodwill in communities.
2. Simultaneously, ISWAP is increasing attacks on the symbols of the State with a view to reducing State presence in the territories where it operates and replacing the State with four khalifates.

At the time of writing, national security forces have no or limited control over several areas in the Lake Chad area. Stabilisation, therefore, can only take place in some parts of the territory, with the provision of security practically everywhere a challenge. Among many others, the lack of security requires an ongoing presence of the military in many stabilisation areas and implies only a limited handover of security provision to the civilian law enforcement agencies can take place.

> "Stabilisation is a timebound, localised, integrated, civilian programme of activities with the primary purpose of extending State presence by:
>
> - Establishing minimum security conditions;
> - Essential infrastructure and services; and
> - Livelihood opportunities…
>
> …necessary to re-establish the social contract, lay the foundations for peace and allow longer-term social cohesion and development processes to achieve momentum and impact."
>
> UNDP´s approach to stabilisation emphasises that not all problems can be addessed during the stabilisation phase, a point also made in UNDP´s 2017 stabilisation stock-taking report, which advises against over-ambitious stabilisation objectives.
>
> For UNDP, stabilisation is a political tool that aims to "keep the momentum going" and lays the foundation for longer term development and peace. It should do-no-harm and be initiated after a comprehensive (and subsequently continuously) updated conflict analysis and due diligence on human rights.

The RSF Theory of Change for stabilisation of the Lake Chad area should therefore set out modest and realistic goals and focus on re-establishing and maintaining State presence as the basis for an improved social contract (providing security and other essential services) and supporting the establishment and continued functioning of early warning systems with the involvement of all local actors to reduce the pressure on the national and regional military forces and allowing those to secure more territory as the foundation for an improved social contract between the State and its citizens.

In line with UNDP´s definition of stabilisation, the organisation will support the establishment and reinforcement of State presence by focusing on security in communities, rehabilitating essential infrastructure, and the provision of essential services and livelihood opportunities.

As mentioned earlier in this amended Prodoc, stabilisation is likely to become more effective when it covers a larger territory, i.e., if scale can be achieved, while maintaining security, the impact on the economy is bound to be more significant and State-led services become easier to provide.

[20] See ISS analysis in Chapter I.

Although stabilisation programming may serve to prevent the recurrence of conflict, it is unlikely it will eliminate the root or structural causes of conflict that are of critical importance in many long-standing civil wars and conflicts. As such, activities that address the latter should be undertaken as part of broader peacebuilding and recovery programmes. Stabilisation can only provide the foundation and the first steps in this kind of programming (such as the establishment and consolidation of community stabilisation committees).

While stabilisation interventions are localised, the role of the national Governments should *not* be underestimated. The allocation of staff and budget for security and essential service provision is fundamental to stabilise the area of intervention in the short-, medium- and longer-term. UNDP country office senior management should therefore consistently engage with the national Governments to advocate for the allocation of resources (staffing, equipping and infrastructure maintenance) for stabilisation.

Summarising, the RSF´s Theory of Change should be modest in what it aims to achieve (outputs) and contribute to (outcomes and desired impact) and should avoid setting ambitious goals more apt for peacebuilding, recovery, and development programmes. It should, however, be bold regarding the scale at which stabilisation programming needs to take place.

Based on the above, the RSF Theory of Change is outlined below.

If…

- …a comprehensive and simultaneous set of stabilisation interventions (on security mechanisms, rehabilitation of social and productive infrastructure, on provision of essential services and livelihood support) is provided…
- …community stabilisation committees facilitate inclusive government-community cooperation…

And assuming that …

- …national, and regional security forces maintain security in the JAP locations and surrounding areas (providing the much needed access for stabilisation actors) …
- …the Government (national or sub-national) allocates and maintains sufficient civilian administrators and law enforcement personnel in the JAP locations…
- …enough financial resources are available to deliver the stabilisation programme at-scale…
- …an understanding exists between stabilisation, recovery, peacebuilding, and development actors on the continuation of support after the foundational stabilisation interventions…

Then…

- …security in communities is reasonably restored…
- …citizens in JAP locations access essential social services, such as health and education…
- …the local economy is boosted, and people have short- and medium-term livelihood opportunities…

And ….

…the foundation is laid for a handover to recovery, peacebuilding, and development actors…

…the foundations will have been laid, and modest progress will have been achieved towards improving the social contract…

2.3 An area-based approach

In line with UNDP's global experience and lessons learned, UNDP views stabilisation as geographically contained, targeted at areas where a multi-sectoral approach can have maximum impact on the lives of individuals at the community level.

The LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy, and the Regional Stabilisation Facility herein, are designed to take an area-based approach.

2.3.1 Territorial Action Plans (TAPs)

The implementation framework for LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy comprises a set of eight Territorial Action Plans (TAPs), prepared under the authority and guidance of the national Governments through a devolved mechanism that allows Governors to provide direct oversight and coordination.

Whereas JAPs are focused on immediate stabilisation of target areas within States/Regions, the TAPs will focus on rationalising and coordinating the process of extended stabilisation, within and across the eight States/Regions of the Strategy as a whole. Even though the JAPs focus on immediate stabilisation, the new JAPs will aim to contribute to the TAPs by identifying actions under the TAPs that are linked to immediate stabilisation.

2.4 Liaison and cooperation with Security Forces

> "*The stabilisation process, however, cannot be achieved by security responses alone; there is a pressing need to better manage the interface between military and civilian actors in the sub-region, to allow increased humanitarian access and a civilian-led stabilisation process that can complement and build upon military efforts, allowing security forces to focus on their primary responsibilities."*[21]

An essential criterion for JAP location selection is the commitment by the Government to maintain security in the location, among others to facilitate government-led improvements of social services, the restoration of livelihoods activities and to provide access for local, national, and international organisations to operate.

The alignment between MNJTF and national governments' security plans and restoring security in areas selected for stabilisation investments is considered a *sine qua non* condition for stabilisation project initiation. Civilian organizations cannot function effectively or bring their specific expertise without the security provided by security forces. All JAPs should therefore include a component (or an annex) on security provision.

UNDP liaison and cooperation with security forces, therefore, is a core task in stabilisation programming. The liaison function:

- Analyses, jointly with national and regional security forces, whether they can provide security in the JAP locations, allowing to initiate stabilisation projects.
- As stabilisation programming starts, liaises continuously with relevant security forces, local authorities, and communities on security related matters, in line with the government commitment to ensure security in proposed sites.

[21] LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy, page 21-22

- Advises on establishing and maintaining the security in communities during all stages of the JAP process.
- Facilitates coordination between security forces and the community.

Specifically, UNDP staff responsible for liaison and cooperation with security forces will:

- Engage with all relevant actors for effective security liaison in JAP locations.
- Maintain links with humanitarian actors and projects, attending CMCoord meetings whenever possible, nurturing bilateral relations with CMCoord Officers as well as Protection and other humanitarian clusters and sectors as appropriate.
- During coordination activities, consistently emphasise the different nature of liaison and cooperation with security forces vis-à-vis humanitarian CMCoord.
- Respect other agencies' (particularly humanitarian agencies) different mandates and their ways of doing business. While there is potential for friction and competing agendas, these should be addressed by the Head of the Stabilisation from the outset.
- Consistently seek to understand the political and security context through constant analysis of regional developments, of conflict drivers, ways to mitigate harm to populations and reputational risks to UNDP.
- To the extent possible, monitor national security strategies, military plans and assess security implications and risks for stabilisation projects.
- Ensure the respective UNDP stabilisation teams initiate and maintain a dialogue on security matters with humanitarian, peacebuilding and development communities, UN system, civil society, international and local NGOs (essential for a variety of other reasons too, such as the stabilisation programme exit strategy).
- Participate in structured and regular information sharing and early warning mechanisms through involvement with communities, including women, considering their particular security threats and concerns.

2.5 Winning the peace

The Lake Chad insurgency developed from, and is sustained by, communities alienated by decades of development neglect and marginalisation. It is considered necessary to *'win the peace'* to win the war. The RSF, and the Regional Stabilisation Strategy it serves, seek to contribute to a renewal of the social contract between the State and the population around Lake Chad.

The breakdown of the social contract needs to be understood as a multi-faceted phenomenon that has moved beyond the critical relationship between the State and the citizen, and – because of the conflict – is also manifesting itself in suspicion of traditional rulers, often seen as complicit in the war economy, in an epidemic of drug abuse amongst young people, and alienation from older generations, and in widespread sexual and gender-based violence.

2.5.1 Community engagement

The selection of the JAP locations is a decision made by UNDP, national and regional civil authorities, security forces, and RSF donors, driven by the selection criteria outlined earlier in the document[22], and based on the RSS and national stabilisation strategies in line with the RSF Theory of Change.

Once locations have been decided, the RSF, jointly with the national and local authorities and the security forces, will continue to actively engage communities in the design and implementation of the JAPs, among others, through a close coordination and empowerment of the Community Stabilisation Committees and similar mechanisms.

Stabilisation planning, however, is unlike planning for longer-term peacebuilding and development programming, given the fluid and fast changing nature of conflict dynamics and security, and may require rapid decision-making that cannot always be fully inclusive of local partners.

2.5.2 Conflict Sensitivity and *Doing No Harm*[23]

The RSF teams will integrate conflict analysis and sensitivity in programmatic decision-making for the reasons outlined in Table 1.

The leadership of the Head of the RSF and the Heads of the National Windows is vital for integration to occur and avoid 'box-ticking' combined with a lack of linkage between conflict analysis and stabilisation programming adaptations.

Table 1. The use of conflict analysis by the RSF Regional and National teams

Purpose	Explanation	How this helps the RSF
Contextual understanding	*Structured* conflict analysis enables deeper understanding of contextual dynamics, focused on drivers of instability and potential factors of resilience	Ensures local knowledge is not lost and can be shared (with new staff, staff in other locations, donors, etc). Can be used in programme documentation (rather than generating new material), also creating consistency across documents Documented conflict analysis also provides a 'time capsule' of RSF understanding at that time, which can later be used to explain why certain decisions were taken.
Conflict sensitivity	Helps programme teams ensure that *all* activity minimises negative impacts and maximises positive impacts on conflict	All RSF activity needs to be conflict-sensitive – and without a shared understanding of core conflict dynamics, it is hard to do this in a systematic fashion.

[22] A more comprehensive Guidance Note for the LGA and RSF is under preparation. This includes guidance for engagement with government endorsed non-state security providers.

[23] Responds, among others, to MTR recommendation #13: "UNDP and donors should re-evaluate how conflict sensitivity and risk management are incorporated into every aspect of the RSF. At a minimum, this should include staff capacity and mechanisms for scenario and contingency planning, detection and mitigation of risks and negative outcomes at every level. This should also include a reporting plan and mechanism for informing the necessary UNDP staff, donors, and other appropriate stakeholders when incidents occur.

Purpose	Explanation	How this helps the RSF
	dynamics (even when this is not the primary goal of an activity)	For senior managers and donors, documented analysis provides (partial) reassurance that the RSF is acting in a conflict-sensitive manner
Targeting of delivery	Helps to identify which areas of work RSF prioritises.	RSF cannot achieve full stabilisation on its own – it is a *contribution* to a wider process; conflict analysis can be used to ground decisions on which factors RSF focuses on in each location it supports.
Monitoring, evaluation, and learning	Data and insight from conflict analysis can be used to improve or set baselines. Regular analysis helps to track progress – and may also highlight any key changes which need to be considered.	Results frameworks should be adapted in line with new insights (see next box on adaptive management). This helps programme staff to focus on activity that is most likely to support stabilisation and avoid doing harm.
Adaptive management	Using analysis to respond to changes in context, conflict dynamics and/or our understanding of what is required, to a) change delivery modalities, while sticking to the same overall goal; or b) change the objectives of (some) activities, since analysis shows that there are now different needs and priorities.	Avoids the risk of 'doing the same thing regardless' – programming can be more targeted to individual locations, change and adapt over time, drop activities which are not contributing to stability, etc. This also provides reassurance to partners that the RSF is a dynamic and flexible programme.
Operational security management	Keeps programme staff and other stakeholders safe through dynamic management of security risks.	Conflict data and analysis can be shared and compared with operational security data and analysis, which will strengthen both processes.

The RSF Regional and National Windows will use three simple conflict analysis tools[24] to ensure the practice is integrated in programmatic decision-making:

- A checklist for analysing drivers of conflict and insecurity.
- A one-page diagram which brings together conflict drivers and other information across different themes and geographical tiers, helping to show how they interact
- A 'tracker table' of key drivers

Checklist for analysing drivers of insecurity

The idea behind the checklist is to help teams and decision-makers, including those drafting Joint Action Plans, to review drivers of (in)security quickly and systematically: much of this information is already captured in Action Plans, but this checklist both ensures that nothing is overlooked and provides a framework for summarising the drivers.

For each of the factors below:

[24] These tools will be road-tested in more depth in the coming months. It is expected that the tools may need further refinement to best suit the varied needs of RSF teams at different levels and locations. The emphasis of road-testing will be to create simple tools that can be used effectively by busy, non-specialist staff.

- How far do they generate tensions between different groups?
- How are the following factors affected by conflict?
- Do these answers differ for men, women, boys, and girls? Are there gender-specific issues?
- How do they support resilience and social cohesion?

Economy & livelihoods

- Regional: Cross-border trade (and obstacles); regional economic cooperation mechanisms (LCBC); climate change & natural resource management
- National/sub-national: General economic situation
- Local: Main livelihood opportunities; impact of population displacement (from/into the area); gendered disaggregation of livelihood opportunities and challenges; Impact of the climate crisis and natural resource management.

Security

- Regional: Extremist actors; MJNTF; international support for security
- National/sub-national: national defence and security forces (incl. border security); liaison between security forces and civilian actors on security; justice; organised crime groups; gendered disaggregation of security challenges and perceptions
- Local: non-state armed groups (e.g., vigilante or other community defence groups); formal and informal justice systems; security of displaced populations & relationship with 'host' communities; history of intra- and inter-community tensions/conflicts (frequency, causes, responses)

Basic services & governance

- Local: Perceptions of local government vs. national government; Quality of services (and related infrastructure) compared to other parts of the country; relative level of attention/support given to the region compared with other parts of the country; (perceptions of) corruption and abuse of power; gender equity in service delivery

Social and cultural factors

- Regional: cross-border relationships/kinships
- National/sub-national: Demographics (such as youth bulge)
- Local: intra- and inter-community tensions/conflicts; religious factors; Prevalence of and attitudes towards gender equality; and SGBV

1-page diagram on conflict drivers across themes and geographical tiers

The diagram below aims to draw together any of the key points identified through the checklist above into a one-page diagram, which can provide a reasonably simple way of visualising the different dimensions of conflict and instability. The outer, cross-border dimension has been partly filled out, on the expectation that this would not change substantially between different national/sub-national (Territorial Action Plan level) and local (JAP level) contexts. Conflict drivers at the different geographic levels and within the various categories are interconnected and can have a complex impact on the situation in the JAP locations.

Tracker table

Table 2 (with a few rows filled in to provide an example) should provide an accessible format which can be updated regularly by the conflict advisor and National Window teams and shared more widely with decision-makers and those providing oversight. The table lists the core factors of

instability/conflict/resilience, explains succinctly why these are of concern, outlines how they directly or indirectly relate to the RSF, and provide a simple analysis of whether current trends are improving, declining or stable. If one driver has an important impact on the trend of another driver it will be noted and monitored.

As such, this tracker table would also link closely to MEL activities, as it provides core insights both into areas where RSF aims to have a specific impact and into the wider security situation in target locations.

Figure 1. One-page diagram on conflict drivers



Table 2. Sample tracker table

Factor of instability /conflict/resilience	Explanation (why this is a factor)	RSF relationship to this factor *(targeted by RSF, e.g. in JAP/TAP? conflict sensitivity concerns?)*	6-mth trend	Explanation for trend rating
Economy and livelihoods				
(e.g.) National and regional trade	Regional trade routes disrupted by BH, damages economy and causes fear	Not directly working on trade routes, but local stability in key trading towns should help to rebuild trade networks.	↓	Further attacks on key trading posts, reduced volume of trade

Factor of instability /conflict/resilience	Explanation (why this is a factor)	RSF relationship to this factor *(targeted by RSF, e.g. in JAP/TAP? conflict sensitivity concerns?)*	6-mth trend	Explanation for trend rating
Security				
Civ-mil cooperation on stabilisation & development	Weak/no mechanisms for coordinating 'hard security' responses to BH with longer-term plans to build stability through socio-economic development	At JAP level, RSF is facilitating stabilisation committees. At national level, engagement with national authorities on long-term stabilisation policy and planning.	↑	Some local stabilisation committees already operating effectively.
Basic services & governance				
Lack of educational opportunities	Education largely stopped due to fleeing teachers and damaged infrastructure; stops families from returning	JAPs helping to rebuild schools and return/relocate teachers; needs additional funding from government to remain sustainable	↑	7 schools in the area have now been rebuilt, all teachers have returned, lessons began again on 1 September, attendance is higher than pre-2014
Social & cultural factors				
Religious tensions	Despite historically good relations, anti-Muslim rhetoric increasing in some communities in response to BH threat	Not directly targeted by RSF but need to be sensitive to such tensions and engage with different religious groups in 'balanced manner'	→	No major incidents, but occasional examples in JAPs communities of anti-Muslim rhetoric or discussion of incompatibility of Christian and Muslim ways of life

2.5.3 The imperative of a rights-based approach

A rights-based approach to combating extremism is not just a moral imperative, but at the heart of smart counter-insurgency tactics.

Security responses by military forces, police or vigilante groups that pay insufficient respect to human rights, including SGBV, risk alienating stressed communities, feeding narratives of radicalisation, and undermining their own objectives. Winning the Peace requires the highest possible levels of accountability of its actors, to mitigate cynicism and to reassure all stakeholders as to the integrity and efficacy of every aspect of the national and regional effort.

The Facility will support human rights monitoring and reporting in the target areas, as part of a broader effort to promote accountability and compliance with all international and continental norms and standards that nurtures relations of trust and confidence between security providers and local communities (see Activity 1.7). If not already achieved, the RSF National Windows will advocate for the respective National Human Rights Commissions' close involvement in human rights monitoring and

reporting. Where feasible, the National Window team will facilitate liaison with national security forces on human rights training and violations.

The Regional Stabilisation Facility will implement the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) and ensure proper mitigation mechanisms to identified human rights related risks, ensuring, among others, that implementation does not in any way legitimise institutions or leaders that have been associated with egregious violations of human rights. The HRDDP framework will be used to assess national security actors prior to engagement, establishing the concrete involvement of local human rights actors and actions necessary to build their capacities.

2.5.4 Visibility and strategic communications

Please refer to Annex 7 for the RSF communications strategy.

2.6 Promoting ownership and working in partnership

2.6.1 Communities and civil society

The Facility will work with local communities through the Community Stabilisation Committees or similar structures to ensure an inclusive, participatory gender and age-balanced approach that reflects community views and responds to community needs.

UNDP will mobilise traditional and religious leaders; 'organic intellectuals' respected by their peers; and women and youth to a) participate in the formulation of the JAPs; b) support the implementation of interventions for immediate stabilisation as defined in the JAPs; c) participate and lead dialogue forums to ensure community 'buy-in' and voice in the JAP process; and d) actively facilitate the Facility monitoring regime and community satisfaction surveys.

The inclusion and empowerment of civil society in JAP implementation is essential to ensure a) the use of RSF funding is directed towards achieving stabilisation outcomes as opposed to being directed for political convenience, b) for human rights monitoring and c) more in general, to promote accountability and transparency in Governments' service delivery.

2.6.2 National and local government

National ownership is the foundational principle upon which implementation of Regional Stabilisation Strategy initiatives, such as the RSF, resides.

Regarding civil-security forces liaison and cooperation, the RSF does not provide financial or other material assistance to the military[25]. The Facility relies upon national military forces to propose and implement military security activities of the proposed Joint Action Plans, to keep target areas secure while the transition to civilian law enforcement and community-organised security arrangements is undertaken.

2.6.3 Regional and continental institutions

The LCBC prepared the Regional Stabilisation Strategy at the request of the Member States concerned. The commitment and responsibilities of Governments to the fulfilment of the Strategy is expressed through

[25] Unless endorsed on a case-by-case basis by UNDP New York and the RSF regional project board.

their membership of the LCBC Council of Ministers. The LCBC Member States approved (on 30th August 2018) and the Peace & Security Council of the African Union endorsed (on 5th December 2018) the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy.

The LCBC, with support of the African Union, will service a Steering Committee to oversee implementation of the Regional Strategy through the RSS Secretariat. The RSF funded RSS Secretariat staff, particularly the Head of the RSS Secretariat will concentrate on supporting the Executive Secretary of the LCBC and his team to strengthen ties with relevant national authorities and other donors. An enhanced political engagement with these authorities is important, as state presence in and increased budget for the Boko Haram-affected areas (including border areas) is of essence in the fight against violent extremism.

The Peace & Security Council of the African Union considers the Strategy an essential step for the Lake Chad Region in realizing the visions outlined by the African Union's Agenda 2063 and the United Nations' Agenda 2030.

The AU-mandated Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) operates under the overall command of the LCBC. The MNJTF remains a critical force in enhancing the security response to the crisis, particularly regarding the strengthening of cross-border collaborations among the crisis-affected countries. Under the Regional Stabilisation Strategy, a joint LCBC-MNJTF Civil Military Cooperation Cell has a particular focus on planning, sequencing, and coordinating initiatives for extending humanitarian access, for the safe cross-border return of refugees, and for the secure opening of borders in support of human mobility and cross-border trade, following bilateral Government agreements to do so.

Building on UNDP-AUC collaboration in facilitating the consultation process and drafting of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy, UNDP's primary partner in supporting capacity development of LCBC to implement the Strategy will continue to be the African Union.

In addition to the AU Liaison Office in N'djamena, responsible for political cooperation and coordination with the AU-mandated MNJTF, the AUC has established a technical Coordination Unit for Lake Chad Stabilisation, based in Addis Ababa to support the Secretariat, and ensure political cooperation between the LCBC and Office of the Chairperson and various departments of the AUC especially the department of Political Affairs and Peace and Security.

The Regional Stabilisation Strategy notes the key role that Regional Economic Communities (RECs) play in ensuring that sub-regional frameworks complement rather than duplicate or conflict with regional frameworks agreed upon in the context of the AU. As such, the Facility will work with LCBC and the AU to ensure that ECOWAS, ECCAS, CEMAC and EUMOA are all appropriately engaged in activities for coordination and harmonisation via their participation in the RSS Steering Committee.

The Lake Chad Basin Governors Forum for Regional Cooperation on Stabilisation, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Development[26] will serve as the primary mechanism for cross-border cooperation as well as domesticating implementation of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy, with a view to ensuring that synergies across the sub-region are leveraged, and that cross-border and transboundary solutions to the crisis are effectively explored.

[26] The Lake Chad Governors Forum was inaugurated in May 2018, as an initiative of the Government of Germany-funded UNDP Project, *Integrated Regional Stabilisation of the Lake Chad Basin (Phase I)*.

2.6.4 The international community

The RSS Secretariat supports the LCBC Executive Secretary to engage at the political level in the four countries on the RSS. The International Support Group (ISG) exists in support of the RSS.

A technical level working group of the ISG and the RSS Secretariat supports the Political level interaction between the ISG and the leadership of the LCBC. The technical working group of the ISG and RSS Secretariat will meet regularly to review progress on RSS implementation.

RSF donor countries and institutions are members of the RSF Regional Technical Coordination Committee (the project board at the regional level) as well as the National Window Partner Platforms, i.e., the national project boards.

Also, RSF donors and the UNDP RSF team have established RSF Technical Committees, which in some cases include government representatives, to ensure regular interaction between RSF donors and UNDP at the technical level; to review RSF progress toward milestones and results at both regional and national levels; and to provide any immediate adjustment or recommendation based on new data and evidence.

III. Results & Partnerships

As described in the Theory of Change, the RSF will contribute to improving the social contract between the State and its citizens in insurgency-affected areas of the Lake Chad area through targeted stabilisation interventions.

Besides providing targeted stabilisation interventions in the Boko Haram conflict-affected areas, the RSF will support extended stabilisation process by providing the resources and expertise to the LCBC RSS Secretariat to oversee, facilitate, and advocate for the implementation of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy.

To consolidate the gains made in the immediate stabilisation phase and transition into the extended stabilisation phase as planned under the TAPs, the RSF National Window teams will continue their support (through an additional Output #2.1) to the actors in the JAP locations after the initial 18-months (immediate stabilisation) phase to ensure:

- A well-planned handover of activities to the respective local Government.
- Advocate for ongoing support from national and international peacebuilding and development actors.

The different conditions pertaining in each of the four Lake Chad countries, and indeed between States and Regions within countries, as well as the dynamic nature of the conflict, requires a staged approach to be taken to the implementation of the indicative activities.

This Chapter details the RSF´s contribution to the outcomes, delivery of the outputs and implementation of the indicative activities. The immediate stabilisation outcome, outputs and indicative activities are further detailed in the amended National Window project documents, which seek to customise the approach to the specific context in the affected states and regions in the four countries, for approval by the respective Partner Platforms.

Finally, the precise mix of activities necessary for immediate stabilisation of JAP locations will be determined during the preparation of the Joint Action Plans.

3.1 Result area 1 - Immediate stabilisation

Outcome 1 of the RSF (immediate stabilisation), builds on UNDP lessons from the first two years of RSF implementation and ongoing UNDP stabilisation work in Liptako-Gourma, Iraq, Libya, among others. The results area sets out three areas of stabilisation support that the RSF will deliver in an integrated way to provide the basis for successful stabilisation. The three areas are summarised in the remainder of this section:

- *Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP locations* - Establishing a) public confidence in the State security and justice umbrella and b) functional, community-driven early warning systems is a prerequisite for the stabilisation of the Lake Chad region. Improved liaison and cooperation with security forces is intended to achieve a joined-up approach between the RSF, security forces, and Governments at the State/Region level to provide security in communities and, where feasible, to establish a sequenced transition from military to civilian control in the selected JAP locations. The RSF will support extension of the civilian law enforcement umbrella – police, judiciary, and customs authorities – and develop non-lethal capacities of community security providers to defend against infiltration and attack by armed opposition groups (see Output 1.1 in section 3.1.1).
- *Essential social services and infrastructure constructed and/or rehabilitated, functional, and accessible* – Besides the provision of security, reinstating regularly functioning services is perhaps the single most likely factor that can render communities liveable and renew the social contract between communities and the State. Sub-national authorities and UNDP RSF staff and implementing partners will work together with community representatives in the JAP locations to define needs and design response packages (see Output 1.2, section 3.1.2).
- *Targeted households provided with livelihood opportunities* - To consolidate the peace, affected areas must be made 'liveable' through improved ability for people to generate income and sustain themselves. The Facility aims to provide targeted households in the target area access to immediate income earning opportunities and minimum income, to address acute levels of poverty, to counter radicalisation and recruitment processes, and to kick-start recovery of the local economy (see Output 1.3, section 3.1.3).

3.1.1 Output 1.1 – Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP locations

Improving physical security for the communities around Lake Chad is fundamental to re-building their trust in Government and a prerequisite for making investments in infrastructure, services, and livelihoods. In new JAP locations, the first step is to map the security forces present and those required to secure the location.

The great variations in security conditions prevailing in the affected States and Regions bring to the fore the need for customised JAPs (including a security component) that respond to local perceptions and realities. For this, the JAPs need to be based on a people-centric, inclusive, and participatory approach to security. Local communities need support and empowerment to define their own security needs and, as much as possible, to address these themselves.

Indicative activity 1.1.1 - *Strengthen stakeholder relationships and collaboration with security forces (military, law enforcement agencies, government recognized community security groups) at community, district, governorate, state, and national levels).*

Liaison and cooperation with regional, national, and local security forces is essential for a variety of reasons. Among these are the need to develop sequenced and coordinated JAPs that:

- Outline the key components of the required security interventions;
- Mobilise and regulate the contribution of the security forces;
- Ensure capacities and resources are provided to and by them; and
- Timelines for implementation are established and respected.

Military authorities, national and MNJTF, will need to be closely involved in the planning process, to provide security while the presence and capacities of civilian security actors is enhanced, and to support key aspects of implementation, such as assessment and clearance of explosive ordnance contamination.

In many places, trust in the police is limited, and needs to be built over time. Often communities have more confidence in vigilante groups, which are central to the setting-up of early warning systems because they know the surrounding area and have the community´s trust.

All engagement with non-UN security forces at national and regional and local levels must be guided by the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. Engagement with Government endorsed, Non-State Armed Groups needs to be assessed and decided by the respective National Project Board on a case-by-case basis taking also into account risks of human rights violations.

Indicative activity 1.1.2 - *Advocate for an increased presence of security forces in JAP locations.*

The RSF will engage Ministries of Interior and police authorities at the State/Region level to plan and implement increased law enforcement presence in communities. Law enforcement agencies will need to recruit, train, and deploy new officers in a timely fashion. Where needed, the RSF will support the rehabilitation of new police stations, accommodation for officers, for training and for vehicles, communications, and specialised non-lethal equipment.

UNDP will liaise with the relevant civilian security providers in each country to ensure the cooperation, necessary for re-establishing effective law enforcement presence in the selected target areas materialises. Agreements will cover the roles and responsibilities of each security provider to recruit, train and equip and deploy the necessary staff, and to increase the gender balance and alignment with applicable gender strategies and good practice.

Engagement with vigilante groups should only take place if the engagement is endorsed by a) the national Government, b) UNDP RBA senior management and c) the respective National Project Board. The engagement should be based on a thorough risk assessment prepared by the UNDP Country Office through a transparent process and in line with UNDP corporate guidance on engagement with Government endorsed Non-State Armed Groups. Following the risk assessment and respective approval processes, vigilantes may receive training to develop their non-lethal capacities, including on human rights and SGBV, to enhance community security and to avoid causing harm to those they are charged to protect. Support to vigilantes should also be contingent to the Government's willingness to adopt a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration strategy.

Indicative activity 1.1.3 - *Construct, rehabilitate and equip security and justice infrastructure (Police, Gendarmerie, Courts etc.).*

In the selected JAP locations, and based on the approved JAPs, the RSF will construct or rehabilitate any security or justice-related infrastructure with designs compliant with international standards and the specific protection needs of women and girls.

The RSF will procure any vehicles, uniforms, communications, and other non-lethal equipment that may be required (by the police, gendarmerie, and courts), according to common specifications in each country. Based on the specifications established, UNDP stabilisation procurement staff will prequalify contractors to fulfil requirements of the Joint Action Plans to be developed for each target area.

The RSF will not rehabilitate or equip infrastructure, unless the national and local Government have committed to staffing and maintaining the infrastructure.

Indicative activity 1.1.4 - *Establish inclusive Community Stabilisation Committees (or similar structures).*

In every JAP location, the RSF will support the establishment or strengthening of community engagement structures on a participatory, inclusive (gender and age-balanced) basis. The aim is to ensure the representation of all segments of the community in decision-making on the design of the intervention overall and to guide its implementation on the ground (ensuring that it meets the specific needs and priorities of women, girls, and at-risk of recruitment community members).

Community engagement mechanisms, among many others, will have an important role to play in the establishment of a network of early warning and response systems.

In some JAP locations, it is likely that similar committees already exist in some form, supported by other projects or programmes. Wherever this is the case, the RSF will work with and build on what already exists rather than establishing new structures or mechanisms, while paying attention to gender balance and inclusivity in the composition of their membership.

An inclusive and participatory approach is vital to address several human security priorities of the immediate stabilisation process. Communities themselves need to be mobilised and supported to find culturally appropriate remedies to the prevalence of psycho-social trauma, the epidemic of sexual and gender-based violence in the region, and widespread drug abuse amongst the young, which is claiming many lives around Lake Chad and has become a key issue between generations.

Indicative activity 1.1.5 - *Strengthen community-level security mechanisms and support the establishment of early warning systems*.

Further to Section 1.2 and with the absence of effective safety and security at the community level, vigilante or other community groups have in many places provided the link between the security agencies and communities, and the functions that vigilantes often perform – perimeter security, patrolling and static guard duties, intelligence gathering etc. – remain vital components of the community security architecture.

Working in close coordination with the formal local, national, and regional security forces and the Community Stabilisation Committees, the RSF will assist in setting-up, providing training, including on human rights and SGBV[27], and equipping early warning systems that will prepare the communities for possible Boko Haram attacks.

RSF supported early warning systems are above all communication tools, which allow for the participation of informal security forces (often at the margins of the legal systems), a crucial actor in the security system. Informal security forces are the eyes and ears of the local authorities and the RSF will help to strengthen communication between them and legitimate security actors. Initially created to combat Boko

[27] Support to informal security forces will be based on the National Window Platform endorsed risk assessment. and approvals.

Haram incursions, communities now use the early warning system to also prevent other types of threats, such as natural disasters.

Indicative activity 1.1.6 - *Develop security forces' capacity and understanding on human rights, including SGBV.*

Human rights violations by security providers are toxic to the overarching effort to rebuild the social contract, and to isolate and defeat the insurgency.

The RSF will continue to advise and train security forces on human rights, including SGBV, and civilian protection, including development of tools and manuals for military personnel, law enforcement officials and other practitioners on the implementation of international standards, and establish a mechanism and forum for pre-deployment training and refresher programmes on human rights, international humanitarian law and civilian protection during operations for personnel of all security agencies.

Indicative activity 1.1.7 - *Monitor and report on human rights and civilian protection in JAP locations.*

The RSF will support human rights defenders´ visibility and regular presence on the ground in every target area for two main reasons. Firstly, to hear and record community grievances, inform about human rights, and advise where to seek assistance. Secondly, to ensure that all security providers – military, police, Government-endorsed vigilante groups – operate to the highest possible standards of behaviour in respect to the local population.

The RSF will support civil society human rights organisations (and if requested, National Human Rights Commissions) to:

- Establish operational presence in the target areas;
- Ensure access for all, including women and girls; and
- Undertake ongoing monitoring and quarterly reporting detailing individual incidents and summarising the human rights situation in general.

The produced monitoring reports act as early warning and document violations and atrocities. The information can be used to later show if a determination of war crimes or crimes against humanity can be made before it is too late to respond.

Indicative activity 1.1.8 - *Where relevant, remove explosive ordnance and other remnants of war and provide mine risk education.*

While not relevant for all JAP locations, if present, removal of explosive ordnance is a priority for the initiation of stabilisation activities. JAP locations require a technical assessment of contamination by mines, IEDs and other explosive war materiel, and type and difficulty of clearance operations required.

For this indicative activity, the RSF will partner with UNMAS or specialised national or international NGOs for both removal and mine risk education.

3.1.2 Output 1.2 - Essential social services infrastructure constructed and/or rehabilitated, functional, and accessible

In Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon, RSF Service Centre procurement staff will continue to identify and pre-qualify building contractors from the affected States and Regions. In Niger, where and when possible, the Governorate of the Region of Diffa will mobilize the State Technical Services at the regional and departmental levels, and will continue to design, rehabilitate, and construct social and productive infrastructure as outlined in the JAPs. Niger's RSF Service Centre will provide the necessary support to the

Governorate of Diffa, including in the procurement process as may be deemed appropriate by the Country Office.

The RSF will continue to pre-qualify contractors to provide:

- Overall design, preparation of bills of quantity & primary-level supervision;
- Construction and rehabilitation works; and
- Secondary-level supervision and monitoring where access is restricted for UN staff (otherwise to be carried out by RSF Engineers directly).

All RSF projects included in the JAPs are subject to the respective Government´s agreement to:

- Mobilise and maintain the necessary civil servants; and
- Commit to the recurrent costs of continued maintenance and delivery of the services (such as the payment of supplies and salaries of teachers and health care workers)[28].

Local authorities will consult with Community Stabilisation Committees in deciding on infrastructure rehabilitation and priority service provision[29] in JAP locations.

Indicative activity 1.2.1 - *Construct, rehabilitate, and equip essential public services infrastructure and facilities (administrative, health, WASH, and education), including accommodation for staff.*

The JAPs outline the required construction, rehabilitation and equipping the RSF will undertake in line with international standards.

The RSF will not rehabilitate or equip infrastructure, unless the national and local Government have committed to staffing and maintaining the infrastructure.

Indicative activity 1.2.2 - *Support basic skills training of local government officials.*

The RSF will provide basic capacity development and operational support to local Government officials to ensure the running of newly restarted or extended essential public services. Support may include on-the-job training and provision of necessary minor equipment as necessary. The RSF will advocate for the inclusion of services to survivors of SGBV, including health and psychological support.

Indicative activity 1.2.3 - *Rehabilitate access roads and bridges.*

If in line with the government's priorities, the RSF will rehabilitate roads and bridges that connect the JAP location to other JAP locations, and other services and markets on the trade route.

Indicative activity 1.2.4 - *Provide communities with permanent housing.*

In selected JAP locations, the RSF will continue to rehabilitate and construct permanent shelter destroyed during the conflict.

Indicative activity 1.2.5 - *Based on the 'building-back-better' approach, adapt, and install facilities and infrastructure with renewable technologies (such as solar-powered street lightning).*

[28] Content responds to MTR feedback: "If the RSF is going to use government buy-in and ownership as indicators of success, then it needs to better disaggregate and define what these terms mean, how they are measured, and the governments needs to be informed of what is expected of them before, during, and after a JAP location is complete.
[29] Services provided to boost the local economy should be based on economic opportunity mapping to ensure services and demand are aligned.

Infrastructure design will include options for "build-back-better" such as the provision of renewable energy to communities, to provide light and power for the purposes of community security, entertainment, communication, cooking[30], pumping of water, and running of education and health facilities, and other public buildings.

3.1.3 Output 1.3 - Targeted households provided with short-term livelihood opportunities

Following the selection of JAP locations, the RSF, based on opportunity mapping assessments, will work with all relevant stakeholders (including the Community Stabilisation Committees) to prepare a mix of potential livelihood options for individuals in the beneficiary communities, and identify the public sector, private sector and CSO/NGO partners best placed to deliver them. RSF staff will ensure equitable inclusion of women and female and male youth.

UNDP will procure livelihood option providers through a mixture of competitive processes and direct contracting modalities, according to its applicable rules and regulations, depending on the option concerned and the legal status of the provider (i.e., Government, UN Agency, private sector, and national and international NGO).

All implementing partners are obliged to follow UNDP stabilisation rules for communication and visibility, which means no use of partner or UNDP branding to reinforce Government ownership.

Indicative activity 1.3.1 - *Rehabilitate productive infrastructure (for example small business offices, market structures).*

See content in section 3.1.2.

Indicative activity 1.3.2 - *Support immediate income earning opportunities for the vulnerable population (for example, female households) and at-risk female and male youth, such as cash for work (waste management, such as garbage collection and street cleaning and infrastructure rehabilitation).*

Indicative activity will continue as per current practice[31].

Indicative activity 1.3.3 - *Provide short-term or quick-fix training.*

Indicative activity will continue as per current practice.

Indicative activity 1.3.4 - *Provision of productive or business assets, agricultural inputs for farmers, fishing gear for fisherman, and medicine for cattle herders.*

Indicative activity will continue as per current practice.

3.2 Result area 2 – Extended stabilisation

Outcome 2 of the RSF comprises activities to contribute to a further four outputs, focusing on extended stabilisation. The amended and extended Prodoc contains one additional output (output 2.1), required to

[30] If renewable energy is not an option, fuel efficient stoves can be provided. This simple measure can help reduce sexual assaults, which mainly occur during firewood collection.
[31] In line with the UNDP "Guide: Livelihoods & Economic Recovery in Crisis Situations", UNDP 2015. Also guides Indicative activities 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5.

cover 'post-JAP period support' to the location. The outputs are briefly described in this section and summarised in the next paragraphs:

- Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilisation achievements and promote social cohesion – The RSF team, after the 18-months JAP period[32], will continue to support formal and informal local authorities to lead in service provision and partner with national and international peacebuilding and development actors (including other UNDP programmes) to take over the support and interaction with formal and informal authorities (Output 2.1, see section 3.2.1)[33]. The UNDP Resident Representatives will closely liaise with their respective Resident Coordinator who plays a central role in ensuring the link of stabilisation programming to longer-term peacebuilding and development programmes.
- Improved cross-border coordination and cooperation – Focuses on RSF regional activities; RSF internal coordination; joint monitoring and reporting; RSF research, learning and knowledge management; RSF wide communication and communication products; providing surge capacity to National Windows when required; supporting the implementation of RSF cross-border activities (as, for example, identified by the Governors' Forum); liaising with MNJTF on behalf of the RSF; and representing the RSF at the Regional Task Force. As a regional initiative, the RSF will implement stabilisation activities that provide value added from both a national and a regional perspective[34]. However, as also highlighted in the MTR report's conclusions[35] and recommendations[36] section, realism is required considering the feasibility of cross-border activities.
- LCBC capacity developed to steer and support RSS implementation and governance structures – The RSS Secretariat will focus on improved cross-border cooperation through a) advocacy with stabilisation, peacebuilding and development actors that are supporting the RSS and coordinate in the Regional Task Force and RSS clusters and b) facilitate regional dialogue and cross-border mechanisms, such as the Governors' Forum. With the eight TAPs formulated and approval expected in the foreseeable future, the role of the RSS Secretariat shifts towards support for TAP implementation (among others through capacity development of Governors' Offices) and TAP coordination, monitoring and oversight (Output 2.3, see 3.2.3).
- Improved LCBC coordination and oversight of TAP implementation - The RSS Secretariat will manage, monitor, and report on the RSS results framework, draw out lessons of TAP

[32] And initiated well-before the end of the 18-months period.

[33] Output 2.1, among others, responds to:

1. MTR recommendation #2: "UNDP and donors should […] focus more on completing and expanding the existing JAPs to locations in proximity and ensure that any gains made are sustained by engaging the other UN agencies and stakeholders necessary for providing the adequate humanitarian, development, governance, and peacebuilding support to these locations".
2. Recommendation #4: "UNDP and donors should link and partner the RSF with other entities and initiatives that complement and fill in gaps inherent in the RSF's immediate stabilisation model. […] Government buy-in is important but expecting ownership from a management, human and financial resource perspective is unrealistic. Therefore, the viability of the RSF depends on these partnerships."
3. Recommendation #6. "UNDP and donors should set more realistic timeframes."

[34] See JAP selection criteria. Regional value added, among others, entails re-establishing trade routes, particularly across borders, to boost the regional economy.

[35] "We agree that part of conceptual appeal of the RSF is that the threats are transnational and require a coordinated response, but the RSF and donors will also need to be realistic around the number and impact of cross-border initiatives since these will be influenced by the competing priorities of national governments, and factors which are often beyond the control of regional governors."

[36] Recommendation #4: "UNDP and donors should re-evaluate the regional / cross-border approach based on its viability and then determine how much emphasis and human and financial resources should be invested."

implementation in the Knowledge Management Platform. Towards the end of the second year of the amended and extended RSF, the UNDP RSS Secretariat team will concentrate on the UNDP hand-over of the RSS Secretariat to the LCBC through a capacity assessment and the formulation of a hand-over roadmap (Output 7, see 3.2.4).

3.2.1 Output 2.1 – Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilisation achievements and promote social cohesion

While most indicative activities in Output 2.1 are a continuation of indicative activities under Outputs 1.1,1.2 and 1.3, the longer timeframe and aim to 'consolidate' suggests the Output and indicative activities are best placed as part of the RSF´s extended stabilisation programming.

Indicative activity 2.1.1 - *Liaise with national and regional security forces for long-term security provision to communities in JAP locations.*

A continuation and consolidation of activities 1.1.1, 1.1.2, and 1.1.5 (see Table 3 in section 3.2.5).

The ongoing provision of security is vital for stabilisation programming. Advocating for and negotiating the provision of security is a key role for the respective UNDP Resident Representatives, Security Forces Liaison Officers and Heads of Stabilisation.

Indicative activity 2.1.2 - *Develop the capacity of Community Stabilisation Committees to function sustainably.*

A continuation of activity 1.1.4 (Establish inclusive CSCs or similar structures).

The RSF will commission an assessment of the type of support required by the CSCs (on a case-by-case basis) to become sustainable. Important in this context is to ensure the CSCs remain an actor the local authorities include in their planning and decision-making.

Based on the individual assessments, the RSF National Windows will set a roadmap that provides support as required.

In this context, the RSF Nigeria National Window has produced useful guidance[37] included as Annex 8.

Indicative activity 2.1.3 - *Support Community Stabilisation Committees in the design and oversight of social cohesion activities.*

This indicative activity builds on activity 1.1.4 (Establish inclusive CSCs or similar structures).

The RSF implementing partners will facilitate the design, monitoring and oversight of stabilisation activities[38] with the Community Stabilisation Committees and advocate for an active role of the CSCs a) in local Authority-led planning and decision-making and b) UNDP and other organisations' peacebuilding and development programmes planning, monitoring and decision-making.

Amongst the social cohesion activities, to be selected based on local conflict analysis are:

- Conflict mediation;
- Promotion of reconciliation jointly implemented with local government and community leaders;

[37] UNDP Nigeria, Community Stabilisation Committees – Guidance Notes for Implementing Partners, February 2021.
[38] "Soft" stabilisation activities (immediate stabilisation activities deliver the "hard" activities or rehabilitation of infrastructure), focusing on improving the social contract between the authorities and the population.

- Collaboration with local peace initiatives in the resolution of conflicts and disputes;
- Advocacy to local government to strengthen regulations with regards to access to water, grazing and farming lands and the management of these resources in an all-inclusive, participatory manner; and
- Continued support to local government in community-based participatory planning approaches to peacebuilding and development.

Indicative activity 2.1.4 - *Advocate for and further develop the capacity of local authorities to improve, maintain and provide access for all to essential public service delivery and lead participatory decision-making processes.*

A continuation of indicative activity 1.2.2 (*Support basic skills training of local government officials)*

The RSF will provide local Government officials with job-specific training required to perform in their roles.

Indicative activity 2.1.5 - *Establish links and hand-over residual support to basic public and judicial service delivery to UNDP, UN and other development partners' basic services, rule of law, local governance, peacebuilding, livelihoods, and environment programmes.*

From the onset and in the context of the HDP Nexus, the UNDP Country Office senior and programme staff will use their networks to advocate for ongoing programmatic presence of international, national, and local organisation to provide programmatic support that builds on stabilisation programming.

As mentioned earlier, in the context of the UN, the Resident Coordinator and his or her Office play a central role in ensuring coherent UN support and should therefore be closely involved in and kept abreast of the progress and challenges of the RSF.

Lastly, the RSF donors play an important role by ensuring that coordination takes place with peacebuilding, recovery, SSR, and development projects they fund bilaterally.

Of essence also is, where feasible, supporting a gradual transition from military to civilian-led security provision.

Indicative activity 2.1.6 -*. Develop the capacity of local, national, and international human rights organisations in the Lake Chad area to function sustainably.*

Indicative activity is a continuation of indicative activity 1.1.6 (*Develop security forces' capacity and understanding on human rights, including SGBV*.) and 1.1.7 (*Monitor and report on human rights and civilian protection in JAP locations*)

The RSF National Windows will commission an assessment of the type of support required by the local, national, and international human rights organisations to do their work sustainably. Based on the assessment, support will be provided as required on a case-by-base basis.

3.2.2 Output 2.2 - Improved cross-border coordination and cooperation

Output 2.2 focuses on RSF-internal coordination, joint monitoring, and reporting, as well as support to implementation of RSF cross-border activities (as, for example, identified by the Governors' Forum), liaison with MNJTF on behalf of the RSF and representation of RSF at the Regional Task Force.

Indicative activity 2.2.1 – *Provide surge capacity to National Windows.*

If required, the RSF regional team will provide surge capacity (from the RSF team or via UNDP and other organisations) the National Windows.

Indicative activity 2.2.2 – *Ensure overall RSF coordination, timely reporting, monitoring, and representation of RSF in RSS-Regional Task Force.*

See Section 6.3.

Indicative activity 2.2.3 – *Commission RSF wide research, organise RSF-internal workshops and strategic reviews, collect best practices and liaise with donor partners before dissemination.*

As part of its knowledge management function, the RSF Regional Team will commission stabilisation-relevant research, organise internal and external learning events and reviews. The team will be responsible for liaison and communication with donor partners, complementing National Window-level interaction.

Indicative activity 2.2.4 – *Facilitated by the RSS Secretariat team, liaise and cooperate (including on behalf of the four national windows) with LCBC and MNJTF command on civil-military cooperation and shared priorities.*

Facilitated by the RSS Secretariat, the RSF will liaise and cooperate with the MNJTF on all strategic and tactic *regional* aspects of the fight against violent extremism and terrorism, such as re-establishing trade routes across borders.

Indicative activity 2.2.5 – *Fund strategic communication, including radio programming.*

The RSF team will fund communication programs and the development of communication products with a regional character to contribute to consistent stabilisation messaging across the Boko Haram-affected territories.

Indicative activity 2.2.6 – *Where feasible, and as identified by the Governors´ Forum, promote UNDP cross-border activities in the JAPs along the prioritised trade routes.*

Further to indicative activity 2.2.4, the RSF, at the request of the Technical Coordination Committee members, has committed to prioritising cross-border activities on the Lake Chad area´s traditional trade routes, historically an essential source of economic activity and income for the area´s population.

Where security allows and Government buy-in exists, the RSF National Windows will aim to develop cross-border JAPs and include the importance for the historical trade route as a key criterion for JAP selection.

The feasibility of this indicative activity, firstly, depends on security in the border areas. Particularly the areas along trade routes are a priority for Boko Haram factions for reasons of financial gain. While options for cross-border are few, some exist but are high risk and volatile.

3.2.3 Output 2.3 – LCBC capacity developed to steer and support RSS implementation and governance structures

Output 2.3 focuses on RSF support to LCBC staff capacity development; the interim staffing of the RSS-Secretariat; the LCBC capacity assessment of LCBC; and setting-up and maintaining the Knowledge Management Platform.

Indicative activity 2.3.1 – *Provide the interim staff for the N´Djamena-based RSS-Secretariat.*

The RSF funded RSS Secretariat team continues to be N'Djamena-based (co-located with the Lake Chad Basin Commission) and will consist of the professionals described in the following paragraphs.

Head of RSS Secretariat

The RSF-supported RSS Secretariat organigramme has changed to ensure the Head of the RSS Secretariat can increasingly focus and accompany the LCBC Executive Secretary in the political engagement with key national and regional actors in the four LCB countries. The most important purpose of the political engagement is to direct the attention of national actors to the needs and challenges of the Lake Chad area states and governorates. The marginalisation of these territories is the principal and root cause of Boko Haram's existence. The only way to truly tackle this root cause in the long-run is to get the respective capitals to be consistently more focused on the Boko Haram conflict-affected territories.

Deputy Head & Programme Specialist

The Deputy's principal responsibility is to take on a significant part of the current workload of the Head of the RSS Secretariat, allowing the latter to focus more on the political aspects of the Secretariat's work. The Deputy will oversee the monitoring and capacity development functions, as well as all operations.

Communications Specialist

Standard terms of reference.

Security Forces Liaison (and Cooperation) Advisor

UNDP in Africa, at the time of writing, is well-advanced in detailing the role of the previously known CIMIC (CMCoord or CivMilCoord) in stabilisation. To avoid further misunderstandings with the humanitarian community, the function is referred to as 'Liaison and cooperation with Security Forces'; and the role as LFSO.

The function is detailed in section 2.3.1 [Liaison and cooperation with Security Forces and the preparation of Joint Action Plans (JAPs)] and may still be subject to changes. Once endorsed by the Director of the Regional Bureau for Africa, the function and role will apply to all UNDP Africa stabilisation programmes.

Figure 2. RSS Secretariat organigramme



Monitoring & Reporting Specialist

Standard terms of reference.

Capacity Development Specialist

Standard terms of reference.

Operations Specialist

Standard terms of reference.

Finance Specialist

Standard terms of reference.

ICT Specialist

Standard terms of reference.

Finance & Admin Assistant

Standard terms of reference.

Driver

Standard terms of reference.

All indicative activities under output 6 and 7 will be implemented, facilitated, and promoted by the RSS Secretariat team.

Indicative activity 2.3.2 – *Commission relevant stabilisation research, policy development and other knowledge products with a view to promoting improved cross-border coordination and cooperation.*

The RSS Secretariat will produce policy and research product (in coordination with the RSF Regional Team and other stabilisation actors to avoid overlaps in knowledge products).

For 2021, the plan is to produce a) the LCBC Community-Based Reconciliation and Reintegration Policy of Persons Associated with Boko Haram and b) a research work on Vigilantes, the Crime-Terror Nexus and Transitional Justice mainstreaming.

Policy and research for 2022, 2023 and 2024 will be defined at a later stage, in coordination with the members of the Regional Task Force, based on emerging issues of relevance for Lake Chad area stabilisation, recovery, and resilience.

Indicative activity 2.3.3 – *Set-up the Knowledge Management Platform and ensure LCBC-internal capacities for KMP management.*

The activity is pending from the previous phase of the RSF.

Indicative activity 2.3.4 – *By July 2022, commission a comprehensive and independent LCBC capacity assessment.*

An important step in establishing a fully LCBC contracted and run RSS Secretariat is the commissioning of an independent LCBC capacity assessment. While the assessment will assess the whole LCBC, it will provide important information on the RSS Secretariat's future composition and staffing.

Indicative activity 2.3.5 – *Based on the capacity assessment, prepare a roadmap for the LCBC to fully integrate the RSS Secretariat (budget, contracts, etc.).*

Based on the recommendation of the LCBC capacity assessment, the RSS Secretariat will elaborate a roadmap with a precise planning for a handover to a LCBC hired RSS Secretariat.

Indicative activity 2.3.6 – *Train and hand-over responsibilities to the LCBC contracted RSS Secretariat.*

The roadmap will set out what training is required for a proper handover.

Indicative activity 2.3.7 – *Further*[39] *strengthen cooperation with the MNJTF through the CIMIC Cell.*

The Secretariat will continue to provide non-kinetic support to the MNJTF, among other on human rights compliance (in particular, SGBV) and the protection of civilians. Other RSS Secretariat support will include

[39] In December 2020, the Secretariat established the LCBC/MNJTF Civil Military cooperation cell which has helped to foster closer working relation with MNJTF on civil military issues as well provides opportunity to building capacity of MNJTF on non-kinetic aspects such as human rights and the protection of civilians. The Cell in collaboration with UNDP has also developed StratComm for the MNJTF as well as recently collaborated with the KAIPTC - Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre for a comprehensive assessment of the non-kinetic capacity needs of the MNJTF.

civil-security force dialogues in affected borderland communities in the region and the implementation of the Cell´s Action Plan.

The RSS Secretariat will work with stabilisation actors to strengthen cooperation at the regional level and agree on cross-border area stabilisation initiatives.

The RSS Secretariat, as part of its knowledge management activities, will document and share LCB region-wide good practice on civil-security force liaison as well as facilitate the regional dialogue between humanitarian, stabilisation, and security actors.

3.2.4 Output 2.4 – Improved LCBC coordination and oversight of TAP implementation

With all TAPs finalised and approval to take place in the foreseeable future, the RSS Secretariat will turn to coordination and oversight of TAP implementation. The output focuses on RSS-Secretariat interactions with external actors in relation to the coordination of the implementation of the TAPs and other aspects of RSS implementation.

Indicative activity 2.4.1 – *Support coordination of TAP implementation.*

Most interventions necessary to implement the RSS are designed and implemented at the national and local levels, as outlined in the Territorial Action Plans (TAPs). The TAPs provide the framework that guides implementing partners (such as UNDP) to support each territory´s stabilisation, recovery, peacebuilding, and development priorities in line with their respective mandates.

The LCBC's function is to amplify the national and local interventions by facilitating cross-border and regional (joint) interventions. A central component of the next Regional Action Plan will be the formulation of a TAP implementation framework and resource strategy.

The framework will be based on a stock-taking exercise that will determine Governors´ Office organisational development, capacity, and funding needs and inform decentralized Information Management Systems (IMS) and Assessment Working Group that will support TAP data collection efforts. The RSS Secretariat will ensure compatibility between the IMS and the RSS knowledge management platform.

Indicative activity 2.4.2 – *Provide ongoing capacity development and other support to the TAP teams in the Governors' Offices.*

Support capacity development of the TAP units in the Governors´ Offices to perform their role adequately.

Indicative activity 2.4.3 – *Oversee monitoring and reporting on TAP implementation.*

The RSS Secretariat will oversee TAP monitoring and ensure a yearly TAP implementation overview as part of the Annual RSS Report.

Indicative activity 2.4.4 – *Ensure cross-fertilisation on TAP implementation good practices and lessons learned between Governors' Offices.*

Organise virtual and, the COVID-19 crisis allowing, face-to-face lessons learned interchanges.

Indicative activity 2.4.5 – *Provide RSS implementing partners support and guidance to link their interventions with the TAPs.*

Provide support to the Task Force and Cluster members and other RSS implementing partners to ensure alignment with the RSS and the TAPs.

Indicative activity 2.4.6 – *Manage, monitor, and report on the RSS results framework.*

The RSS Secretariat, Regional Task Force, and members of the three Clusters (Governance; Humanitarian and Development; and Protection and Security) have produced a detailed results framework.

The framework is intended to serve the following purposes:

- It is an operational tool to enable progress tracking and needs identification. The LCBC Secretariat and partners will use the framework to measure progress on the RSS on an annual basis. Relatedly, they will use the results framework to identify gaps in delivery so that funds can be mobilized to enable additional interventions.
- The LCBC Secretariat, AU, UN agencies and other actors will use the results framework to inform the sequencing of immediate stabilisation, humanitarian, and longer-term development interventions.
- UN agencies and other implementers will use the results framework to align relevant interventions to the Strategy and demonstrate contributions to the Strategy. In addition, the LCBC Secretariat and implementers will use the results framework to capitalize on existing information, avoid duplication, and enable learning.

The RSS Secretariat will:

- Produce and oversee the RSS monitoring and evaluation framework
- Annually report on the RSS progress
- Map all completed, ongoing and proposed initiatives of the Strategy
- Update, if required the RSS results framework
- Liaise with and coordinate donor on the RSS results framework.

Indicative activity 2.4.7– *Promote joint initiatives for TAP implementation.*

Where feasible, advocate for joint initiatives (such as those promoted by the Peacebuilding Fund) between UN Agencies or any other type of joint initiative that supports the implementation of the TAPs.

Indicative activity 2.4.8 – *Consistently promote and plan to connect areas along the trade route where RSS implementing partners (including UNDP) are active.*

The RSS Secretariat, based on a detailed understanding of stabilisation, recovery, peacebuilding, and development programming[40] taking place in the Boko Haram-affected areas is uniquely positioned to facilitate and promote coordination and cooperation between stabilisation, recovery, peacebuilding, and development actors to connect and synergise their different programming activities along the trade routes.

Indicative activity 2.4.9 – *Facilitate the formulation the next phase of the RSS August 2023 – August 2028.*

An essential task of the UNDP contracted RSS Secretariat is to facilitate a comprehensive and inclusive process for the formulation of the next RSS.

The drafting of the new RSS will be commissioned to a renowned academic entity with experience in this type of document.

[40] The inclusive TAP formulation processes have yielded a wealth of information on the four stabilisation, recovery, peacebuilding, and development "Ws" (Who does what, where and when?).

Indicative activity 2.4.10 – *Facilitate and promote regional dialogue and cross-border cooperation mechanisms (Governors' Forum, Regional Interparliamentary Committee, CSO Platform, Inter-Ministerial Meetings and Private Sector Investment Platform) and other standing or ad hoc initiatives promoting cross-border cooperation.*

The third Governors´ Forum was held in Yaoundé from 4-5 October 2021. The RSS Secretariat will boost support to the Regional Interparliamentary Committee and the Private Sector Investment Platform.

The Secretariat will engage the respective parliaments in the four countries to ensure national and local law makers are aware of the Lake Chad area challenges and lobby for harmonisation of policies that will support the overall implementation of the RSS (such as the Community-Based Reconciliation and Reintegration of Persons Formerly Associated with Boko Haram).

Private sector involvement is critical for the stabilisation and recovery of the region. As part of this task, the Secretariat will coordinate the involvement of private sector in the development of the region including commissioning of a study on Small and medium Scale Enterprise opportunities in the region and, engagement of private entities through the convening of a private sector investment Forum for the Lake Chad where the outcome of the study will be presented.

Indicative activity 2.4.11 – *Ensure consistent inclusion of women and youth in RSS governance structures and reporting.*

The RSS Secretariat will consistently (and to date relatively successfully) advocate for the inclusion of women and youth in the RSS governance structures.

The RSS results framework is gender sensitive at the strategic objective and indicator level and facilitates gender and age-sensitive reporting.

Indicative activity 2.4.12 – *Where feasible, facilitate RSS implementing partners (including UNDP programmes such as the RSF) cross-border activities surrounding the prioritised trade routes.*

The participants in a recent RSS Secretariat organised workshop identified a series of key cross border interventions for the affected territories. The workshop brought together Governors' representatives from eight affected territories, Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), AU representatives, RSS Secretariat, and several resource persons[41].

The outcomes of this workshop and other studies on cross-border trade route dynamics, provide the foundation for the RSS Secretariat´s advocacy for cross-border programming. While the security situation will likely continue to complicate and limit this type of programming, at the time of writing, locations exist where programming can and currently is not taking place. The RSS Secretariat will support implementing partners, such as UNDP, to focus on cross border interventions in the areas identified by the workshop participants.

Indicative activity 2.4.13 – *Provide support and content to the organisation of decision-making mechanisms such as the RSS Steering Committee.*

The RSS Steering Committee provides general oversight over the RSS activities and interventions and provides advice on overall strategic, political, policy and programme priorities. The Steering Committee also serve as the platform for strategic reviews, decisions making and direction for the RSS and serve as

[41] Summary of Cross-border interventions workshop, 7-8 April 2021. Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram Affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin Region (RSS).

mechanism for joint mobilization of international support in a coordinated and synergized manner including ensuring the coordination, harmonization, monitoring, review, and evaluation of national and international support for the implementation of the strategy.

Indicative activity 2.4.14 – *Engage with and support the RSS Regional Task Force and three RSS clusters.*

The RSS recognises the critical role of different stakeholders and the imperative for coordination amongst stakeholders at the local, national, regional as well as continental level including international partners, civil society actors and the private sector. In 2019, the Secretariat facilitated the establishment of the RSS Task Force and three Cluster working Groups. The Secretariat will continue to coordinate RSS Task Force meetings biannually and support the meetings of the Cluster Working Groups as required.

The Secretariat will work with Task Force members to develop joint programmes and initiatives, commission joint research, coordinate information sharing and management through the Knowledge Management Platform.

The Secretariat will continue to collaborate with Task Force and Cluster Working Groups on baseline data, survey, territorial, country, and regional analysis and, importantly, annual reporting on RSS implementation progress and challenges.

Indicative activity 2.4.15 – *Fully operationalise the RSS Civil Society Platform*[42].

The LCBC CSO platform will help organizations harmonize their programmatic approach, so that individual projects arising from multiple funding streams fit under the umbrella of a single planning and response strategy in short-, medium- and longer-term. This not only to ensure coherent and sustainable assistance, but also to ensure CSOs are at the heart of direct implementation and be the impetus behind large scale response plans and resource mobilization in the region.

The network has recently been formed and will require longer-term nurturing by the RSS Secretariat to achieve its potential. Long terms activities are envisioned as follows:

- Provide the CSO Platform membership with a comprehensive approach to coordination, capacity strengthening (organisational development), data collection, information management and sharing, for the purpose of a strengthened CSO ownership of the RSS program cycle.
- Coordinate the set up and roll-out of a robust CSO Platform Information Management system, to which a Lake Chad area Civil Society Directory is a part of.
- Ensure appropriate CSO consultation and representation in the RSS Coordination architecture (Cluster and Pillar Working Groups).
- Foster consistent CSO responses and promote best practices in programming, as per CSO Platform Organisational Development Methodology.
- Tie CSO platform membership to a set of relaxed, context specific donor criteria which will be embedded in a dedicated CSO allocation strategy under the Multi Partner Trust Fund, in line with Grand Bargain commitments.

The LCBC CSO Platform Civil Society will be represented at the RSS Steering Committee.

Indicative activity 2.4.16 – *Ensure all RSS partners have access to the Knowledge Management Platform*[43].

[42] The RSS CSO Platform terms of reference is included as Annex 6.
[43] Please see Annex 9 for details.

For 2021, a priority task is to operationalise the Knowledge Management Platform, ensure it is fully compatible with the existing LCBC platform and facilitate compatibility with the upcoming PROLAC data platform.

Upon finalisation of the platform, the RSS Secretariat will widely advocate for its use as well as inclusion of area´s stabilisation, recovery, and development actors' knowledge products.

Indicative activity 2.4.17 – *Facilitate interaction between the MNJTF and RSS implementing partners in support of regional level civil-security force cooperation.*

The Secretariat will work with UN entities and other relevant actors to facilitate the interaction with the MNJTF on stabilisation and humanitarian issues.

3.2.5 Summarised RSF results framework

The RSF Regional and National Windows will use one harmonised results framework, summarised in this section. While harmonised and aiming to reduce the reporting burden for the regional and national teams, the framework should not be a straight-jacket and a certain amount of flexibility is required to allow the National Window programmes to adapt to the ever-changing realities in their respective countries.

Table 3. Summarised RSF results framework

Impact	Social contract improved in insurgency-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin						
Impact indicators	Proportion of population in JAP locations who report improved trust and confidence in government's capacity to provide community stability						
Outcomes	#1 – "Immediate" stabilisation – Community stability and State presence increased in JAP[44] locations			#2 – "Extended" stabilisation – Local, national, and regional stabilisation structures oversee, coordinate, and implement stabilisation and recovery efforts			
Outcome indicators	1.1 Percentage of the population in JAP locations who say there is safety and security (disaggregated by age[45], gender, and location) 1.2 Percentage of the population in JAP locations who say they have access to justice (disaggregated by age, gender, and location) 1.3 Proportion of population expressing satisfaction with provision of and access to essential social services in JAP locations, e.g., health, education, and WASH (disaggregated by age, gender, and location) (Adapted RSS indicator) 1.4 Proportion of individuals participating in livelihoods strengthening interventions in the JAP locations who report improved livelihoods (disaggregated by age, gender, and location) (Adapted RSS indicator)			*The outcome 1 indicators are also relevant for outcome 2* 2.1 Extent to which the LCBC level of coordination of the RSS is good according to stabilisation actors (Adapted RSS indicator) 2.2 Level of collaboration of cluster working groups of the Regional Taskforce on strategy implementation and accountability according to stabilisation actors (Adapted RSS indicator) 2.3 Proportion of population in JAP locations expressing satisfaction with the maintenance of the constructed and/or rehabilitated infrastructure (disaggregated by age, gender, and location) 2.4 Percentage of the population in JAP locations who say they trust members of other communities			
Outputs	1.1 Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP locations	1.2 Essential social services infrastructure constructed and/or rehabilitated, functional, and accessible	1.3 Targeted households provided with livelihood opportunities	2.1 Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilisation achievements and promote social cohesion	2.2 Improved cross-border coordination and cooperation	2.3[46] LCBC capacity developed to steer and support RSS implementation and governance structures	2.4 Improved LCBC coordination and oversight of TAP implementation
Indicative activities for outputs *Activities of relevance for all UNDP RSF outputs:* *1. Conduct and regularly update a conflict analysis for each JAP location*	The National Window teams will: 1.1.1 Strengthen stakeholder relationships and collaboration with security forces (military, law enforcement agencies, government recognized community security groups) at community, district,	The National Window teams will: 1.2.1 Construct, rehabilitate, and equip essential public services infrastructure and facilities (administrative, health, WASH, and education), including accommodation for staff	The National Window teams will: 1.3.1 Rehabilitate productive infrastructure (for example small business offices, market structures) 1.3.2 Support immediate income earning opportunities for the	The National Window teams will: 2.1.1 Liaise with national and regional security forces for long-term security provision to communities in JAP locations 2.1.2 Develop the capacity of Community Stabilisation	The RSF Regional Team will: 2.2.1 Provide surge capacity to national windows 2.2.2 Ensure overall RSF coordination, timely reporting, monitoring, and representation of RSF	The RSF will: 2.3.1 Provide the interim staff for the N´Djamena-based RSS-Secretariat The RSS Secretariat will: 2.3.2 Commission relevant stabilisation research, policy development and other knowledge products with a view to promoting	The RSS Secretariat will: 2.4.1 Support coordination of TAP implementation 2.4.2 Provide ongoing capacity development and other support to the TAP teams in the Governors' Offices

[44] Joint Action Plan
[45] Age groups: youth of 14 to 35 years and adult of 36 years and older
[46] Output 2.3 and 2.4 are funded by the RSF and implemented by the RSS Secretariat. Reporting will be reflected in the RSS Annual Report.

Outputs	1.1 Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP locations	1.2 Essential social services infrastructure constructed and/or rehabilitated, functional, and accessible	1.3 Targeted households provided with livelihood opportunities	2.1 Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilisation achievements and promote social cohesion	2.2 Improved cross-border coordination and cooperation	2.3[46] LCBC capacity developed to steer and support RSS implementation and governance structures	2.4 Improved LCBC coordination and oversight of TAP implementation
2. Establish the baselines required for progress monitoring and reporting through a set of tools used by all RSF windows *3. In close coordination with local authorities, security forces and other partners, prepare and implement JAPs* *4. Where relevant, ensure the equitable participation of women and youth in all activities* *5. Prepare, implement, and regularly update a RSF Gender Strategy*	governorate, state, and national levels) 1.1.2 Advocate for an increased presence of security forces in JAP locations 1.1.3 Construct, rehabilitate and equip security and justice infrastructure (Law enforcement agencies, Gendarmerie, Courts etc.) 1.1.4 Establish inclusive Community Stabilisation Committees (or similar structures) 1.1.5 Strengthen community-level security mechanisms and support the establishment of early warning systems 1.1.6 Develop security forces' capacity and understanding on human rights, including SGBV 1.1.7 Monitor and report on human rights and civilian protection in JAP locations 1.1.8 Where relevant, remove explosive ordnance and other remnants of war and provide mine risk education	1.2.2 Support basic skills training of local government officials 1.2.3 Rehabilitate access roads and bridges 1.2.4 Provide communities with permanent housing 1.2.5 Based on the 'building-back-better' approach, adapt or install facilities and infrastructure with renewable technologies (such as solar-powered street lighting)	vulnerable population (for example, female households) and at-risk female and male youth, such as cash for work (for waste management, such as garbage collection and street cleaning and infrastructure rehabilitation) 1.3.3 Provide *short-term* or quick-fix training 1.3.4 Provision of productive or business grants or assets, including agricultural inputs for farmers, fishing gears for fisherman, or medicine for cattle herders	Committees to function sustainably 2.1.3 Support Community Stabilisation Committees in the design and oversight of social cohesion activities 2.1.4 Advocate for and further develop the capacity of local authorities to improve, maintain and provide access for all to essential public service delivery and lead participatory decision-making processes 2.1.5 Establish links and prepare to hand-over residual support to basic public and judicial service delivery to UNDP, UN and other development partners' basic services, rule of law, local governance, peacebuilding, livelihoods, and environment programmes 2.1.6 Develop the capacity of local, national, and international human rights organisations in the Lake Chad area to function sustainably	in RSS-Regional Task Force 2.2.3 Commission RSF wide research, organise RSF-internal workshops and strategic reviews, collect best practices and liaise with donor partners before dissemination 2.2.4 Facilitated by the RSS Secretariat team, liaise and cooperate (including on behalf of the four national windows) with LCBC and MNJTF command on civil-military cooperation and shared priorities 2.2.5 Fund strategic communication, including radio programming 2.2.6 Where feasible, and as identified by the Governors´ Forum, promote UNDP cross-border activities in the JAPs along the prioritised trade routes	improved cross-border coordination and cooperation 2.3.3 Set-up the Knowledge Management Platform and ensure LCBC-internal capacities for KMP management 2.3.4 By July 2022, commission a comprehensive and independent LCBC capacity assessment 2.3.5 Based on the capacity assessment, prepare a roadmap for the LCBC to fully integrate the RSS Secretariat (budget, contracts, etc.) 2.3.6 Train and hand-over responsibilities to the LCBC contracted RSS Secretariat 2.3.7 Further strengthen cooperation with the MNJTF through the CIMIC Cell	2.4.3 Oversee monitoring and reporting on TAP implementation 2.4.4 Ensure cross-fertilisation on TAP implementation good practices and lessons learned between Governors' Offices 2.4.5 Provide RSS implementing partners support and guidance to link their interventions with the TAPs 2.4.6 Manage, monitor, and report on the RSS results framework 2.4.7 Promote joint initiatives for TAP implementation 2.4.8 Consistently promote and plan to connect areas along the trade route where RSS implementing partners (including UNDP) are active 2.4.9 Facilitate the formulation the next phase of the RSS August 2023 – August 2028 2.4.10 Facilitate and promote regional dialogue and cross-border cooperation mechanisms (Governors' Forum, Regional Interparliamentary Committee, CSO Platform, Inter-Ministerial Meetings

Outputs	1.1 Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP locations	1.2 Essential social services infrastructure constructed and/or rehabilitated, functional, and accessible	1.3 Targeted households provided with livelihood opportunities	2.1 Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilisation achievements and promote social cohesion	2.2 Improved cross-border coordination and cooperation	2.3[46] LCBC capacity developed to steer and support RSS implementation and governance structures	2.4 Improved LCBC coordination and oversight of TAP implementation
							and Private Sector Investment Platform) and other standing or ad hoc initiatives promoting cross-border cooperation 2.4.11 Ensure consistent inclusion of women and youth in RSS governance structures and reporting 2.4.12 Where feasible, facilitate RSS implementing partners (including UNDP programmes such as the RSF) cross-border activities surrounding the prioritised trade routes 2.4.13 Provide support and content to the organisation of decision-making mechanisms such as the RSS Steering Committee 2.4.14 Engage with and support the RSS Regional Task Force and three RSS clusters 2.4.15 Fully operationalise the RSS Civil Society Platform 2.4.16 Ensure all RSS partners have access to the Knowledge Management Platform 2.4.17 Facilitate interaction between the MNJTF and RSS implementing partners in support of regional level civil-security force cooperation

Outputs	1.1 Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP locations	1.2 Essential social services infrastructure constructed and/or rehabilitated, functional, and accessible	1.3 Targeted households provided with livelihood opportunities	2.1 Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilisation achievements and promote social cohesion	2.2 Improved cross-border coordination and cooperation	2.3[46] LCBC capacity developed to steer and support RSS implementation and governance structures	2.4 Improved LCBC coordination and oversight of TAP implementation
Output indicators	1.1.1 Stakeholder relationships and collaboration with security forces (military, law enforcement agencies, government recognized community security groups) at established and functional at community, district, governorate, state, and national levels 1.1.2 Number of security and justice infrastructures (Law enforcement agencies, Gendarmerie, Courts, etc.) constructed, rehabilitated, equipped, and staffed 1.1.3 Number of Community Stabilisation Committees or similar structures established and strengthened (Adaptation of RSS indicator: "…local infrastructures for peace established or strengthened') 1.1.4 Number of female representatives and presidents within Community Stabilisation	1.2.1 Number of new, rehabilitated and equipped essential social service infrastructure projects (administrative, health, WASH, and education[48]) handed over to local authorities or communities[49] (Adapted RSS indicator) 1.2.2 Number of bridges and km of roads rehabilitated 1.2.3 Number of permanent housing units constructed 1.2.4 Number of public facilities and infrastructure equipped with renewable technologies	1.3.1 Number of rehabilitated or constructed productive infrastructure projects (such as small business offices and market structures) 1.3. 2 Number of people benefitting from cash for work as income generating opportunities in the JAP locations (disaggregated by gender and age) 1.3.3 Number of people benefiting from *short-term* and quick-fix training in JAP locations (gender and age disaggregated) 1.3.4 Number of people benefitting from provided productive or business grants or assets (disaggregated by gender and age)	2.1.1 Percentage of local structures involved in stabilisation with members with knowledge in promoting social cohesion 2.1.2 Number of officials of local authorities with knowledge in delivery of social services for all 2.1.3 Number of local structures involved in stabilisation with members with knowledge of promoting gender equity 2.1.4 Number of local structures involved in stabilisation with members with knowledge of community-based participatory planning approaches 2.1.5 Number of information exchanges, coordination meetings, joint advocacy, and fundraising with UNDP, UN, and other development partners	2.2.1 Number of surge capacity to national windows 2.2.2 Number of RSF knowledge products developed 2.2.3 Number of RSF strategic communications products and programs developed 2.2.4 Number of cross-border interventions included in the JAPs 2.2.5 Number of JAP locations connected along trade routes	RSS Secretariat: 2.3.1 Number of knowledge products finalized 2.3.2 Extent to which RSS research, monitoring, reporting, analysis, and advocacy, at the territorial and regional levels, are gender and youth-sensitive (RSS indicator) 2.3.3 Existence of RSS Knowledge Management Platform 2.3.4 Number of people accessing the knowledge management platform (disaggregated by location and gender) 2.3.5 Existence of LCBC Institutional Capacity Building plan 2.3.6 Number of capacity-building action plans and trainings for LCBC implemented 2.3.7 Number of non-kinetic CIMIC related joint initiatives between RSS Secretariat and MNJTF	RSS Secretariat: 2.4.1 Existence of report of Governors' Offices Capacity Assessment for TAPs implementation 2.4.2 Number of trainings on coordination, information management, monitoring and reporting to Governors' Offices 2.4.3 Existence of monitoring and reporting tools and guidelines for TAPs implementation (disaggregated by tool) 2.4.4 Existence of TAPs M&E frameworks per territory 2.4.5 Number of coordination and experience sharing meetings between Governors' Offices on TAPs implementation 2.4.6 Number of coordination meetings between RSS implementing partners for TAPs implementation (disaggregated by territory) 2.4.7 Number of technical coordination meetings

[48] Number of schools (not classrooms); all community waterpoints counted

[49] Two types of information will be provided: 1) infrastructures handed over to local authorities or communities and 2) infrastructures certified by UNDP

Outputs	1.1 Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP locations	1.2 Essential social services infrastructure constructed and/or rehabilitated, functional, and accessible	1.3 Targeted households provided with livelihood opportunities	2.1 Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilisation achievements and promote social cohesion	2.2 Improved cross-border coordination and cooperation	2.3[46] LCBC capacity developed to steer and support RSS implementation and governance structures	2.4 Improved LCBC coordination and oversight of TAP implementation
	Committees or similar structures 1.1.5 Number of JAP locations with operational early warning systems[47] 1.1.6 Percentage of security providers with knowledge of human rights and prevention of gender-based violence 1.1.7 Number of JAP locations in which local human rights defenders are reporting on human rights violations and issues surrounding civilian protection (Adapted RSS indicator) 1.1.8 Percentage of population in JAP locations at-risk of mines with improved understanding of mine risk						between RSS implementing partners and RSS Secretariat for TAPs implementation (disaggregated per territory) 2.4.8 Number of coordination meetings conveyed by Governors' Offices with RSS implementing partners (disaggregated by territory) 2.4.9 Number of joint-led initiatives between RSS implementing partners 2.4.10 Number of joint-led initiatives between RSS implementing partners and the RSS Secretariat 2.4.11 Number of cross-borders initiatives identified by the RSS Secretariat shared with RSS implementing partners (disaggregated per type) 2.4.12 Number of engagement meetings to promote and plan connection of areas along trade routes 2.4.13 Existence of document of next phase of

[47] Include, depending on context, information exchange coordination mechanisms (through for example sub-groups of the Community Stabilisation Committees) between the local population and security forces; communication channels established between local population and security forces; informal information exchange between local population and government recognized community security groups and channeling of information to security forces.

Outputs	1.1 Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP locations	1.2 Essential social services infrastructure constructed and/or rehabilitated, functional, and accessible	1.3 Targeted households provided with livelihood opportunities	2.1 Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilisation achievements and promote social cohesion	2.2 Improved cross-border coordination and cooperation	2.3[46] LCBC capacity developed to steer and support RSS implementation and governance structures	2.4 Improved LCBC coordination and oversight of TAP implementation
							the RSS August 2023 – August 2028 2.4.14 Yearly cross-border cooperation meetings organised (Governors' Forum/Steering Committee/ Interparliamentary Committee/ Private Sector Forum/ CSO Platform meetings etc.) (RSS indicator) 2.4.15 Proportion of participants of the RSS coordination mechanisms reporting that engagement with the strategy has strengthened their capacity to implement the RSS (disaggregated by gender and location) (RSS indicator) 2.4.16 Number of RSS Regional Task Force and the three RSS Thematic Clusters meetings (disaggregated per type) 2.4.17 Number of RSS Civil Society Platforms established and operational 2.4.18 Number of RSS CSO Platforms meetings (disaggregated per level) 2.4.19 Proportion of RSS CSO Platform participants reporting that the CSO platform and other RSS engagement mechanisms

Outputs	1.1 Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP locations	1.2 Essential social services infrastructure constructed and/or rehabilitated, functional, and accessible	1.3 Targeted households provided with livelihood opportunities	2.1 Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilisation achievements and promote social cohesion	2.2 Improved cross-border coordination and cooperation	2.3[46] LCBC capacity developed to steer and support RSS implementation and governance structures	2.4 Improved LCBC coordination and oversight of TAP implementation
							are effective and inclusive of a wide range of civil society actors, including both national and local level organizations (disaggregated by gender, age, and location) (RSS indicator) 2.4.20 Number of requested engagement meetings facilitated by the RSS Secretariat for interested RSS implementing partners and MNJTF
Challenges	Lack of transition from military to law enforcement agency provision of security Limited civilian security umbrella Poor community security and access to justice BH radicalisation and recruitment High levels of trauma, drug abuse, and SGBV Increased intra-community tension resulting from returnees and the presence of refugees Ongoing farmers – herder conflict, exacerbated by the climate crisis Limited staff mobility in JAP locations	High levels of damage or destruction of infrastructure Limited capacity of local firms for infrastructure construction and rehabilitation Lack of access to WASH, health, and education Absence or limited presence of local Government and service providers Most civil servants do not want to work in conflict-affected and isolated areas	Lack of incomes and reliance on humanitarian assistance and debt Lack of safe access to agricultural land Security restrictions hamper economic activity	Limit capacity of community committees	Insufficient regional dialogue forums and mechanisms to address common threats and leverage cross-border opportunities	Lack of institutional buy-in	Insufficient buy-in and weak engagement from actors and stakeholders (Governor's Offices, implementing partner such as UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes and donor community)

Outputs	1.1 Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP locations	1.2 Essential social services infrastructure constructed and/or rehabilitated, functional, and accessible	1.3 Targeted households provided with livelihood opportunities	2.1 Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilisation achievements and promote social cohesion	2.2 Improved cross-border coordination and cooperation	2.3[46] LCBC capacity developed to steer and support RSS implementation and governance structures	2.4 Improved LCBC coordination and oversight of TAP implementation
	Continued restriction to access insular JAP locations						

3.2.6 RSF alignment with and contribution to RSS implementation

The table below outlines the alignment with and contribution to the Regional and National RSF Windows to the RSS. It is important to note that the cost of RSS implementation is estimated to be around US$ 12 billion. As the RSF budget is only a fraction of this amount, expectations on the RSF contribution to RSS implementation should be commensurate.

Table 4. Contribution of the Regional and National RSF Windows to the RSS

Contribution of the Regional and National RSF Windows to the RSS				
RSS			RSF	
RSS Pillar	RSS Strategic Objective	RSS SO description	RSF Output	RSF Indicative activity
I - Political cooperation	#4 - Enhancing capacities of LCBC Secretariat and AUC	To effectively enhance the capacities of the LCBC Secretariat and the AUC for the effective implementation of the strategy	#2.3 - LCBC capacity developed to steer and support RSS implementation and governance structures	Most indicative activities of Outputs # 2.3. In particular: By July 2022, commission a comprehensive and independent LCBC capacity assessment Based on the capacity assessment, prepare a roadmap for the LCBC to fully integrate the RSS Secretariat (budget, contracts, etc.) Train and hand-over responsibilities to the LCBC contracted RSS Secretariat
II - Security and human rights	#5 - Enhancing support to MNJTF operations	To enhance support to the MNJTF to enable it to continue to fulfil its mandate	#1.1 - Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP locations	Strengthen stakeholder relationships and collaboration with security forces (military, law enforcement agencies, government recognized community security groups) at community, district, governorate, state, and national levels)

Contribution of the Regional and National RSF Windows to the RSS				
RSS			RSF	
RSS Pillar	RSS Strategic Objective	RSS SO description	RSF Output	RSF Indicative activity
			#2.1 - Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilisation achievements and promote social cohesion #2.2 - Improved cross-border coordination and cooperation #2.3 - LCBC capacity developed to steer and support RSS implementation and governance structures #2.4 - Improved LCBC coordination and oversight of TAP implementation	Advocate for an increased presence of security forces in JAP locations Liaise with security forces for long-term security provision to communities in JAP locations Facilitated by the RSS Secretariat team, liaise and cooperate (including on behalf of the four national windows) with LCBC and MNJTF command on civil-military cooperation and shared priorities Further strengthen cooperation with the MNJTF through the CIMIC Cell Facilitate interaction between the MNJTF and RSS implementing partners in support of regional level civil-security force cooperation
	#6 - Reinforcement of community security and restoration of Rule of Law	To enhance capacities for safety and security at the community level through increased responsive law enforcement that extends and safeguards the rule of law to all areas, as military forces clear the territory under Boko Haram control	#1.1 - Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP locations #2.1 - Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilisation achievements and promote social cohesion	All indicative activities of output # 1.1 In particular: Strengthen stakeholder relationships and collaboration with security forces (military, law enforcement agencies, government recognized community security groups) at community, district, governorate, state, and national levels) Advocate for an increased presence of security forces in JAP locations Construct, rehabilitate and equip security and justice infrastructure (Law enforcement agencies, Gendarmerie, Courts etc.) Strengthen community-level security mechanisms and support the establishment of early warning systems Monitor and report on human rights and civilian protection in JAP locations

Contribution of the Regional and National RSF Windows to the RSS				
RSS			RSF	
RSS Pillar	RSS Strategic Objective	RSS SO description	RSF Output	RSF Indicative activity
				Liaise with security forces for long-term security provision to communities in JAP locations Develop the capacity of local, national, and international human rights organisations in the Lake Chad area to function sustainably
	#8 - Promoting human rights	To ensure that security service providers operate at the highest levels of integrity and respect for human rights based on international and continental norms and standards, through effective internal and external oversight and accountability mechanisms. With appropriate remedial mechanisms to address alleged human rights abuse	#1.1 - Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP locations #2.1 - Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilisation achievements and promote social cohesion	Develop security forces' capacity and understanding on human rights, including SGBV Monitor and report on human rights and civilian protection in JAP locations Develop the capacity of local, national, and international human rights organisations in the Lake Chad area to function sustainably
V - Governance and the social contract	#18 - Improving service delivery	To restore and strengthen state authority and institutions capacity to enhance the scope and improve the quality of *social* service delivery at the local level	#1.1 - Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP locations #1.2 - Essential social services and infrastructure constructed and/or rehabilitated, functional, and accessible #2.1 - Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilisation achievements and promote social cohesion	Note SO description emphasises *social* service delivery. In particular: Construct, rehabilitate and equip security and justice infrastructure (Law enforcement agencies, Gendarmerie, Courts etc.) Construct, rehabilitate, and equip essential public services infrastructure and facilities (administrative, health, WASH, and education), including accommodation for staff Support basic skills training of local government officials Provide communities with permanent housing Advocate for and further develop the capacity of local authorities and law enforcement officers to improve, maintain and provide access for all to essential service delivery Establish links and prepare to hand-over residual support to basic public and judicial service delivery to UNDP, UN and

Contribution of the Regional and National RSF Windows to the RSS				
RSS			RSF	
RSS Pillar	RSS Strategic Objective	RSS SO description	RSF Output	RSF Indicative activity
				other development partners' basic services, rule of law, local governance, peacebuilding, livelihoods, and environment programmes
	#20 - Enhancing Public Participation and Civic Engagement	To strengthen civic engagement and participation in the implementation of the strategy	#1.1 - Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP locations #2.1 - Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilisation achievements and promote social cohesion #2.4 - Improved LCBC coordination and oversight of TAP implementation	Establish inclusive Community Stabilisation Committees (or similar structures) Strengthen community-level security mechanisms and support the establishment of early warning systems Develop the capacity of Community Stabilisation Committees to function sustainably Community Stabilisation Committees design and oversee social cohesion activities Facilitate and promote regional dialogue and cross-border cooperation mechanisms (Governors' Forum, Regional Interparliamentary Committee, Private Sector, Investment Platform) and other standing or ad hoc initiatives promoting cross-border cooperation Fully operationalise the RSS Civil Society Platform Ensure consistent inclusion of women and youth in RSS governance structures and reporting
	#21 Improving cross-border cooperation	To strengthen cross-border and transboundary cooperation for mutually beneficial solutions and sub-regional integration	#2.2 - Improved cross-border coordination and cooperation #2.3 - LCBC capacity developed to steer and support RSS implementation and governance structures #2.4 - Improved LCBC coordination and oversight of TAP implementation	Where feasible, facilitate RSS implementing partners (including UNDP) cross-border activities surrounding the prioritised trade routes Consistently promote and plan to connect areas along the trade route where RSS implementing partners (including UNDP) are active Facilitate and promote regional dialogue and cross-border cooperation mechanisms (Governors' Forum, Regional Interparliamentary Committee, CSO Platform, Inter-Ministerial Meetings and Private Sector Investment

Contribution of the Regional and National RSF Windows to the RSS				
RSS			RSF	
RSS Pillar	RSS Strategic Objective	RSS SO description	RSF Output	RSF Indicative activity
				Platform) and other standing or ad hoc initiatives promoting cross-border cooperation. Commission relevant stabilisation research, policy development and other knowledge products with a view to promoting improved cross-border coordination and cooperation Where feasible, and as identified by the Governors´ Forum, promote UNDP cross-border activities in the JAPs along the prioritised trade routes
VI - Socio-economic recovery and environmental sustainability	#22 - Supporting Sustainable Livelihoods	To support and promote livelihoods, particularly in the agricultural sector (farming, fishing, and livestock) in a way that takes account of climate change and environmental sustainability	#1.3 - Targeted households provided with livelihood opportunities #2.1 - Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilisation achievements and promote social cohesion	All indicative activities of Output #1.3 Establish links and prepare to hand-over residual support to basic public and judicial service delivery to UNDP, UN and other development partners' basic services, rule of law, local governance, peacebuilding, livelihoods, and environment programmes
VII - Education, learning and skills	#27 - Promoting Professional, Vocational Training and Skills Acquisition	To promote professional technical and vocational training skill acquisition programmes in line with job market demand	#1.3 - Targeted households provided with livelihood opportunities	Provide short-term or quick-fix training
VIII - Prevention of violent extremism and building peace	#36 - Supporting peace architecture	To build, review and strengthen local and national peace architecture, including early warning and early response mechanisms	#1.1 - Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP locations #2.1 - Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilisation achievements and promote social cohesion	Strengthen stakeholder relationships and collaboration with security forces (military, law enforcement agencies, government recognized community security groups) at community, district, governorate, state, and national levels) Establish inclusive Community Stabilisation Committees (or similar structures) Strengthen community-level security mechanisms and support the establishment of early warning systems

Contribution of the Regional and National RSF Windows to the RSS				
RSS			RSF	
RSS Pillar	RSS Strategic Objective	RSS SO description	RSF Output	RSF Indicative activity
				Liaise with security forces for long-term security provision to communities in JAP locations Develop the capacity of Community Stabilisation Committees to function sustainably Community Stabilisation Committees design and oversee social cohesion activities
IX - Empowerment and inclusion of women and youth	#37 - Protecting Women and Girls	To ensure effective protection measures that empower women and girls as beneficiaries and can effectively engage in the stabilisation and peacebuilding process as well as prevention and response to violence extremism. Protect women and girls from all forms of violence, exploitation, and abuse	#1.1 - Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP locations #2.1 - Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilisation achievements and promote social cohesion #2.3 - LCBC capacity developed to steer and support RSS implementation and governance structures	Indicative activity for all outputs: Where relevant, ensure the equitable participation of women and youth in all activities Develop security forces' capacity and understanding on human rights, including SGBV Monitor and report on human rights and civilian protection in JAP locations Develop the capacity of local, national, and international human rights organisations in the Lake Chad area to function sustainably Ensure consistent inclusion of women and youth in RSS governance structures and reporting
	#39 - Youth Empowerment, Participation, and Protection	To ensure effective mechanisms are established to ensure that youth are protected, empowered, and effectively engaged in structured dialogues, stabilisation, and peacebuilding process)		Indicative activity for all outputs: Where relevant, ensure the equitable participation of women and youth in all activities Ensure consistent inclusion of women and youth in RSS governance structures and reporting
	#40 - Monitoring and Accountability	To improve research, monitoring, reporting, analysis, and advocacy ensures that a gender & youth-sensitive approaches are mainstreamed, and that the stabilisation process leverages effectively upon the capacities of girls and women	#2.3 - LCBC capacity developed to steer and support RSS implementation and governance structures	Indicative activity for all outputs - Where relevant, ensure the equitable participation of women and youth in all activities

Contribution of the Regional and National RSF Windows to the RSS				
RSS			RSF	
RSS Pillar	RSS Strategic Objective	RSS SO description	RSF Output	RSF Indicative activity
			#2.4 - Improved LCBC coordination and oversight of TAP implementation	Consistently promote and plan to connect areas along the trade route where RSS implementing partners (including UNDP) are active Oversee monitoring and reporting on TAP implementation Ensure cross-fertilisation on TAP implementation good practices and lessons learned between Governors' Offices Provide RSS implementing partners support and guidance to link their interventions with the TAPS Promote joint initiatives for TAP implementation Manage, monitor, and report on the RSS results framework Ensure consistent inclusion of women and youth in RSS governance structures and reporting Commission relevant stabilisation research, policy development and other knowledge products with a view to promoting improved cross-border coordination and cooperation Operationalise and ensure all RSS partners have access to the Knowledge Management Platform

3.3 Partnerships

The key partners for the effective implementation of the Facility include:

- Local communities as stakeholders;
- Government authorities, both civilian and military, as counterparts;
- UN Agencies and other relevant actors for coordination purposes;
- International partners, regional and continental institutions, such as LCBC, relevant Regional Economic Commissions, and the African Union for guidance and funding.

3.4 Risks and assumptions

Please read this section after section 2.4.2 (*Conflict Sensitivity and Doing No Harm*). Instead of commissioning a risk analysis, as suggested in the previous version of the RSF Prodoc, the RSF will contract two conflict sensitivity specialists responsible for setting-up and regularly updating the risk logs (including the assumptions) and proposing programme adaptations based on new or existing risks.

The RSF Steering Committee emphasises that risk management is not a "tick-the-box" and desktop exercise. The RSF and National Windows are therefore designing a risk management system where risks are regularly validated or re-assessed and, if needed, new mitigation measures implemented. The system can only be effective if regular and quality data and analysis is produced, either directly by UNDP or via third parties, such as think-tanks and TPMs.

The soon to be contracted conflict sensitivity specialists, as part of their terms of reference, will contribute to setting-up and maintaining this evidence-based risk management system in the four countries[50]. The system will produce specific analysis and mitigation measures for each JAP and National Window office location.

3.5 Stakeholder engagement

3.5.1 A focus on youth

In terms of targeting within communities, the RSF will ensure a strong focus on female and male youth, both as beneficiaries and agents. The UN Security Council recognizes a clear role for youth to play in preventing and resolving conflict and in building and maintaining peace - UNSC Resolutions 2250 (2015) and 2535 (2020). UNDP will ensure the participation of female and male youth in all the activities and an adequate representation in the membership of the Stabilisation Committees and in the consultative community processes, including in decision-making forums on security. UNDP will also ensure consistent inclusion of female and male youth in RSS governance structures. The dire state of local economies has contributed to a sense of hopelessness amongst many young people across the Lake Chad Region. This hopelessness underpins recruitment into radical and extremist groups, but it also drives migration, youth

[50] Although planned before the MTR report, the section responds to the following MTR observation: "It does not appear that there is an adequate risk management system in place for monitoring, tracking, documenting, and communicating unintentional negative impacts or potential risks within and between country windows, with the regional secretariat, with the various UNDP regional hubs, and with the donors. It is also unclear who is responsible for responding to allegations, addressing negative impacts, and mitigating risks at each level of the RSF."

crime and delinquency, and drug abuse to escape the hardships of daily life and the lack of vision that many young people hold for the future. Youth-at-risk will be targeted in the provision of immediate income earning opportunities such as cash for work or short-term and quick-fix trainings.

Youth constitute most of the population in the region. The usual conception of youth as covering the years 18-35 will be extended lower in response to UNDP research into the personal journeys of violent extremists, indicating the prevalence of radicalisation in childhood, between the ages of 14-17.

3.5.2 Addressing the situation of women & girls

Issues of gender are at the heart of the crisis around Lake Chad and remain central to its sustainable resolution. Pillar nine of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy calls for specific actions to tackle a culture in which sexual and gender-based violence has become endemic and calls for a gender-sensitive approach to be mainstreamed into all responses.

Women have an important role to play in peacebuilding, as recognised by UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015) on Women, Peace & Security. UNDP will continuously advocate for the enhanced participation of women in decision-making on security at all levels and in all forums, working with LCBC and the AUC to promote gender balance in the governance structures and consultative mechanisms envisaged for implementation of both the Regional Stabilisation Strategy and the Regional Stabilisation Facility herein.

The strengthening of community safety and security should particularly benefit women and girls. UNDP, to the maximum extent possible, will ensure a gender balance on all mechanisms for community engagement and decision-making forums on security. The RSF captures gender disaggregated data in the household questionnaires and perceptions of security in the studies to be undertaken.

Activities will also include specific action to raise awareness of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in communities and amongst traditional and religious leaders, as well as to mobilise and advocate against it. Monitoring and reporting on SGBV will be included in the remit of work to be undertaken by human rights defenders. All training of security providers – military, police, community vigilante groups –will continue to integrate a gender awareness component.

The provision of essential infrastructure and basic services will benefit women and girls, given the disproportionate burden they bear in regard as family providers and carers. Health centres – as well as cash transfers to households caring for the most vulnerable – further reduce the burden on women.

Women have equal access livelihood options. As necessary, women-only work brigades will be established under the cash-for-work option. The strategic communications work of the RSF will ensure space for women's voices and concerns.

The RSF Regional Team will produce a gender strategy, which will be presented for endorsement at the first Regional TCC after endorsement of the amended and extended Prodoc.

3.6 South-south and triangular cooperation

The UNDP Global and Regional practice community continues to extract lessons from the organisation´s stabilisation programmes in many countries in the world. The Facility will benefit from the global and regional experience, through publications, access to UNDP experts and peer-to-peer learning.

The partnership with the African Union for LCBC capacity development will further RSF's opportunities to access and channel experience of other relevant African stabilisation efforts.

3.7 Knowledge management

Please see Annex 10 for a detailed description of the function.

IV. Project Management

4.1 Cost efficiency and effectiveness

UNDP's previous experience in stabilisation validates the agency's ability and agility to facilitate quick and reliable delivery. UNDP has acquired institutional capacity and in-house know-how to put in place fast-track mechanisms with dedicated operation support to the facility which facilitate and accelerate operational transactions while ensuring transparency, value for money, accountability, effectiveness of partnerships and quality assurance.

UNDP has augmented its existing delivery capacity by establishing a stand-alone Service Centre in Maiduguri and is underway to establish similar centres in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, enhancing current Country Office structures, to provide fast-track operational support to Facility implementation. Each Facility Service Centre will comprise a mixed team of national and international staff, serving as engineers, procurement experts, finance and human resources associates, and drivers that can be scaled appropriately to the volume of funding available.

The Service Centre model, and the configuration of operations staff required, is based upon previous UNDP experience and lessons learned in delivering successful stabilisation programmes in Iraq, Libya and elsewhere.

The programmatic need to move at speed to consolidate military gains and re-establish civilian control of target areas dictates a narrow range of immediate stabilisation activities that can be delivered quickly; such a model is by nature cost-efficient, as direct costs – staff wages in particular – need to be budgeted over a relatively short period of two years. The Facility has been designed to launch with a ratio of direct costs to programme budget of 20%.

4.2 The project set-up

4.2.1 Offices

UNDP has established a presence in most Boko Haram conflict-affected regions, except for Adamawa and Yobe states in Nigeria, where the establishment was underway at the time of writing.

4.2.2 Four national teams

The RSF has set-up team in each of the four countries. The leadership of the respective country offices have recruited staff based on national and local needs (a combination of national and international staff; national and international UNVs; and national and international consultants). At the time of writing various positions were vacant and the recruitment process started, particularly for operation staff. The RSF National Windows teams that do not have gender advisors in their organigramme will initiate the recruitment process upon TCC endorsement of this amended and extended project document.

The National Window Project Documents outline the composition of National Window teams. Any changes to the National Window is a point of discussion for the National Window Platforms.

4.2.3 Regional coordination and support to LCBC[51]

An essential change in the organigramme, and in line with MTR recommendations 11 and 12[52], is a clear division of labour between the RSF funded RSS Secretariat[53] and the RSF Regional Window team.

The RSF consists of Regional and National Window staff. Regional staff is directly responsible for the delivery of Output 2.2; National Window staff for Outputs 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 2.1.

The Dakar-based RSF team

The RSF Regional Team will be Dakar-based and will consist of the professionals described in the remainder of this section.

The RSF team is responsible to deliver on the regional aspects of the RSF, among others:

- Coordination with the RSS Secretariat on stabilisation matters;
- Coordinating with the National Windows to connect JAPs with trade routes and initiate cross-border JAPs;
- Ensuring good practice exchange and learning loops between National Windows;
- Ensuring the harmonisation (where useful) of tools and methodologies;
- Coherent and evidence-based reporting; and
- Liaison with donors and regional institutions.

Head of RSF

The Regional Window will be led by a senior Head of RSF[54], a position created, among others, to ensure:

---

[51] The proposed changes, most already underway, also respond to:

1. MTR recommendation #2: "UNDP and donors should decouple the RSF immediate stabilisation window from the RSS...".
2. MTR recommendation # 8: UNDP and donors should […] redefine the function, roles, and responsibilities of the RSF [Regional Window] vis-à-vis the country windows in a way that enables autonomy and flexibility and encourages cooperation across country windows and sharing information (i.e., intelligence, learning, risks, and opportunities) horizontally and vertically. These revisions should incentivize collaboration, not competition. Additionally, UNDP should set clearer lines of responsibility, including lines of communication so that everyone knows who is responsible for what across all windows, including donors and other stakeholders.
3. MTR recommendation #9: "UNDP and donors should ensure that the RSF has the right human resources to perform the functions necessary for achieving the RSF's objectives."

[52]

1. MTR recommendation #11: "UNDP and donors should clearly define the mandate of the RSF and how it relates to the RSS"
2. MTR recommendation #12: "UNDP should separate the leadership and management of the RSF and building the capacity of the LCBC".

[53] See Indicative Activity 6.1 for RSS Secretariat staffing details.

[54] At the time of writing the amended Prodoc, the recruitment process was underway. The decision to create the position is in line with:

1. MTR recommendation #3 as the Head of RSF´s role, among others is to: "…make a more explicit connection between the RSF's strategy, planning, design, implementation and M&E and the political and security dynamics at

- A clear separation between RSF support to the RSS Secretariat and the RSF Regional Window.
- An improved liaison with and coordination of the Heads of the National Windows[55].
- An improved interaction between the RSF, RSS and UNDP Regional Hub teams.
- A coordinated interaction on stabilisation with regionally operating institutions, such as the African Union, Economic Commissions, thinks-tanks, and academic institutions (such as the ISS).
- Ensure RSF alignment with the regional counter-insurgency strategy led by the four national governments, national militaries and the MNJTF.
- An improved interaction with the RSF donors at the regional level.
- To the extent feasible, a stronger focus on re-establishing or boosting regional trade routes through improved cross-border coordination.
- Improved South-South cooperation and cross fertilisation of good practice between the respective National Window teams.
- A well-coordinated UNDP knowledge management, communication, MEL, conflict analysis and reporting function.

Deputy Head & Regional Stabilisation Specialist

The Deputy Head will support the Head of the RSF in his or her functions as described above.

Specifically, the Deputy Head will lead the team that focuses on improved monitoring, reporting, knowledge management and learning, which to date has been a major challenge and requires improvement. The Deputy Head will also lead on UNDP internal compliance, allowing the Head of RSF to focus on the 'external' responsibilities of the RSF Regional Window.

Conflict Sensitivity Advisors (two professionals)

The RSF will recruit two Conflict Sensitivity Advisors, experienced professionals at a suitably senior grade. As advisory positions, they have no formal authority over delivery, but play a critical role in integrating conflict analysis and sensitivity throughout all RSF planning, activities, and reporting.

The advisors will report directly to the Head of the RSF, giving them influence throughout the RSF and ensuring that the Head can draw on their knowledge and analysis. In their rapport with the National Window staff, they are in a support as opposed to a compliance role.

The advisors will be expected to spend a considerable percentage of their time in the field, working with National Window teams, from Heads of Stabilisation down. Much of the success of their role will depend on building close relationships with staff on the ground and creating networks across locations (simultaneously developing the staff´s conflict analysis capacity). This will ensure a coordinated (bottom-up and top-down) approach to conflict analysis and sensitivity, allowing local adaptation while ensuring a shared, cross-RSF understanding of local, national, and regional conflict drivers – and potential drivers of stabilisation.

Tasks of the conflict sensitivity advisors include:

---

the regional, national, territorial, cross-border, and local level".

2. MTR recommendation #7: "UNDP and donors should appoint a senior leader to drive the implementation of the Facility with the necessary seniority, political acumen, relationships, authority, knowledge and experience of leading a multi-donor stabilisation facility, ideally with knowledge of the LCB."

[55] The Heads of the National Windows will report to the respective Resident Representatives and have a secondary reporting line to the Head of the RSF. Without this secondary reporting line, the Head of RSF´s coordination role will be on paper only.

- Driving forward the generation, updating and use of conflict analysis. Facilitation of workshops and discussions; regular catch-ups with key staff; consolidation of available information and analysis from across all relevant internal teams and also external experts (including conflict analysis products commissioned for the RSF, such as the ISS research); 'holding the pen' on drafting of conflict analysis documents and updates.
- Implementation of conflict sensitivity in all RSF activity. Advice, support (including training) and quality assurance with staff and other implementing partners on the conflict sensitivity of their activity, how peace impacts can be improved/risks minimised.
- Preparing accessible conflict analysis 'products'. Compressing the complexities of a multi-faceted, complex conflict into short, easy-to-absorb text, graphics and tables which can be shared with project staff and programme boards and used to inform decision-making.
- Supporting learning and adaptation. Helping those responsible for implementation and oversight to learn from conflict-related data and analysis and to adapt accordingly by not only providing relevant products but also actively participating in, and where appropriate facilitating, operational and management-level discussions. Advisers also help to document adaption to maintain a record of how the programme has adapted.

Communications Specialist

Standard UNDP terms of reference, except for a reduced focus on promoting UNDP, and an increased focus on promoting the LCBC and respective national and local Governments involved in the RSF.

Knowledge Management Specialist

Among the tasks of the Knowledge Management Specialist are:

- Support the management to prepare drafts for agendas, minutes, and reports of RSF Coordination meetings.
- Prepare briefing notes, provide technical input, and ensure quality and coherence amongst different materials, PowerPoint presentations and documents prepared at the RSF Regional Window.
- Conduct and help coordinate in-depth research and analysis on stabilisation related themes.
- Develop a knowledge base platform to track various stabilisation activities being launched and ensure information sharing, policy coherence and consistency among the National Window knowledge products.
- Organize knowledge sharing events, such as workshops or "virtual café hours" on specific themes and lessons learned.
- Identify RSF National and Regional Window good practice and lessons learned for the UNDP stabilisation knowledge base. Ensure the products comply with quality standards.
- Advise practitioners on the application of the knowledge platform and how to provide inputs and how to get access.
- Maintain the platform and promote its use and implementation, particularly the exchange of experiences in thematic forums and through the capture of lessons learned.
- Share UNDP knowledge products on stabilisation with the RSS Knowledge Platform.

Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) Specialist

The MEL specialist has standard UNDP M&E terms of reference. For the Learning function, the following task is added (see also section 6.4 – Learning): "In close coordination with the conflict sensitivity advisors

and the knowledge management specialist, organise regular RSF Regional Window learning loops that provide the data and analysis for decision-making on stabilisation programming adaptation."

Reporting Specialist

Standard terms of reference.

If necessary, particularly for large and complex procurement and the recruitment of human resources, the RSF Regional and National Windows can request support from the Dakar-based Regional Service Centre and the following RSC staff (not funded by the RSF and therefore not included in the organigramme further down):

Operations Coordinator - The Operations Coordinator will be responsible for the coordination of all operational functions between the regional level and the country offices, ensuring that operations are adapted to the rapidly changing situation on the ground. He / she will ensure the formulation and application of the UNDP rapid implementation rules and will benefit from a strong delegation of authority to allow for the rapid implementation of interventions. He / she must ensure that administrative blockages to the proper implementation of the project are resolved as quickly as possible.

Purchasing and Supply Specialist - The Purchasing and Supply Specialist will be responsible for implementing the purchasing and supply plan by seeking to obtain the best value for money. He / she will support the country offices in identifying companies capable of implementing complex projects in risk areas and finding solutions for the effective implementation of all project interventions. The Specialist works closely with the program management team to ensure the rapid and scale-up of stabilisation interventions.

Human Resources Specialist - The Human Resources Specialist will perform many services and support the country offices to enable the recruitment of officials and consultants necessary for the proper execution of the project.

Figure 4. RSF organigramme



4.2.4 Project assurance and audit arrangements

The UNDP Sub-regional Hub in Dakar, assisted by the Regional Centre in Addis, is responsible for project assurance. The Dakar Hub will carry out periodic internal monitoring missions to assess progress toward the desired results and make recommendations for adjustments as deemed necessary. Donor partners may undertake additional monitoring visits both through their own staff or through independent consultants for independent monitoring reviews.

The Facility will be subject to the internal and external auditing procedures provided for in the financial regulations, rules, and directives of UNDP. The audit of UNDP activities is carried out by external and/or internal auditors:

- External audit: fulfilled by the United Nations Board of Auditors (BoA); and
- Internal audit: assigned to the Office of Audit and Investigations (OAI).

All externally available information on accountability of UNDP, including disclosure of audit reports can be found at: http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/accountability/overview.html

In accordance with Executive Board decision 2012/18 of June 2012, all audit reports issued by UNDP Office of Audit and Investigations (OAI) since 1 December 2012 are publicly disclosed on this website, one month after they have been issued internally.

V. Results Framework

Intended Outcome as stated in the Regional Programme Results and Resource Framework: Regional Programme Outcome 4: African men, women, and youth, supported by their local and national institutions as well as the African Union and Regional Economic Communities, achieve measurable progress towards sustainable peace. Strategic Plan Outcome 3: Resilience built to respond to systemic uncertainty and risk. Strategic Plan Signature solutions 2 on Governance and 2 on Resilience
Outcome indicators as stated in the Regional Programme Results and Resources Framework, including baseline and targets: Number of countries that have integrated conflict, peacebuilding, preventing and responding to violent extremism in their national strategies.
Applicable Output(s) from the UNDP Strategic Plan: 2.3 Responsive governance systems and local governance strengthened for socio economic opportunity, inclusive basic service delivery, community security, and peacebuilding 3.2 Capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding strengthened at regional, national, and sub-national levels and across borders 3.3 Risk informed and gender-responsive recovery solutions, including stabilisation efforts and mine action, implemented at regional, national, and sub-national levels
Project title and Atlas Project Number: Regional Stabilisation Facility for Lake Chad (Amendment and Extension)

Table 5. Results framework

Intended Outcome as stated in the Regional Programme Results and Resource Framework: Regional Programme Outcome 4: African men, women, and youth, supported by their local and national institutions as well as the African Union and Regional Economic Communities, achieve measurable progress towards sustainable peace. Strategic Plan Outcome 3: Resilience built to respond to systemic uncertainty and risk. Strategic Plan Signature solutions 2 on Governance and 2 on Resilience
Outcome indicators as stated in the Regional Programme Results and Resources Framework, including baseline and targets: Number of countries that have integrated conflict, peacebuilding, preventing and responding to violent extremism in their national strategies.
Applicable Output(s) from the UNDP Strategic Plan: 2.3 Responsive governance systems and local governance strengthened for socio economic opportunity, inclusive basic service delivery, community security, and peacebuilding 3.2 Capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding strengthened at regional, national and sub-national levels and across borders 3.3 Risk informed and gender-responsive recovery solutions, including stabilisation efforts and mine action, implemented at regional, national and sub-national levels
Project title and Atlas Project Number: Regional Stabilisation Facility for Lake Chad (Amendment and Extension)

Outcome	Outcome indicator	Data source	Baseline (RSF Phase 1)[56]	Target				Data collection methods
				2021 – 2nd S	2022	2023	2024 – 1st S	
#1 – "Immediate" stabilisation – Community stability and State presence increased in JAP locations	1.1 Percentage of the population in JAP locations who say there is safety and security (disaggregated by age, gender, and location)	Pulse check report	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	Proportion of population in JAP locations surveyed who report very safe or safe and very secure or secure
	1.2 Percentage of the population in JAP locations who say they have access to justice (disaggregated by age, gender, and location)	Pulse check report	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	Proportion of population in JAP locations surveyed who say they have access to justice (likert scale)
	1.3 Proportion of population expressing satisfaction with provision of and access to essential social services in JAP locations, e.g., health, education, and WASH (disaggregated by age, gender, and location) (Adapted RSS indicator)	Pulse check report	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	Proportion of the population in JAP locations that are very satisfied or satisfied
	1.4 Proportion of individuals participating in livelihoods strengthening interventions in the JAP locations who report improved livelihoods (disaggregated by age, gender, and location) (Adapted RSS indicator)	RSF reports	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	Proportion of participants in livelihood strengthening activities who report improved livelihood opportunities
#2 – "Extended" stabilisation – Local, national, and regional stabilisation structures oversee, coordinate, and implement stabilisation and recovery efforts	2.1 Extent to which the LCBC level of coordination of the RSS is good according to stabilisation actors (scale 0 – 3) (Adapted RSS indicator)	RSS Secretariat report	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	The indicator is measured on a scale from 0 to 3[57]
	2.2 Level of collaboration of cluster working groups of the Regional Taskforce on strategy implementation and accountability according to stabilisation actors (scale 1 to 5) (Adapted RSS indicator)	RSS Secretariat report	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	The indicator is measured on a scale from 0 to 5
	2.3 Proportion of population in JAP locations expressing satisfaction with the maintenance of the constructed and/or rehabilitated infrastructure (disaggregated by age, gender, and location)	Pulse check report	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	Proportion of the population in the JAP locations that are very satisfied or satisfied
	2.4 Percentage of the population in JAP locations who say they trust members of other communities	Pulse check report	TBDF	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	Proportion of the population in the JAP locations that say they trust members of other communities (likert scale)

[56] As of 31 July 2021

[57] The indicator is measured on a scale from 0 – 3: 0 – no capacity, 1 – limited capacity, 2 – average capacity, 3 – good capacity

**Calculated by accumulating the criteria: a) TAPs are standardized and interconnected; b) Joint communication products are agreed upon; c) RSS Steering Committee & International Support Group meet at least once annually.

Outputs	Output indicator	Data source	Baseline (RSF Phase 1)[58]	Target				Data collection methods
				2021 – 2nd S	2022	2023	2024 – 1st S	
1.1 - Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP locations	1.1.1 Stakeholder relationships and collaboration with security forces (military, law enforcement agencies, government recognized community security groups) at established and functional at community, district, governorate, state, and national levels	Pulse check report; Partner reports; RSF reports	21	27	40	48	48	Household survey FGD KII
	1.1.2 Number of security and justice infrastructures (Law enforcement agencies, Gendarmerie, Courts, etc.) constructed, rehabilitated, equipped, and staffed	Partner reports; Mission reports; Pulse check report; RSF reports	48	57	87	121	130	Engineering designs & BoQs
	1.1.3 Number of Community Stabilisation Committees or similar structures established and strengthened (Adaptation of RSS indicator: "…local infrastructures for peace established or strengthened')	Partner reports; Mission reports; RSF reports	21	21	40	55	59	Counting of number of Community Stabilisation Committees or similar structures established and strengthened
	1.1.4 Number of female representatives and presidents within Community Stabilisation Committees or similar structures	Partner reports; Mission reports; RSF reports	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	Counting of female representatives and presidents in Community Stabilisation Committees or similar structures
	1.1.5 Number of JAP locations with operational early warning systems	Partner Reports; Pulse check report; RSF Reports	21	27	40	48	48	Counting of number of JAP locations with operational early warning systems
	1.1.6 Percentage of security providers with knowledge of human rights and prevention of gender-based violence	Pulse check report; Training reports; RSF reports	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	Survey targeting security providers Pre- and Post-training evaluation
	1.1.7 Number of JAP locations in which local human rights defenders are reporting on human rights violations and issues surrounding civilian protection (Adapted RSS indicator)	Human Rights reports; Partner reports	21	27	38	48	48	Counting of partner reports
	1.1.8 Percentage of population in JAP locations at-risk of mines with improved understanding of mine risk	Pulse check report;	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	Survey Pre- and Pot-training evaluation

[58] As of 31 October 2021

		Partner reports; RSF reports						
1.2 - Essential social services infrastructure constructed and/or rehabilitated, functional, and accessible	1.2.1 Number of new, rehabilitated and equipped essential social service infrastructure projects (administrative, health, WASH, and education[59]) handed over to local authorities or communities[60] (Adapted RSS indicator)	Partner reports; Mission reports; Pulse check report; RSF reports	251	296	374	451	471	Engineering Designs and BoQs
	1.2.2 Number of bridges and km of roads rehabilitated	Partner reports; Mission reports; RSF reports	0	0	TBD (depending on new JAP locations)	TBD (depending on new JAP locations)	TBD (depending on new JAP locations)	Engineering designs and BoQ
	1.2.3 Number of permanent housing units constructed	Partners report; Mission reports; RSF reports	1000	1326	18932	3448	3973	Engineering Designs and BoQs
	1.2.4 Number of public facilities and infrastructure equipped with renewable technologies	Partner reports; Mission reports; RSF reports	51	63	122	186	196	Counting the number of Solar-powered energy infrastructures
1.3 - Targeted households provided with livelihood opportunities	1.3.1 Number of rehabilitated or constructed productive infrastructure projects (such as small business offices and market structures)	Partner reports; Mission reports; Pulse check report; RSF reports	68	105	153	202	220	Engineering designs & BoQs
	1.3.2 Number of people benefitting from cash for work as income generating opportunities in the JAP locations (disaggregated by gender and age)	Partner reports; Pulse check report; RSF reports	2355	4688	6088	8488	9388	KII
	1.3.3 Number of people benefiting from *short-term* and quick-fix training in JAP locations (gender and age disaggregated)	Partner reports; Pulse check report; RSF reports	4737	6997	11687	17437	20137	KII
	1.3.4 Number of people benefitting from provided productive or business grants or assets (disaggregated by gender and age)	Partner reports; Pulse check report; RSF reports	10516	12816	16016	20416	23316	KII
	2.1.1 Percentage of local structures involved in stabilisation with members with knowledge in promoting social cohesion	Pulse check report; Training reports;	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	

[59] Number of schools and classrooms; all waterpoints counted
[60] Two types of information will be provided : infrastructures handed over to local authorities or communities and 2) infrastructures certified by UNDP

2.1- Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilisation achievements and promote social cohesion		RSF reports						Survey targeting local structures involved in stabilisation, including Community Stabilisation Committees and local authorities Pre- and Post-training evaluation
	2.1.2 Number of officials of local authorities with knowledge in delivery of social services for all	Survey report; Training reports; RSF reports	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	Survey targeting local authorities Pre- and Post-training evaluation
	2.1.3 Number of local structures involved in stabilisation with members with knowledge of promoting gender equity	Pulse check report; Training reports; RSF reports	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	Survey targeting local structures involved in stabilisation, including Community Stabilisation Committees and local authorities Pre- and Post-training evaluation
	2.1.4 Number of local structures involved in stabilisation with members with knowledge of community-based participatory planning approaches	Pulse check report; Training reports; RSF reports	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	Survey targeting local structures involved in stabilisation, including Community Stabilisation Committees and local authorities Pre- and Post-training evaluation
	2.1.5 Number of information exchanges, coordination meetings, joint advocacy, and fundraising with UNDP, UN, and other development partners	RSF reports	3	5	16	28	31	Counting the number of exchanges, etc.
2.2- Improved cross-border coordination and cooperation	2.2.1 Number of surge capacity to national windows	Surge deployments reports	0	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	Counting the number of surge deployments
	2.2.2 Number of RSF knowledge products developed	RSF reports	0	11	34	56	68	Counting the number of knowledge products
	2.2.3 Number of RSF strategic communications products and programs developed	RSF report	0	28	84	140	168	Counting the number of communications products and programs
	2.2.4 Number of cross-border interventions included in the JAPs	RSF reports JAPs	2	2	6	10	10	Counting the number of cross-border interventions
	2.2.5 Number of JAP locations connected along trade routes	RSF reports JAPs	0	0	4	8	8	Counting the number of JAPs connected along trade routes

2.3 - LCBC capacity developed to steer and support RSS implementation and governance structures	2.3.1 Number of knowledge products finalized	Knowledge Products	5	5	7	9	10	Counting of publications
	2.3.2 Extent to which RSS research, monitoring, reporting, analysis, and advocacy, at the territorial and regional levels, are gender and youth-sensitive (RSS indicator)	RSS Reports	High level	High level	High level	High level	High level	Document review
	2.3.3 Existence of RSS Knowledge management Platform r (yes/no)	Knowledge Management Platform	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Verification of existence of knowledge Management Platform website
	2.3.4 Number of people accessing the knowledge management platform (disaggregated by location and gender)	Knowledge Management Platform	0	0	200	400	600	Knowledge Management Platform Tracking User Activity
	2.3.5 Existence of LCBC Institutional Capacity Building plan (yes/no)	LCBC Institutional Capacity Building Plan	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Verification of existence of capacity-Building Plan
	2.3.6 Number of capacity-building action plans and trainings for LCBC implemented	LCBC Institutional Capacity Building Plan	1	1	4	7	8	Action Plans Reports and Training certificates
	2.3.7 Number of non-kinetic CIMIC related joint initiatives between RSS Secretariat and MNJTF	RSS Secretariat – MNJTF joint initiatives	4	4	8	12	14	Publications / reports review
2.4 - Improved LCBC coordination and oversight of TAP implementation	2.4.1 Existence of report of Governors' Offices Capacity Assessment for TAPs implementation (yes/no)	Governors' Office Capacity Assessment	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Report review
	2.4.2 Number of trainings on coordination, information management, monitoring and reporting to Governors' Offices	Training Products	0	0	2	4	5	Trainings' Reporting
	2.4.3 Existence of monitoring and reporting tools and guidelines for TAPs implementation (yes/no; disaggregated by tool)	TAPs Monitoring and Reporting tools	RSS Results Framework: Yes RSS Reporting Guidelines: Yes RSS Reporting Templates: Yes	RSS Results Framework: Yes RSS Reporting Guidelines: Yes RSS Reporting Templates: Yes	RSS Results Framework: Yes RSS Reporting Guidelines: Yes RSS Reporting Templates: Yes	RSS Results Framework: Yes RSS Reporting Guidelines: Yes RSS Reporting Templates: Yes	RSS Results Framework: Yes RSS Reporting Guidelines: Yes RSS Reporting Templates: Yes	Verification of existence of Monitoring & Reporting tools and guidelines for TAPs implementation

	2.4.4 Existence of TAPs M&E frameworks per territory (yes/no)	TAPs M&E Frameworks	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Verification of TAPs M&E frameworks per territory
	2.4.5 Number of coordination and experience sharing meetings between Governors' Offices on TAPs implementation	Meetings of the Governors' Offices of the 8 affected territories	0	0	4	8	10	Meetings' records
	2.4.6 Number of coordination meetings between RSS implementing partners for TAPs implementation (disaggregated by territory)	Pillar Working Groups' meetings	0	0	4	8	10	Meetings' records
	2.4.7 Number of technical coordination meetings between RSS implementing partners and RSS Secretariat for TAPs implementation (disaggregated per territory)	Pillar Working Groups and RSS Secretariat meetings	0	1	5	9	11	Meetings' records
	2.4.8 Number of coordination meetings conveyed by Governors' Offices with RSS implementing partners (disaggregated by territory)	Pillar Working Groups	0	0	1	2	3	Meetings' records
	2.4.9 Number of joint-led initiatives between RSS implementing partners	Joint-led Initiatives	5	6	11	16	18	Reports review
	2.4.10 Number of joint-led initiatives between RSS implementing partners and the RSS Secretariat	Joint-led Initiatives	5	6	8	10	11	Publications/Reports review
	2.4.11 Number of cross-borders initiatives identified by the RSS Secretariat shared with RSS implementing partners (disaggregated per type)	Cross-border initiatives	5	6	9	12	13	Publications/Reports review
	2.4.12 Number of engagement meetings to promote and plan connection of areas along trade routes	Meetings	0	0	1	2	3	Meeting records
	2.4.13 Existence of document of next phase of the RSS August 2023 – August 2028 (yes/no)	LCBC-AUC Regional Stabilisation Strategy (RSS)	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Document review
	2.4.14 Yearly cross-border cooperation meetings organised (yes/no per year) (Governors' Forum/Steering Committee/ Interparliamentary Committee/ Private Sector Forum/ CSO Platform meetings etc.) (RSS indicator)	RSS cross-border cooperation mechanisms meetings	Governors' Forum: 2019: Yes 2020: No Interparliamentary Committee: 2019: No 2020: No Private Sector Forum: 2019: No 2020: No CSO Platform meetings:	Governors' Forum: Yes Interparliamentary Committee: No Private Sector Forum: No CSO Platform	Governors' Forum: Yes Interparliamentary Committee: Yes Private Sector Forum: Yes CSO Platform	Governors' Forum: Yes Interparliamentary Committee: Yes Private Sector Forum: Yes CSO Platform	Governors' Forum: Yes Interparliamentary Committee: Yes Private Sector Forum: Yes CSO Platform	Event report

			2019: Yes 2020: Yes	meetings : No	meetings : Yes	meetings : Yes	meetings : Yes	
	2.4.15 Proportion of participants of the RSS coordination mechanisms reporting that engagement with the strategy has strengthened their capacity to implement the RSS (disaggregated by gender and location) (RSS indicator)	RSS Coordination mechanisms	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	Surveys for members of the RSS coordination mechanisms
	2.4.16 Number of RSS Regional Task Force and the three RSS Thematic Clusters meetings (disaggregated per type)	RSS Regional Task Force; RSS Thematic Clusters	Regional Task Force: 2 Three Clusters: 2	Regional Task Force: 1 Three Clusters: 1	Regional Task Force: 3 Three Clusters: 3	Regional Task Force: 5 Three Clusters: 5	Regional Task Force:6 Three Clusters: 6	Meetings' record
	2.4.17 Number of RSS Civil Society Platforms established and operational (1 Regional, 4 National, 8 Territorial)	RSS Civil Society Platforms	12 (excl. regional)	12 (excl. regional)	13	13	13	RSS Civil Society Platforms
	2.4.18 Number of RSS CSO Platforms meetings (disaggregated per level)	RSS CSO Platforms meetings	Regional: 1 National: 8 Territorial: 2	Regional: 1 National: 8 Territorial: 2	Regional: 2 National: 10 Territorial: 6	Regional: 3 National: 12 Territorial: 10	Regional: 4 National: 13 Territorial: 12	Meetings' record
	2.4.19 Proportion of RSS CSO Platform participants reporting that the CSO platform and other RSS engagement mechanisms are effective and inclusive of a wide range of civil society actors, including both national and local level organizations (disaggregated by gender, age, and location) (RSS indicator)	RSS CSO Platforms meetings	TBD	Majority	Majority	Majority	Majority	Surveys
	2.4.20 Number of requested engagement meetings facilitated by the RSS Secretariat for interested RSS implementing partners and MNJTF	Meetings	0	1	2	3	4	Meetings' record

VI. Monitoring, Evaluation, Learning and Reporting

6.1 Monitoring

The amended project will have two types of monitoring:

- UNDP (or internal) monitoring, consisting of monitoring as part of the Country Office's assurance function and RSF National Window team monitoring. UNDP requires a shift from output and activity monitoring to outcome level monitoring; and
- Third party (external) monitoring (TPM). The contractor (or Third-Party Monitor) reports to the Technical Coordination Committee (TCC) and National Window decision-making body (Partner Platforms or Project Boards). TPM findings and required adaptations to programme management and implementation are discussed in the TCC and the National Windows' decision-making body[61].

Both types of monitoring will benefit from the improved conflict analysis system described in section 2.4.2 - Conflict Sensitivity and Doing No Harm.

As part of a quality monitoring system, UNDP Nigeria has set up a dashboard (for all JAP locations) that visualizes and provides access to primary data on the following components:

- RSF infrastructure activities monitored through high resolution satellite images;
- Community perception studies. The first round is completed, and subsequent rounds are planned to be rolled out every quarter to monitor RSF objectives (including feeling of safety and social contract); and
- Conflict trends in the region, including where attacks are taking place, number of fatalities, and type of attacks.

Together the three components provide an up-to-date assessment of situation on the ground and enable monitoring RSF´s progress.

In the amended and extended RSF phase, the other three countries will a) organise data collection and analysis in line with the requirements of the dashboard; and b) adopt the dashboard to ensure consistent reporting on progress between the four National Windows.

6.2 Evaluation

UNDP will commission an independent mid-term review of the RSF Regional and National Windows in the third quarter of 2022.

UNDP will commission an independent evaluation of the amended and extended RSF project in January 2024, 5 months before the ending of the amendment and extension phase.

National Window evaluations will take place as per the amended National Window project documents.

[61] The Third-Party Monitor can be UNDP or donor contracted if the independence of the TPM is guaranteed by ensuring a direct reporting line to the Technical Coordination Committee. UNDP has extensive experience with the set-up.

6.3 Reporting and communication with donors[62]

The RSF Regional and National Windows will report twice a year, as follows:

- National Windows: 31st July – First semester report.
  Regional Window: 31st August – First semester report.
- National Windows: The 31st of January in the following year – Annual report (combines the 2nd semester and annual report).
  Regional Window: End of February in the following year - Annual report (combines the 2nd semester and annual report).

The RSF Regional Window will not report on outputs 2.3 and 2.4, as this is the responsibility of the RSS Secretariat.

The RSS Secretariat will report on the first semester on the 31st of July and annually on the 31st of January in the following year.

The National Windows will produce a "Pulse check" in the last week of June and December.

The Regional and National Windows are encouraged to produce knowledge products.

The formats of the respective reports will be approved in the first regional project board following the approval of this amended and extended Project Document.

It is important to clarify the reporting relationship between the RSF and the RSS Secretariat, as follows:

- The RSF (like any other RSS partner) reports yearly to the LCBC RSS Secretariat on its contribution to the implementation to the RSS and ad-hoc, as requested by the RSS Secretariat; and
- The RSS Secretariat reports financially and substantively to the RSF in its capacity as an "implementing partner" of the RSF.

The Heads of the Regional and National Windows will organise a monthly (or, in coordination with the respective project boards, on an as-needed-basis) informal interaction with the Regional and National Window donors.

---

[62] Responds, among others, to MTR recommendation #15: "The RSF should build the in-house capacity of the RSF at the regional and country level for reporting, including hiring and training appropriate staff. The goal of all reporting should be to provide a clear picture of the reality as transparently as possible. Some suggestions include:

- Agree on a single reporting template and cycle across everyone involved in the RSF (donors, UNDP regional and country windows). [A single reporting template is facilitated by a results framework to be used by all National Windows, included at the end of section 3.2.4]
- Most interviewees recommended quarterly, six month, and annual reporting with flexibility for ad-hoc reporting only when necessary (major milestones, sudden changes, risks, incidents).
- Six month and annual reporting should focus on strategic outcomes and political dynamics. Activities and outputs can be placed in an Annex.
- Lighter touch Quarterly updates (1–3 pages) could consist of fact sheets showing any significant results of the RSF, incidents, concerns, plans, and other points of interview. Staff will still require adequate time to get inputs from the necessary stakeholders [Referred to as 'Pulse checks' in the amended project document].
- Consider the use of online dashboards and geospatial M&E technologies to breed further confidence and shrink the distance between donors (and potentially other stakeholders) with the work being delivered on the ground, preferably in real-time.

6.4 Learning

The 3-year RSF amendment and extension project will integrate a focus on conflict analysis (as a basis for conflict sensitive programming), consistent monitoring, evaluation, and knowledge management; three interconnected processes that will provide the data and analysis required to feed regular learning loops[63] and decision-making on stabilisation programming adaptation.

The learning loops will centre on the political and strategic level and will periodically question whether the RSF is a) heading towards the direction outlined in the Theory of Change and b) towards achieving the outcomes, as defined in the RSF results framework.

Activity level monitoring remains important but should not form part of the learning loops, as these should function a as space for brainstorming, political analysis, and outcome-level assessment. Where appropriate, donors could participate in the learning loops, which will support boosting UNDP accountability and transparency and donors trust in UNDP stabilisation programming.

[63] UNDP´s Crisis Bureau is leading a corporate adaptive management practice based on recent country-level experiences in Yemen, Guatemala, and Madagascar. Central to an adaptive management practice is the institutionalization of regular learning loops as the basis for evidence-based programmatic decision-making and programme or project adaptations. UNDP´s Regional Bureau for Africa has integrated adaptive management as a central programme management component in the upcoming Regional Programme and regional initiatives, such as the RSF.

VII. Multi-year work plan [64,65]

Table 6. Multi-year work plan

Outputs	Indicative activities	Budget per year in US$				Total budget in US$
		2nd semester 2021	2,022	2,023	1st semester 2024	
1.1 - Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP locations	1.1.1 Strengthen stakeholder relationships and collaboration with security forces (military, law enforcement agencies, government recognized community security groups) at community, district, governorate, state, and national levels)	204,179	725,968	952,833	385,671	**2,268,650**
	1.1.2 Advocate for an increased presence of security forces in JAP locations	204,179	725,968	952,833	385,671	**2,268,650**
	1.1.3 Construct, rehabilitate and equip security and justice infrastructure (Law enforcement agencies,Police, Gendarmerie, Courts etc.)	3,062,678	10,889,520	14,292,495	5,785,058	**34,029,750**
	1.1.4 Establish inclusive Community Stabilisation Committees (or similar structures)	306,268	1,088,952	1,429,250	578,506	**3,402,975**
	1.1.5 Strengthen community-level security mechanisms and support the establishment of early warning systems	510,446	1,814,920	2,382,083	964,176	**5,671,625**
	1.1.6 Develop security forces' capacity and understanding on human rights, including SGBV	408,357	1,451,936	1,905,666	771,341	**4,537,300**
	1.1.7 Monitor and report on human rights and civilian protection in JAP locations	408,357	1,451,936	1,905,666	771,341	**4,537,300**
	1.1.8 Where relevant, remove explosive ordnance and other remnants of war and provide mine risk education	204,179	725,968	952,833	385,671	**2,268,650**
	Sub-total for Output #1.1	5,308,641	18,875,168	24,773,658	10,027,433	**58,984,900**
1.2 - Essential social services infrastructure constructed	1.2.1 Construct, rehabilitate, and equip essential public services infrastructure and facilities (administrative, health, WASH, and education), including accommodation for staff	3,062,678	10,889,520	14,292,495	5,785,058	**34,029,750**

[64] Cost definitions and classifications for programme and development effectiveness costs to be charged to the project are defined in the Executive Board decision DP/2010/32

[65] Changes to a project budget affecting the scope (outputs), completion date, or total estimated project costs require a formal budget revision that must be signed by the project board. In other cases, the UNDP programme manager alone may sign the revision provided the other signatories have no objection. This procedure may be applied for example when the purpose of the revision is only to re-phase activities among years

and/or rehabilitated, functional, and accessible	1.2.2 Support basic skills training of local government officials	204,179	725,968	952,833	385,671	**2,268,650**
	1.2.3 Rehabilitate access roads and bridges	2,245,964	7,985,648	10,481,163	4,242,376	**24,955,150**
	1.2.4 Provide communities with permanent housing	204,179	725,968	952,833	385,671	**2,268,650**
	1.2.5 Based on the 'building-back-better' approach, adapt, or install facilities and infrastructure with renewable technologies (such as solar-powered street lighting)	204,179	725,968	952,833	385,671	**2,268,650**
	Sub-total for Output #1.2	**5,921,177**	**21,053,072**	**27,632,157**	**11,184,445**	**65,790,850**
1.3 - Targeted households provided with livelihood opportunities	1.3.1 Rehabilitate productive infrastructure (for example small business offices, market structures)	1,225,071	4,355,808	5,716,998	2,314,023	**13,611,900**
	1.3.2 Support immediate income earning opportunities for the vulnerable population (for example, female households) and at-risk female and male youth, such as cash for work (for waste management, such as garbage collection and street cleaning and infrastructure rehabilitation)	2,450,142	8,711,616	11,433,996	4,628,046	**27,223,800**
	1.3.3 Provide short-term or quick-fix training	612,536	2,177,904	2,858,499	1,157,012	**6,805,950**
	1.3.4 Provision of productive or business grants or assets, including agricultural inputs for farmers, fishing gears for fisherman, or medicine for cattle herders	2,003,985	7,125,280	9,351,930	3,785,305	**22,266,500**
	Sub-total for Output #1.3	**6,291,734**	**22,370,608**	**29,361,423**	**11,884,386**	**69,908,150**
2.1 - Stabilisation actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilisation achievements and promote social cohesion	2.1.1 Liaise with national and regional security forces for long-term security provision to communities in JAP locations	204,179	725,968	952,833	385,671	**2,268,650**
	2.1.2 Develop the capacity of Community Stabilisation Committees to function sustainably	408,357	1,451,936	1,905,666	771,341	**4,537,300**
	2.1.3 Support Community Stabilisation Committees in the design and oversee oversight of social cohesion activities	408,357	1,451,936	1,905,666	771,341	**4,537,300**
	2.1.4 Advocate for and further develop the capacity of local authorities and law enforcement officers to improve, maintain and provide access for all to essential service delivery and lead participatory decision-making processes	612,536	2,177,904	2,858,499	1,157,012	**6,805,950**
	2.1.5 Establish links and prepare to hand-over residual support to basic public and judicial service delivery to UNDP, UN and other development partners' basic services, rule of law, local governance, peacebuilding, livelihoods, and environment programmes	204,179	725,968	952,833	385,671	**2,268,650**
	2.1.6 Develop the capacity of local, national, and international human rights organisations in the Lake Chad area to function sustainably	408,357	1,451,936	1,905,666	771,341	**4,537,300**
	Sub-total for Output #2.1	**2,245,964**	**7,985,648**	**10,481,163**	**4,242,376**	**24,955,150**

2.2 - Improved cross-border coordination and cooperation	2.2.1 Provide surge capacity to national windows	100,000	250,000	250,000	100,000	**700,000**
	2.2.2 Ensure overall RSF coordination, timely reporting, monitoring, and representation of RSF in RSS-Regional Task Force	37,500	75,000	75,000	37,500	**225,000**
	2.2.3 Commission RSF wide research, organise RSF-internal workshops and strategic reviews, collect best practices and liaise with donor partners before dissemination	150,000	300,000	300,000	150,000	**900,000**
	2.2.4 Facilitated by the RSS Secretariat team, liaise and cooperate (including on behalf of the four national windows) with LCBC and MNJTF command on civil-military cooperation and shared priorities	10,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	**70,000**
	2.2.5 Fund strategic communication, including radio programming	150,000	300,000	300,000	150,000	**900,000**
	2.2.6 Where feasible, and as identified by the Governors´ Forum, promote UNDP cross-border activities in the JAPs along the prioritised trade routes	75,000	150,000	150,000	75,000	**450,000**
	Sub-total for Output #2.2	**522,500**	**1,095,000**	**1,095,000**	**532,500**	**3,245,000**
2.3 - LCBC capacity developed to steer and support RSS implementation and governance structures	2.3.1 Provide the interim staff for the N´Djamena-based RSS-Secretariat	699,775	2,099,326	2,099,326	1,399,551	**6,297,978**
	2.3.2 Commission relevant stabilisation research, policy development and other knowledge products with a view to promoting improved cross-border coordination and cooperation	10,000	35,000	45,000	15,000	**105,000**
	2.3.3 Set-up the Knowledge Management Platform and ensure LCBC-internal capacities for KMP management	200,000	245,000	200,000	167,000	**812,000**
	2.3.4 By July 2022, commission a comprehensive and independent LCBC capacity assessment		15,000	35,000		**50,000**
	2.3.5 Based on the capacity assessment, prepare a roadmap for the LCBC to fully integrate the RSS Secretariat (budget, contracts, etc.)					**-**
	2.3.6 Train and hand-over responsibilities to the LCBC contracted RSS Secretariat			30,000	20,116	**50,116**
	2.3.7 Further strengthen cooperation with the MNJTF through the CIMIC Cell	20,000		20,000	15,000	**55,000**
	Sub-total for Output #2.3	**929,775**	**2,394,326**	**2,429,326**	**1,616,667**	**7,370,094**
2.4 - Improved LCBC coordination and oversight of TAP implementation	2.4.1 Support coordination of TAP implementation	143,333	435,000	415,000	296,667	**1,290,000**
	2.4.2 Provide ongoing capacity development and other support to the TAP teams in the Governors' Offices	75,000	215,000	190,000	175,000	**655,000**
	2.4.3 Oversee monitoring and reporting on TAP implementation					**-**
	2.4.4 Ensure cross-fertilisation on TAP implementation good practices and lessons learned between Governors' Offices	13,558	20,000		20,000	**53,558**

	2.4.5 Provide RSS implementing partners support and guidance to link their interventions with the TAPs	20,000	40,000		50,000	110,000
	2.4.6 Manage, monitor, and report on the RSS results framework					-
	2.4.7 Promote joint initiatives for TAP implementation					-
	2.4.8 Consistently promote and plan to connect areas along the trade route where RSS implementing partners (including UNDP) are active		11,674	26,674		38,348
	2.4.9 Facilitate the formulation the next phase of the RSS August 2023 – August 2028			50,000	30,000	80,000
	2.4.10 Facilitate and promote regional dialogue and cross-border cooperation mechanisms (Governors' Forum, Regional Interparliamentary Committee, CSO Platform, Inter-Ministerial Meetings and Private Sector Investment Platform) and other standing or ad hoc initiatives promoting cross-border cooperation		350,000	320,000	130,000	800,000
	2.4.11 Ensure consistent inclusion of women and youth in RSS governance structures and reporting		20,000	25,000	25,000	70,000
	2.4.12 Where feasible, facilitate RSS implementing partners (including UNDP programmes such as the RSF) cross-border activities surrounding the prioritised trade routes		20,000	25,000		45,000
	2.4.13 Provide support and content to the organisation of decision-making mechanisms such as the RSS Steering Committee		30,000	14,000	35,000	79,000
	2.4.14 Engage with and support the RSS Regional Task Force and three RSS clusters		30,000	15,000		45,000
	2.4.15 Fully operationalise the RSS Civil Society Platform	45,000	54,000	100,000	40,000	239,000
	2.4.16 Ensure all RSS partners have access to the Knowledge Management Platform					
	2.4.17 Facilitate interaction between the MNJTF and RSS implementing partners in support of regional level civil-security force cooperation		60,000	70,000	35,000	165,000
	Sub-total for Output #2.4	**296,891**	**1,285,674**	**1,250,674**	**836,667**	**3,669,906**
Total for outputs		**21,516,681**	**75,059,496**	**97,023,401**	**40,324,472**	**233,924,050**
Mid-term review and Final evaluation			150,000		150,000	300,000
Total output and evaluations		**21,516,681**	**75,209,496**	**97,023,401**	**40,474,472**	**234,224,050**
UNDP staff		3,780,000	11,955,000	11,955,000	6,940,000	34,630,000
Travel		65,000	315,000	315,000	125,000	820,000

DSA	160,000	320,000	320,000	160,000	**960,000**
Security	200,000	400,000	400,000	200,000	**1,200,000**
Office rental & running costs	530,000	1,060,000	1,060,000	530,000	**3,180,000**
Office equipment	370,000	100,000	100,000	80,000	**650,000**
Vehicles, vehicle maintenance & running costs	250,000	500,000	500,000	250,000	**1,500,000**
Communications & Visibility	150,000	425,000	425,000	375,000	**1,375,000**
Project assurance	80,000	240,000	240,000	160,000	**720,000**
Monitoring & Evaluation	192,500	470,000	550,000	550,000	**1,762,500**
Capacity building and cross-border learning	165,000	290,000	290,000	165,000	**910,000**
Total UNDP Direct Costs (20% of total outputs and evaluations)	**5,942,500**	**16,075,000**	**16,155,000**	**9,535,000**	**47,707,500**
General Management support (8% of total outputs and evaluations)					**22,554,524**
Total Budget	**27,459,181**	**91,284,496**	**113,178,401**	**50,009,472**	**304,486,074**

VIII. Governance and management arrangements

8.1 Funding modalities

The Stabilisation Facility will operate as a basket fund with five 'windows' for contributions:

- Four national Windows - For partners wishing to contribute to Results Area 1; and
- A Regional Window - For partners wishing to contribute to Result area 2.

While permitted, earmarking is *not* encouraged both by UNDP and the current RSF donor partners.

National Windows have been established to allow and encourage Government cost-sharing from the affected countries.

8.2 Governance arrangements

8.2.1 RSF Technical Coordination Committee

See RTCC Terms of Reference in Annex 4.

The RSF Regional Technical Coordination Committee will decide at the beginning of each year on the RSF Regional and National Window allocations. The allocations for the National Windows are performance-based, i.e., allocations are not entitlements and can be re-allocated from low to high delivery National Windows.

8.2.2 Partner Platforms

The Partner Platforms, i.e., National Window Project Boards, are organised as stipulated in the National Window Project Documents.

IX. Legal context and risk management

9.1 Legal context standard clauses

This project forms part of an overall programmatic framework under which several separate associated country level activities will be implemented. When assistance and support services are provided from this Project to the associated country level activities, this document shall be the "Project Document" instrument referred to in: (i) the respective signed SBAAs for the specific countries; or (ii) in the Supplemental Provisions to the Project Document attached to the Project Document in cases where the recipient country has not signed an SBAA with UNDP, attached hereto and forming an integral part hereof. All references in the SBAA to "Executing Agency" shall be deemed to refer to "Implementing Partner".

This project will be implemented by UNDP ("Implementing Partner") in accordance with its financial regulations, rules, practices, and procedures.

X. Risk management standard clauses

UNDP as the Implementing Partner will comply with the policies, procedures, and practices of the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS.)

UNDP as the Implementing Partner will undertake all reasonable efforts to ensure that none of the [project funds] [UNDP funds received pursuant to the Project Document] are used to provide support to individuals or entities associated with terrorism and that the recipients of any amounts provided by UNDP hereunder do not appear on the list maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999). The list can be accessed via http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/aq_sanctions_list.shtml. This provision must be included in all sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered under this Project Document.

Social and environmental sustainability will be enhanced through application of the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards (http://www.undp.org/ses) and related Accountability Mechanism (http://www.undp.org/secu-srm).

UNDP as the Implementing Partner will: (a) conduct project and programme-related activities in a manner consistent with the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards, (b) implement any management or mitigation plan prepared for the project or programme to comply with such standards, and (c) engage in a constructive and timely manner to address any concerns and complaints raised through the Accountability Mechanism. UNDP will seek to ensure that communities and other project stakeholders are informed of and have access to the Accountability Mechanism.

In the implementation of the activities under this Project Document, UNDP as the Implementing Partner will handle any sexual exploitation and abuse ("SEA") and sexual harassment ("SH") allegations in accordance with its regulations, rules, policies, and procedures.

All signatories to the Project Document shall cooperate in good faith with any exercise to evaluate any programme or project-related commitments or compliance with the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards. This includes providing access to project sites, relevant personnel, information, and documentation.

UNDP as the Implementing Partner will ensure that the following obligations are binding on each responsible party, subcontractor, and sub-recipient:

a) Consistent with the Article III of the SBAA [or the Supplemental Provisions to the Project Document], the responsibility for the safety and security of each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient and its personnel and property, and of UNDP's property in such responsible party's, subcontractor's and sub-recipient's custody, rests with such responsible party, subcontractor, and sub-recipient. To this end, each responsible party, subcontractor, and sub-recipient shall:
   i) put in place an appropriate security plan and maintain the security plan, taking into account the security situation in the country where the project is being carried;
   ii) assume all risks and liabilities related to such responsible party's, subcontractor's and sub-recipient's security, and the full implementation of the security plan.

b) UNDP reserves the right to verify whether such a plan is in place, and to suggest modifications to the plan when necessary. Failure to maintain and implement an appropriate security plan as required hereunder shall be deemed a breach of the responsible party's, subcontractor's, and sub-recipient's obligations under this Project Document.

c) In the performance of the activities under this Project, UNDP as the Implementing Partner shall ensure, with respect to the activities of any of its responsible parties, sub-recipients and other entities engaged under the Project, either as contractors or subcontractors, their personnel and any individuals performing services for them, that those entities have in place adequate and proper procedures, processes, and policies to prevent and/or address SEA and SH.

d) Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will take appropriate steps to prevent misuse of funds, fraud, or corruption, by its officials, consultants, subcontractors, and sub-recipients in implementing the project or programme or using the UNDP funds. It will ensure that its financial management, anti-corruption, and anti-fraud policies are in place and enforced for all funding received from or through UNDP.

e) The requirements of the following documents, then in force at the time of signature of the Project Document, apply to each responsible party, subcontractor, and sub-recipient: (a) UNDP Policy on Fraud and other Corrupt Practices and (b) UNDP Office of Audit and Investigations Investigation Guidelines. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient agrees to the requirements of the above documents, which are an integral part of this Project Document and are available online at www.undp.org.

f) In the event that an investigation is required, UNDP will conduct investigations relating to any aspect of UNDP programmes and projects. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will provide its full cooperation, including making available personnel, relevant documentation, and granting access to its (and its consultants', subcontractors', and sub-recipients') premises, for such purposes at reasonable times and on reasonable conditions as may be required for the purpose of an investigation. Should there be a limitation in meeting this obligation, UNDP shall consult with it to find a solution.

g) Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will promptly inform UNDP as the Implementing Partner in case of any incidence of inappropriate use of funds, or credible allegation of fraud or corruption with due confidentiality.

   Where it becomes aware that a UNDP project or activity, in whole or in part, is the focus of investigation for alleged fraud/corruption, each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will inform the UNDP Resident Representative/Head of Office, who will promptly inform UNDP's Office of Audit and Investigations (OAI). It will provide regular updates to the head of UNDP in the country and OAI of the status of, and actions relating to, such investigation.

h) UNDP will be entitled to a refund from the responsible party, subcontractor, or sub-recipient of any funds provided that have been used inappropriately, including through fraud or corruption, or otherwise paid other than in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Project Document. Such amount may be deducted by UNDP from any payment due to the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient under this or any other agreement.

   Where such funds have not been refunded to UNDP, the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient agrees that donors to UNDP (including the Government) whose funding is the source, in whole or in part, of the funds for the activities under this Project Document, may seek recourse to such responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient for the recovery of any funds determined by UNDP to have been used inappropriately, including through fraud or corruption, or otherwise paid other than in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Project Document.

Note: The term "Project Document" as used in this clause shall be deemed to include any relevant subsidiary agreement further to the Project Document, including those with responsible parties, subcontractors, and sub-recipients.

i) Each contract issued by the responsible party, subcontractor, or sub-recipient in connection with this Project Document shall include a provision representing that no fees, gratuities, rebates, gifts, commissions, or other payments, other than those shown in the proposal, have been given, received, or promised in connection with the selection process or in contract execution, and that the recipient of funds from it shall cooperate with any and all investigations and post-payment audits.

j) Should UNDP refer to the relevant national authorities for appropriate legal action any alleged wrongdoing relating to the project or programme, the Government will ensure that the relevant national authorities shall actively investigate the same and take appropriate legal action against all individuals found to have participated in the wrongdoing, recover, and return any recovered funds to UNDP.

k) Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient shall ensure that all of its obligations set forth under this section entitled "Risk Management" are passed on to its subcontractors and sub-recipients and that all the clauses under this section entitled "Risk Management Standard Clauses" are adequately reflected, mutatis mutandis, in all its sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into further to this Project Document.

XI. Annexes

Annex 1 - Project Quality Assurance Report

Updated report to be included after UNDP Project Appraisal Committee.

Annex 2 - Social and Environmental Screening Template

Updated template to be included after UNDP Project Appraisal Committee.

Annex 3 – Risk analysis

Use the standard Risk Log template. Please refer to the Deliverable Description of the Risk Log for instructions

Annex 4 – Terms of Reference Regional Technical Coordination Committee

1. Background

Over the last decade, the four countries around Lake Chad Basin; Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, have experienced unprecedented levels of crises, exacerbated by repeated incidences of violence from the Boko Haram terrorist group. In response to the crisis, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2015 authorized the reorganization and operationalization of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram.

Despite the significant progress made by the MNJTF, there is a consensus that overall success of the collective effort will be contingent upon coherent acceleration and completion of the second phase of the mandate, which is to "facilitate the implementation of overall stabilisation programme by the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) Member States and Benin in the affected areas, including the full restoration of state authority and facilitating the safe and voluntary return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and resettlement of refugees in accordance with international laws and standards".

To achieve this, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) in partnership with African Union (AU) Commission with support from UNDP developed the Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery & Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin (RSS). The 5- year Strategy was adopted by the LCBC Council of Ministers on 30 August 2018 and endorsed by the AU PSC on 5 December 2018. The RSS provides a comprehensive, integrated, and multi- level framework for overall stabilisation through nine inter-related pillars, which include military support to the MNJTF, provision of humanitarian assistance and key interventions to secure early recovery and long-term resilience.

The Strategy recognizes the nexus between security, humanitarian and development issues in the Lake Chad Basin and calls for a "New Way of Working" that recognises that critical role of different stakeholders and the imperative for coordination amongst stakeholders at the local, national, and regional level including international partners, civil society actors and the private sector. To operationalize and manage the RSS, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) has established a Steering Committee to serve as the overall strategic, political, policy, programme, and decision-making mechanism, ensuring that the RSS is achieving its overall strategic objectives and delivers results as intended.

In support of the RSS implementation, UNDP has developed the Regional Stabilisation Facility (RSF) for the Lake Chad conflict-affected area. The RSF has two components: immediate stabilisation covering interventions under Outputs 1, 2, and 3, and extended stabilisation as per Outputs 4, 5, 6 and 7. The RSF is set up with four national windows, one window for each of the countries affected by the crisis: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. The four national windows cover stabilisation activities under the immediate stabilisation component and Output 4 of extended stabilisation. The RSF further has a regional window for interventions under the extended stabilisation component (Outputs 5 – 7).

For effective management of the RSF, a coordinated approach to results-based management and reporting, a regional technical coordination committee has been proposed as governance mechanism.

2. RSF Regional Technical Coordination Committee– the scope of work

The Regional Technical Coordination Committee´s (RTCC) main objectives are to ensure a coherent overarching regional programmatic framework built on consolidated national window workplans.

Specifically:

- Review and approve the regional annual workplan and provide overall guidance and direction to the regional window.
- Integrate national window annual workplans into a regional workplan.
- Review overall progress of national windows with regional lenses and recommend programmatic perspectives from a regional context.
- Receive and review regular reports from the national and regional windows and approve consolidated results-based reports and propose actions for subsequent period regional workplan.
- Examine integration into the regional window of recommendations from regional mechanisms supported under the RSS, such as the: Governors´ forum, CSO, Private Sector and regional MPs forums into sound regional interventions.

- Examine and approve monitoring reports from regional window M&E interventions and from joint regional/national window monitoring interventions.
- Examine financial performance information of the collated national windows and, regional window and recommend actions for any adjustment including as may be appropriate to ensure effective implementation of the regional window interventions.

Generation/review of research, strategic content, regional perspectives and advising on integration within regional and national window interventions. Specifically:

- Share lessons from the RSF operationalization of national windows and the regional window.
- Propose and review regional research / studies / surveys / reports and other relevant content and advising on their application/integration within regional and national window workplans.
- Propose and review regional risk assessments and advise national windows on their management. Further, assess the regional window mitigation measures for risks identified at all levels of RSF implementation.
- Conduct regional evaluation.

Identification of specific elements for resource mobilization for the implementation of the RSF. Specifically:

- Review and approval of gaps analysis content (RSF cumulative financial performance) for resource mobilization.
- Review of communication and strategic outreach content for resource mobilization.

3. RSF – RTCC composition and membership

The RTCC will meet every 6 months but may convene more regularly as deemed necessary. It shall be possible to participate in meetings via video-link. Ad hoc meetings of the RTCC may be called to address specific issues and will be convened by the co-chairs in consultation with the members.

The RTCC will be co-chaired by the LCBC and UNDP RSCA. Membership of the RTCC will include the following:

- A representative of LCBC
- A representative of the AU
- A representative of UNDP-RSCA
- A representative from each donor
- The Resident Representatives of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria

4. Quorum and Decision-making

Quorum - A minimum number of 7 (seven) members are required for decision-making purposes. The quorum must include a minimum number of 1 (one) member from the LCBC; 1 (one) member from the four UNDP country teams each; and 2 (two) members from donors funding RSF work.

Decision-making Process - The decisions of the Regional Technical Coordination Committee will be made based on the consensus among the members. However, a course of action or recommendation should be consistent with UNDP's policies and procedures.

5. Reporting and Delegation of Authority

The RSF Regional Technical Coordination Committee may delegate a Sub-Committee to carry out specific tasks and advise the RSF Regional Technical Coordination Committee through a report.

6. Secretariat of the RSF Regional Technical Coordination Committee

The Regional Stabilisation Facility Unit in Dakar shall serve as the Secretariat for the RSF-TCC and provide technical, operational, and administrative support to the RSF-RTCC, and maintain all records of meetings.

Guidance and overall coordination of the RSF-TCC shall be provided by the RBA's Regional Programme based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Annex 6 – Terms of Reference for the CSO Platforms[66]

1. Context and Justification

Over the last decade, the four riparian countries of Lake Chad (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria), have been experiencing various challenges, exacerbated by repeated incidences of violence from the Boko Haram terrorist group. In response to the crisis, the four affected countries and Benin Republic, in 2015, resolved to contribute troops, with the support of the African Union Commission (AUC), for the reorganization and operationalization of the Multi-national Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram. Despite the significant progress made by the MNJTF, there is a consensus by all concerned stakeholders that overall success of the collective effort will be contingent upon the implementation of overall stabilisation programme by the affected countries.

To achieve this, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) in partnership with the AUC and support from UNDP, developed a Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery & Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin (RSS). The Strategy was adopted by the LCBC Council of Ministers on 30 August 2018 and endorsed by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) on 5 December 2018. The RSS provides a comprehensive, integrated, and multi-level framework for overall stabilisation through nine inter-related pillars which include military support to the MNJTF, provision of humanitarian assistance and key interventions to secure early recovery and long-term resilience.

The RSS embeds the nexus between security, humanitarian and development issues in the Lake Chad Basin and calls for a "New Way of Working" that recognises the critical role of different stakeholders and the imperative for coordination amongst stakeholders at the local, national, regional as well as continental level including international partners, civil society actors and the private sector.

To ensure local ownership of the process, the RSS programming is designed and implemented at the local level with national and regional oversight through the Territorial Action Plans (TAPs). TAPs are anchored on a "Whole of Society Approach" emphasizing the critical need of all stakeholders in the implementation of the RSS. The Strategy further recognizes that for effective and mi local and national ownership of the process and for legitimacy, the involvement and role of the CSO cannot be ignored. According to the Strategy NGOs and CBOs have a particularly significant role to play in the definition and implementation of Territorial Action Plans and in the deradicalization effort at the local levels. Effective NGOs and CBOs that have local credibility can build support, community resilience and work with local actors in different aspect of the Strategy including but not limited to deradicalization. The strategy also noted that CSO can act as advocacy agents and play crucial role in proffering solutions for local challenges given their proximity and attachment to community of operations as well as articulate issues for regional consideration at both programme and policy levels. Therefore, the RSS envisages CSO platform that operates across the three

[66] The CSO platform is funded by the RSF and managed and supported by the RSS Secretariat.

tiers of the Strategy at the local, national, and regional levels that can help to contribute to the broader coordination, efficacy, and relevance of stabilisation efforts.

Considering the role of the CSOs in the RSS implementation, the Strategy also envisaged that CSOs representation and participation will cut across territorial level, national and regional level at both technical and strategic level to ensure linkage between CS engagement at the technical level (at the technical committee and working groups) as well as a voice at the Strategic Political level at the Steering Committee.

2. LCBC CSO Platforms

The LCBC RSS Civil Society Platforms are established at territorial, national, and regional level to support the implementation of the Strategy across board. Overall, there will be eight territorial platforms, four national platforms and one regional platform as follows.

3. Roles and Responsibilities

The CSO platform aims to articulate the civil society role in the implementation of the RSS Strategy. The mains roles of the platform can be highlighted as:

- Represent CSO groups in Platform meetings at each level as appropriate.
- Coordinate CSO engagement with the RSS at all levels (territorial, national, and regional).
- Encourage the participation and membership of new and qualified civil society organizations in the platform.
- Sensitize members and participate in TAP implementation, monitoring and reporting.
- Encourage members participation and membership of the RSS Pillar Working Groups in each territory.
- Build synergies and coordination amongst other partners in RSS implementation in the region.
- Support data collection on RSS implementation and contribute to annual report.
- Represent CSOs in meetings, for a and other gatherings such as conferences and workshops.
- Contribute data to CSO information management system and participate in community of practice dialogues.
- Organize and coordinate platform meetings at the territorial, national, and regional levels as appropriate.
- Update the CSO action plan at territory level and plan activities according.
- Support the localization approach at a territory level.
- Represent and participate in RSS Task force and Pillar Cluster meetings (regional platform)
- Represent CSOs in territorial, national, and regional Steering Committee Meetings if nominated as CSO representative at the Steering Committee for each level.

4. Composition of CSO Platforms

The composition of the LCBC CSO platform will vary from territorial, national to regional level to ensure representation, participation, and inclusion of the various segments of the CSO in the region. Overall, the platform will be made up of civil society organizations engaged in the implementation of stabilisation, recovery and resilience programmes and interventions across the region who are interested in working together to contribute to the 9 Pillars and 40 Strategic Objectives of the RSS. For clarification scopes, CSOs in this context will mean national NGOs, community Based organisations, faith-bases groups, traditional institutions, international NGOs, research think tanks, women association (group) and youth association (group).

In addition, non-members - including donors, multilateral institutions, private sector- may attend the Platforms meetings by invitation. The Platform will report to the LCBC Secretariat (RSS) and feed into discussions of the Governors' Forum. The Platform will provide input into the RSS Regional Taskforce that has been established by the LCBC. In addition, and through the CSO Platform chair (LCBC), appropriate coordination with Regional and Country Level Coordination platforms will be ensured.

Territorial level - The CSO platform is composed of all CSO members working on RSS Pillars and Strategic Objectives in the territory.

National level - The Platform is composed of all CSO members from the affected territories. For equal representation and participation, each territory will be represented as the national platform by 10 CSO platform members from each territory respective gender balance of fives males and females.

Regional level - The CSO platform is composed of all CSOs working in all eight affected territories. In line with the geographical scope of the RSS, the regional platform will be composed of sixteen CSO platform members representing two members from each of the affected territory – Cameroon (4), Chad (4), Niger (2) and Nigeria (6). Each territory is to nominate one male and one female to serve in the regional CSO platform.

5. Criteria and Eligibility for members of the Platform

The membership criteria for the CSO platform at territorial, national, and regional levels are as follows:

- Presence in the region or one of the affected territories
- Be involved in and/or implementing stabilisation, recovery, and resilience intervention in one or
- more of the affected territories.
- Being interested in working collaboratively towards the implementation of the different RSS pillars of the RSS.

6. Representation at the RSS Steering Committee

The RSS Steering Committee provides general oversight over the RSS activities and interventions and provides advice on overall strategic, political, policy and programme priorities. The Steering Committee also serve as the platform for strategic reviews, decisions making and direction for the RSS and serve as mechanism for joint mobilization of international support in a coordinated and synergized manner including ensuring the coordination, harmonization, monitoring, review, and evaluation of national and international support for the implementation of the strategy. Each National CSO Platform will nominate member to serve in the RSS Steering Committee on rotational basis. The nomination must come from one of the representatives at the Regional Platform.

7. Leadership/Chair of the Platforms

For proper coordination of the platform's activities, CSO platforms at the territorial and national level shall decides leadership (Chair and Co-Chair) while respecting gender balance. The tenure for the Chair and Co-Chair shall be for two (2) years to ensure consideration and sustainable leadership.

Regional CSO platform - The Regional CSO platform member is composed of those nominated by each territory. The regional platform will nominate a two co-chaired from the sixteen (16) regional members. The LCBC RSS Secretariat will serve as convener of the meeting in close coordination with the Co-chairs and the respective regional platform members.

- Good experience in coordinating national or regional CSO platform/network.
- CSO with good coverage in two or more countries of the Lake Chad Basin.

- Good experience in CSO coordination activities.

The Regional CSO platform chairs have a mandate of two years eligible once, this will be discussed with the regional CSO platform members.

The Chair/Co-Chair Agency responsibilities include:

- Coordinate the accomplishment of the Platform objectives and tasks and encouraging active
- participation from all members.
- Curate the CSO Platform Workplan and amending, as necessary.
- Support RSS M&E plan, as necessary.
- In collaboration with the Secretariat, support the organisation of workshops, events as per workplan activities.
- Foster linkages with other coordination platform in and outside of the RSS Framework, to ensure synergies and avoid duplications.
- Address blockages and troubleshoot solutions.
- Prepare agendas and minutes, membership mailing list.
- Maintain communication and share information on a rolling basis with the RSS Regional Taskforce and the Head of the LCBC RSS Secretariat through the CSO Advisor

8. Frequency and Coordination of Platform Meetings

The frequency of the CSO platform meetings is:

- Regional CSO platform: two meeting in a year, led by the regional chair.
- National CSO platform (BAY'CSO platform for Nigeria): four meeting in year (quarterly) lead by
- the national chair.
- Territorial CSO platform: Meeting two month each, led by the territorial chair.

Responsibilities of CSO platform chair:

- Coordinate the CSO platform and encouraging active participation from all members.
- Curate the CSO Platform Workplan and amending, as necessary.
- Develop and Curate an M&E plan and amend, as necessary.
- Organize ad hoc workshops, events as per workplan activities.
- Provide mentorship (training, workshops) on as per CSO Capacity Development and Engagement framework.
- Foster linkages with other coordination platform in an outside the RSS Framework, to ensure synergies and avoid duplications.
- Identify challenges and suggest solutions.
- Prepare agendas and minutes, membership mailing list.
- Maintain communication and share information on a rolling basis with the RSS Regional Taskforce and the Head of the LCBC RSS Secretariat.

Decision-Making - Decision making in meetings is based on consensus. Agreement on accuracy of minutes, wording of documents etc. will be on a 'no objections' basis, with every effort made to ensure members have adequate time to respond.

Resources - The CSO Platform will be facilitated by contributions of the LCBC Secretariat and the RSF. The meetings will be conducted in the LCBC offices in N'djamena, Chad with VTC connections. At the country level CSO Platform meetings will be coordinated by a CSO nominated to lead coordination at country level. The RSS Secretariat will also participate in the meeting on need basis.

Monitoring implementation - The Country level CSO coordinators are responsible for monitoring the implementation of the platforms' Objectives and Tasks and report to the Secretariat on any emerging issues.

Annex 7 – RSF Communication Strategy

UNDP will share for discussion and endorsement of the first Regional TCC after the endorsement of the amended and extended Prodoc.

Annex 8 - Community Stabilisation Committees – Guidance Notes

Due to the size of the document (50+ pages), the Annex is shared separately.

Annex 9 - Support to LCBC Knowledge Management

The RSS Knowledge Management Platform (KMP) is envisaged as a key tool of the LCBC - AU Regional Stabilisation Strategy. At the heart of the new way of working must be an increased availability and sharing of information, improved understanding, networking, and coordination across and between actors, sectors, and countries. In a vast region in emergency, with poor transport links, borders and language barriers, the new way of working must be forged on-line, at a meeting place to which all have access.

The RSS KMP will be linked with the existing LCBC Information Management Systems (IMS). One of the objectives of the upcoming World Bank PROLAC project is to promote knowledge sharing and regional dialogue with a data platform. The latter, when implementation starts, could also be linked to the LCBC IMS by the WB.

To avoid inefficiencies, the LCBC Executive Secretary has instructed the RSS Secretariat to ensure that the RSF funded RSS KMP is fully integrated into the LCBC IMS and has encouraged to World Bank to coordinate the integration with the RSS Secretariat to avoid duplication.[67]

The KMP is envisaged as a high-quality web-based resource for policy makers, practitioners, and civil society. The KMP will serve the following purposes:

- The go-to source for news and information on all aspects of the stabilisation, recovery, and development effort around Lake Chad.
- A space for networking and interaction of the practice community.
- A dynamic tool for improved coordination and crisis response.
- A repository for policy documents, strategies and action plans, assessment reports, lessons learnt and good practices, both regional and global.

If the KMP is to retain user interest, and to function as the "*go to*" source for news and information on stabilisation in the region, it must be established as a dynamic resource with regular new content, more akin to a daily newspaper than a 'static' website. The Knowledge Management Platform will be available in

[67] The need for coordination was also highlighted by the MTR: "…both UNDP and the WB are seconding staff / consultants to the LCBC to develop knowledge management systems (KMS) for the LCBC. Based on interviews, the proposed KMS are not yet aligned; and as a result, the LCBC could end up with two different systems with no internal capacity to manage either of them.

both English and French language editions. Key content will be translated as required to ensure consistency (e.g., news and events, coordination matrix). Other content will be language-specific (e.g., user discussion forums). Moderators and community managers, as well as members of the community will receive specific training.

"Crowd-sourcing" of content is at the heart of the KMP concept. Rather than attempting to generate and publish the amount of new content required, the KMP model is to establish a core team to collate inputs from UNDP staff in the region and to solicit content from other UN Agencies, implementing partners, academic institutions, and other civil society actors.

The KMP will make use of user-friendly software to ensure that the means to upload content is technically straightforward and accessible to all. Uploading of content, and participation in user discussion forums, will be limited to registered users. User registration will require verification of identity to ensure security and mitigate against posting of malicious or offensive content. All content for upload will be subject to moderation by KMP staff to ensure alignment with community standards and values.

Structure, Content & Sources of Information

Observatory - The KMP act as a "*one-stop*" portal for open-source news reports and statistical data available regarding the activity of Non-State Armed Groups around Lake Chad, as well as trends in regard to security and stabilisation, humanitarian access etc, via a home page introducing LCBC and the Regional Stabilisation Strategy. The portal will also include dynamic maps developed by UNOSAT.

The Observatory will collate and re-post open-source information and data, on a thematic and territorial basis, with an archive system for retrieval. The Observatory will be established in partnership with a regional academic institution to be selected upon the basis of competitive call for proposals. Communications staff of the UNDP Stabilisation Facility will monitor and collate links to print and electronic media reports for inclusion.

Practice Community - The Practice pages of the KMP will be used to inform, network, and engage a community of stabilisation practitioners and stakeholders around Lake Chad through the provision of news about LCBC activity regarding the Regional Stabilisation Strategy. It will maintain a diary of upcoming conferences and events and publish proceedings and conclusions, facilitating event organisers to upload key documentation to enhance their own visibility.

Practice pages will also include links to live meetings, interactions, pear-learning, and lessons learned exchanges (to be organized through webinars or zoom meetings).

Regular features and opinion pieces on stabilisation work will be solicited from registered KMP users for publication on a moderated blog discussion forum.

LCBC will launch an online effort of the International Task Force for Lake Chad to establish an overarching Monitoring and Evaluation framework to measure progress in implementation and achievement of the nine pillars of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy. The implementation of the Monitoring and Evaluation framework will be supported by UNITAR.

Coordination Tool - The KMP will establish an overarching regional coordination matrix and database of past, present, and planned interventions undertaken within the framework of the twelve pillars of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy. The KMP will also provide a transparent aid-tracking tool to document donor commitments in response to the Oslo II High-Level Conference held in Berlin in September 2018, at which the RSS was formally launched.

Initial mapping has been undertaken as part of the TAPs process in each of the eight RSS regions and collated online by the KMP team. UNDP Stabilisation Facility staff responsible for coordination work in each region will review and update with State authorities on an ongoing basis.

Registered users will have the right to upload or edit entries, categorising against pillars and across pillars and regions, and will be able to add project descriptions and hyper-links to key documents or their own websites. All entries/links will be subject to KMP verification and moderation.

Resource Base - The KMP will act as a repository of information regarding methodologies for undertaking stabilisation work in the region, including all relevant policy documents, research and assessments, GIS mappings and analysis, action plans and reports, and will seek to capture lessons learned globally.

The Resource Base will also support the development and dissemination of good practice. as well as should be both documented and transparent. Registered users will be able to upload and share their own practice notes and toolkits, programme evaluations and lessons learned globally as well as around Lake Chad.

Implementation Arrangements

The Knowledge Management Platform will be developed by UNDP and UNITAR on behalf of LCBC, in support of implementation of the LCBC-AU Regional Stabilisation Strategy for Lake Chad. The KMP will build the presence and visibility of LCBC, expressing its ownership of the Regional Strategy and its convening authority in galvanising and coordinating its implementation as a framework for action.

The Knowledge Management Platform will be structured as a joint UN Agency Programme of UNDP and the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). UNDP provides a Secretariat to LCBC implementation of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy and seeks to perform its system role as 'integrator' in support the *New Way of Working* identified by the Strategy as essential to successful implementation and impact. UNITAR provides training and learning services to national and local government of UN member states and civil society representatives from around the world. UNITAR will co-design and then implement the content sourcing strategy of the project.

Subject to approval of this Concept Note by the Steering Committee of the LCBC regional Stabilisation Strategy, UNDP/UNITAR will prepare a detailed project document, with accompanying detailed Terms of Reference and content sourcing strategy for the KMP.

Management & Staffing

The Head of the RSS Secretariat will act as Editor-in-Chief of the Knowledge Management Platform, with ultimate responsibility for project implementation on behalf of the Steering Committee for the LCBC-AU Regional Stabilisation Strategy.

An Executive Editing Committee - employing bilingual international UNVs working under UNITAR supervision - will be set up, with responsibility for the development and implementation of the content sourcing strategy, practice community animation and moderation. IT maintenance support and troubleshooting will also be provided by specialized personnel, working under the guidance of UNITAR.

A second international UNV, embedded in the UNDP support team to LCBC, will maintain the coordination matrix and database, and aid-tracking tool. In addition, s/he will liaise with UNDP communications and coordination staff of the UNDP Stabilisation Facility in each country, as well as support local procurement processes and partnerships.

Monitoring & Evaluation

The Lake Chad Regional Stabilisation Strategy is the first of its type in sub-Saharan Africa and all aspects of its implementation must both learn from experience elsewhere and be itself characterised by a transparent, inclusive approach, open to evaluation and potential replication.

Implementation of the Knowledge Management Platform will be subject to an ongoing internal monitoring regime intended to assess its impact and to inform its further development.

M&E tools will include Google analytics to measure number and location of users, pages visited; regular surveys of registered users, per type; online feedback questionnaires embedded in each KMP section.

The project will be subject to an external evaluation (as part of the overall RSF evaluation) to be undertaken in January 2024.

Outline Budget, Two Years Project Duration

Activity	Cost	Timeline
Project formulation, including preparation of KMP Terms of Reference	$20,000	Last Quarter 2019
Request for proposals for technical design, development & ongoing KMP maintenance & trouble shooting	$175,000	1st Quarter 2020
KMP development, launch and web hosting fees	$25,000	2nd Quarter 2020
Observatory content partnership agreement with local academic institution	$14,000	2nd Quarter 2020
Coordination Matrix & Database (International UNV, UNDP, two years)	$130,000	From 2nd Quarter 2020
Practice Community animation and moderation; KMP Resource Base (International UNV, UNITAR, two years)	$130,000	From 2nd Quarter 2020
Office equipment and maintenance, other direct costs	$60,000	From 2nd Quarter 2020
External Evaluation	$20,000	Third Quarter 2021
Subtotal Project Cost	$680,000	
UNDP/UNITAR GMS @ 8%	$54,400	
Total cost	**$734,400**	